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
OUR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

*A STUDY IN NATIONAL INTEREST
AND THE NEW DIPLOMACY.*

BY

PAUL SCOTT MOWRER

AUTHOR OF "BALKANIZED EUROPE"



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To

My Father

FROM WHOM I HAVE LEARNED TO
VIEW MEN AND EVENTS RATHER AS
THEY SEEM REALLY TO BE, THAN AS
I MIGHT PREFER OR FANCY THEM
TO BE, THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED

PREFACE

THE weakness of this book, as well as whatever of strength the reader may courteously find it to possess, resides in the fact that its aim is not ultimate but immediate, not theoretical but practical. I am not here concerned with the fascinating questions, whether or not the economic, political and moral bases of contemporary society are fundamentally sound, or whether an intensive civilization, like that of ancient Greece, is not essentially superior to our own extensive organization. I assume that the peoples of the world are going to continue, for a time, at least, along the lines they have lately been following. I take it for granted that men, in ninety-nine out of a hundred instances, will reject the radical, the courageous, the ideal solution to follow the old, worn path of least resistance; that of two efforts, they will, in almost every case, choose the less strenuous. In short, by practical politics, in the sense here accorded the term, I understand the continual compromise of principles with existing facts; the continual search for the possibilities, not of the distant future, but of to-day, believing, as I do, that a small and cautious step which can actually be taken at once, is worth more in the march of human progress than a whole program of steps, which may or may not be nobler and loftier in conception, but which cannot be executed within any reasonable length of foresight.

Nevertheless, I trust that the reader will become

aware, in the course of perusal, that the author of these pages, without at all setting himself up as a reformer, is yet not without certain definite ideals, looking toward what he, the author, imagines to be the betterment, not only of American foreign policy, but of international relations in general. I have a profound sentimental affection for this intractable mankind of ours; yet in conscience I must add, with Helvetius, the observation that "if one would love humanity, one must expect little of it." In the history of international relations, two great names stand out, which have often been opposed, the one to the other: Machiavelli and Grotius. In these two names have been symbolized, on the one hand, selfishness, competition, force, cunning, and on the other, generosity, co-operation, candor, law. Yet why oppose them? The much-maligned Florentine looked honestly and keenly about him, and described without hypocrisy the means and the ways he saw in vogue; he was a realist, a scientist. The "father of international law," on the contrary, observed in the life about him not so much a thing in itself, to be described as such, as a wrong to be righted, a chaos in need of ordering; he was an idealist, a reformer. I conceive that both these types of mind are necessary. Without the Machiavelli in us we become filled with illusions about ourselves; we are soon lost in clouds and vaporings; because no longer able to see the earth at our feet, we stumble. But without the Grotius in us our instinct to advance goes haltingly and short of sight, for we no longer perceive either path or goal.

Having said so much, I need scarcely emphasize that such concrete suggestions as are here proffered

have at least the merit of moderation, and tend always toward the mean rather than toward extremes. Moreover, they are general rather than specific suggestions, and the treatment is broad rather than detailed. The reason for this is not that it is difficult to say specifically what, for example, should be American policy in such concrete problems as those of reparations, allied debts, or the capitulations in Turkey, but that it is impractical. For in the first place, so unceasing is the flow of occurrences that, doubtless, before these lines could be published, the situation would have changed; and in the second place, this book is intended primarily for the general reader, and while I am convinced that every intelligent citizen should have a general notion as to what should be his country's foreign policy, I do not consider it wise or expedient that he should be asked to study too deeply into what are in reality complex technicalities of financial or political diplomacy.

My conclusions, I think, will be found to be definite enough, and I believe they are accurate, but I do not by any means ask that the reader shall accept them ready-made. Our democracy, with respect to foreign affairs, is now on trial. My whole aim is, first to set forth our new situation, correcting certain misapprehensions both as to public opinion and as to diplomacy; second, to stimulate interested individuals to think about general aspects of foreign policy for themselves; and, finally, to show them how to go about this thinking, or this study, easily, 'scientifically. In short, what I have to present is rather a method than a doctrine. Only by effort and thought on the part of those citizens, in each community, to whom the spectacle of

the life of the nations in the greater world beyond our frontiers exercises an appeal, can foreign affairs be democratized, for only through them can public opinion be furnished with sound bases. By dint of a little application in leisure moments, anyone who is so inclined can, if he will, achieve, rapidly and without too great difficulty, an acquaintance with the principles and the main facts of international relations. The task is not only attractive, not only worth doing, it is positively essential, if our country is to occupy that place in the world to which our previous history and our great potentialities now formally entitle us.

A part of the material included in Part I of this book appeared originally in certain newspapers, in the form of articles. For permission to republish here, acknowledgment is due to Mr. Victor F. Lawson, editor and publisher of the *Chicago Daily News*. I desire also to express publicly my indebtedness to the several friends who have aided me with encouragement and advice, and, in particular, to Mr. Basil Miles, late of the United States Diplomatic Service, for suggestions appertaining to one or two of the concluding chapters.

PAUL SCOTT MOWRER.

Paris, October 15, 1923.

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INTRODUCTORY

THE TREND OF THE BOOK

"Every American should feel ashamed that any country in the world should have a better diplomatic organization than the United States. This is not a matter simply of national pride; it is a matter of national security."

—CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, May 18, 1922.

"Foreign affairs, if you examine the matter, are really domestic affairs—the most domestic of all our affairs, for this reason: they touch the life, the interest, and the pocket of every member of the community. It is in relation to our foreign affairs that every man and woman in this country secures immunity from war, relief from the heavy burden of taxation, prosperity of trade and industry."

—MARQUIS CURZON, November 11, 1922.

THE TREND OF THE BOOK

FROM the first chapter to the last, the argument which I propose here to develop may be said to run somewhat in this way:

The Great War, which marks the termination of one phase of universal history and the beginning of another, has fundamentally transformed the international position of the United States. Two prejudices, the one of moral superiority, the other of fear, have, however, prevented us, up to the present, from accurately estimating the consequences of this transformation. Our feeling of moral superiority over foreign peoples may or may not be justified. It is, in any event, pharisaical; it is humanly ignoble, and it is diplomatically useless; for all peoples, to a greater or less degree, are afflicted with this same moral egotism, and will never admit the pretensions of the others to a monopoly of right and justice. As for our feeling of fear—our fear, in particular, of Europe,—from the first day of our independence, right up to the year 1918, it has been more than justified by the preponderance, in world-politics, of the great European powers, and by our own relative political inferiority. But it is so no longer. Democracy, our first and most persistent ideal, has conquered the earth. Especially, our own rise to pre-eminent power, though scarcely realized as yet by us, has been victoriously

demonstrated; and our maintenance of this new supremacy seems henceforth assured.

What we now require are policies based, not upon empty prejudice or upon emptier ideology—the spirit of illusion, or of crusade,—but upon enlightened and far-seeing interest; which is, indeed, from another point of view, the only sound foundation for a lofty internationalism. Contrary to the popular supposition, the United States already possesses, traditionally, a body of wise and adequate policies, political, economic, and moral, derived largely from the sense of enlightened self-interest, and requiring only to be adapted to our new circumstances to become applicable even to-day. In short, our traditions by no means stand opposed to our advancement in power and in prestige; and we may therefore confidently proceed to inquire, in a broad way, what those new interests are which the war must inevitably have bequeathed us.

As we are now potentially the world's foremost nation, these interests, of necessity, are both political and economic. For a variety of reasons, our first interest is seen to be political in character, namely, the preservation of world-peace, not only as between ourselves and other nations, but also as between foreign nations. Our second interest, derived from our increasing need for foreign markets for our raw products and our manufactured goods, and from our rather startling metamorphosis from a debtor to a creditor nation, is world-wide foreign trade and investment. There remains only to ask the question, how these interests may best be furthered—whether, that is, by isolation, or by international co-operation. A close analysis of the circumstances indicates that

neither peace nor trade can now be assured by any other means than co-operation; and leads to the inescapable conclusion that our foreign policy, from this time on, should be directed definitely, in our own enlightened interest, toward world-peace and economic expansion, by the device of fearless, courteous, and whole-hearted co-operation with other predominant powers.

However, in a democracy, it is not enough to establish abstractly what a policy ought to be. The people themselves must be convinced. This work of education usually consumes a considerable period, during which interest begins to pull in one direction, while sentiment continues to push in another; with the result that a crisis ensues—a temporary paralysis of policy. The United States, it so happens, has been undergoing, in the last three years, precisely such a crisis. There is to-day no more urgent problem before us than the determination of methods whereby our misguided popular sentiment may, as speedily as possible, be induced to elevate itself out of its present discords of narrow uncertainty and unlovely prejudice, into harmony once more with our new national interests.

The prolongation of this crisis in our foreign affairs should not be attributed to supposed defects in our form of government. The constitutional machinery, properly understood, is effective enough. What has been failing, in quality if not in quantity, is the motive-power—the force of public opinion. The crisis, in short, is really a crisis in democracy. It can be overcome, in any permanent sense, only when American opinion begins to give its alert and discriminating attention to the issues involved. The first thing which

our people must understand is the necessity of eliminating, from the consideration of foreign policy, the old evil of factionalism—that is, the evil of making national interests the toy of party politics, whether at the behest of politicians, or of groups of “hyphenated American” voters. The second need is for full and accurate information as to what is going on abroad, especially a better quality of information, and a more general distribution. The third need—the most important of the three—is for public-spirited leaders, for what the Europeans call an “elite,” who should be found scattered in all walks of life and in all communities, who would be ready to devote a portion of their leisure to the study and debate of the fascinating problems of international politics and economics, and who would thus serve to formulate issues, to mould opinion, and to give consistency and continuity to our foreign policy. This elite is already beginning to emerge. Its chief requirement now is some more thorough and more penetrating method of objective study and analysis.

The study of foreign peoples, their interests and their aims, is less difficult than is commonly imagined. Like everything else, it can be ordered and organized by the apprehension of certain principles. To avoid confusion, the student should confine his efforts to one point, one inquiry, one induction at a time. He should remember, first, that in politics, it is actions, not words, results, not intentions, which count; and second, that while vigilance is essential, judgment should never be rendered hastily, and that the foreign people, meanwhile, are entitled to the benefit of the doubt. A method for the analysis of the essential facts in the

life of any given country is outlined in some detail, and as an example of its application, a technical, but easy-running, analysis of the United States, from the viewpoint of foreign affairs, is presented. The opinion is further expressed that the various measures here recommended are really already being put into effect by the American people, and that consequently the resolution of the crisis, by the conscious and generous re-entry of the United States into the arena of world-affairs, is now merely a question of time.

However, even when a policy has been formulated and the people have rallied to its support, there remains the task of putting it into execution, which is the task, specifically, of diplomacy. The aims of diplomacy, in whatever clime or era, are two in number: first, to secure full and significant information regarding foreign states; and second, to influence the sources of power in these states in a sense favorable to the policies of the nation or ruler concerned. These functions are as old as history; they are permanent; and owing to the increasing interdependence, and to the recent sudden enlargement, of the international community, they have never been so important as they are to-day. The development of rapid communications, while it has modified certain methods, has not fundamentally affected diplomacy. But the rise of democracy, with the consequent shifting of the sources of power from the upper class to the masses, is causing, or should be causing, diplomats to regard ever more closely, and to endeavor discreetly to influence, the great currents of mass-opinion which are characteristic of our times. Secret diplomacy, while it is not the unrelieved iniquity it is vulgarly painted, has be-

come an anachronism, and is diminishing, although, in the nature of things, it can probably never be done away with altogether. And it should be realized that no diplomacy can be really successful which is not supported by the military, moral, economic, and cultural force of the nation, either implied or expressed.

Diplomatically, the principal trait of the new era is the henceforth unavoidable political, economic, and moral interdependence of the nations. Political interdependence, now as of old, assumes the form of a universal preoccupation, conscious or unconscious, with the maintenance of a balance of power, which, by acting as a preventive check upon the stronger and more aggressive states, will serve to guarantee the peace, or at most, the victorious independence, of the weaker and less aggressive states. Economic interdependence takes the form of an ever more complex exchange of raw-stuffs and manufactures, obliging diplomacy to keep an eye on business as well as on politics. Of moral interdependence, the principal expression is international law, whose growth and influence, despite recent set-backs, seem now more than ever assured. Finally, in addition to all these, and comprising them all, the era is distinguished by an almost universal popular will to end war, to make war forever impossible. A detailed analysis of the causes, and known remedies, of war, shows that while its permanent prevention is probably not impossible, the nations,—especially the stronger nations,—are not as yet willing to make the necessary sacrifices. The most urgent need of the moment, therefore, in the cause of peace, is popular education, with a view to eliminating blind prejudice and passion, as far as

possible, from the consideration of foreign affairs, and to the substitution for these of a true sense of national rights and duties, and of international courtesy.

And what of our American diplomacy? Either apart from, or in connection with, our more general interests in peace and trade, we now have specific political, economic, and moral interests in practically every country. The organism which, under the direction of the president and of the secretary of state, is destined to watch over and to further these interests, is to be known henceforth as the Foreign Service of the United States. It exhibits certain glaring deficiencies, which can and should be corrected, but it is, on the whole, not inadequate, either as to tradition or as to personnel. If it does not, at present, function more effectively, the reason is that our government and people, whether generally or specifically, have not as yet indicated what they want. Lacking definite and positive policies, our diplomats have no means of initiative. On one occasion after another, the most brilliant and obvious diplomatic opportunities are allowed to pass unnoticed; then when it is too late, when, after repeated warnings, we are at last confronted with the accomplished fact, we suddenly awaken to our injured interests; we wax indignant, we accuse ourselves, our diplomats, everybody; we enregister impotent protests! So long as this deplorable, this half-ludicrous insufficiency is allowed to persist, our interests, our power, our prestige, our new pre-eminence—all are compromised.

Our people are a great people, with great gifts to offer to the progress of mankind. The point to which I would at last conduct the patient reader is precisely

this : for every one of us, however humble, there exists, in the matter of foreign affairs, some means of action. It is time that we should bestir ourselves to a realization of our enlightened duty, both toward ourselves and toward others, and that each of us, within his own sphere, and in his own modest way, should act accordingly.

PART I

OUR NEW PLACE IN THE WORLD

1

THE END OF AN ERA

A NOT unnatural aspect of our aversion to the idea of war is our impatience with those historians who seem to us to have been fascinated, exclusively, and even to the point of morbidity, by revolutions, revolts, conquests, defeats, the alarums and the shock of hostile armies. Are these, then, the realities of our successive generations? Or should we not dwell rather upon man's nobler and no less heroic struggles to achieve artistic, scientific, social, and economic progress? In the historian's preoccupation with the hatreds and rivalries of nations, is there not really an element of demoralization, a subtle stimulus to our baser instincts of combativeness and domination? We know too well the part recently played by perversions of historical fact and proportion in the running amuck of Germany, not to be dismayed at the thought of having always to be immersing our own minds in the "blood and iron" of military chronicles.

Yet what is history—the history, at least, of those more or less natural human groupings known as nations? A long, irregular, competitive effort toward material and moral betterment, interrupted more or less frequently by the violent convulsions of war. The convulsions are inhuman, destructive, horrible, but they cannot be slighted—they are too important. They may profit no one, but they reverse relative posi-

tions, shaking the political kaleidoscope into new patterns. They overthrow dynasties, change frontiers, interrupt or open trade routes, remove or establish dominations, revolutionize ideas. They mark beginnings, and signify ends. In war, the nations are born: Rome, France, England, Holland, Germany; yesterday the United States; to-day, Ireland. In war they die: Babylon, Carthage, Greece, Rome; yesterday, Poland, the newly resurrected; to-day, Austria-Hungary, shattered forever. The dead are buried, the ruins are restored, the people that remain go on living, toiling; but the conditions are all changed. For some, ruin; for others, wealth. For some, new vistas, increased opportunities, added self-respect; for others, lowering horizons, diminished influence, humiliation, bitterness. The Turks take Constantinople, cutting off the gateway to the East; and the great rich cities of the continental trade route, deprived of the life-blood of commerce, drowse and perish. Verona, Venice, Nuremberg, Bruges—what are they to-day? Spain, after an epic struggle, throws off the Moorish incubus, and rises for a relatively brief space to world pre-eminence, only to decline again, in later wars. The Anglo-Saxon colonists of North America, having assured to themselves the hegemony of a continent by victories over the French, next win by arms their independence from England. For a time, their rapid expansion westward by land is no more determined and energetic than their commercial expansion by sea. There is scarcely a port in Europe or Asia that does not know the proud-spread sails of the Yankee clipper. But then come civil dissension, and four years of racking war, necessitating a long period of intensive internal development

and consolidation. The Yankee clipper succumbs to the British steamship. It is not until the Spanish-American War, in 1898, that the United States again begins to look outward.

Perhaps then, after all, it is we ourselves, and not the historians, who have been mistaken. If such is indeed the grim significance of war in the long story of the nations, let us face the reality with steady eye. The history of peace is of course engrossingly meaningful with its wonders of art and literature, of science and invention, of social organization and commercial grandeur. Peace is the health of the nations—the active condition of well-being which all desire to maintain; war is their sickness. But is it not a sound maxim, that he who would administer to health must first endeavor to understand disease?

The World War, through which we have just passed, exceeds both in extent and intensity any preceding military cataclysm. To repeat this is of course a platitude. Everyone has said it, but how many have paused to reflect upon what it may mean? Millions have died; millions have been shuffled back and forth across the globe; millions have suffered, and are suffering, devastation, famine, pestilence, poverty. Fabulous riches have been wiped out. Mighty empires have fallen; dynasties have been dethroned; and from the death convulsions of venerable nations, young, new nations have sprung to life. The political map of Europe has been re-drawn. Vast territories have changed hands. The magnetic centers of political power have silently shifted, destroying old, creating new currents, and a new political complexity. The material centers of economic power have also shifted,

creating an unforeseen economic complexity. Asia, Africa, Australasia, the two Americas—not a continent has gone untouched. We live in a time of unparalleled change and grandeur, the end of which none can foretell.

The dominant factor in the life of every man now living is, and will long continue to be, the war—the war and its tremendous consequences. If there is any meaning in history, the bloody period from which we are scarcely emerging is not a mere tragic episode, it is the end of an era—an end, and a beginning. No thinking, social, political or economic, which ignores this axiom, can hope to reach a true conclusion.

Yet by what is psychologically a natural reaction, and intellectually a sardonic paradox, the war—in its larger sense—is the one thing we are not now willing to contemplate. "Of all ages and epochs," writes General Charles G. Dawes, in his *Journal of the Great War*, "this is the greatest and the one to which all those of the future will hark back—this in which, though we played our great part, we yet live heedlessly and with little thought of the future." We are wearied, the General rightly perceives, of the hate and the horrors. We sigh for peace—real peace—for 1914 again, and things as they used to be. We do not even want to think about the war, let alone talk about it. We are tired—tired, disillusioned, confused. Uncertain of the future, disappointed in the present, we cling almost desperately to the past. It is as if events had become too big for us. We no longer dominate things, they dominate and oppress us; and with our newly-acquired fatalism, itself a legacy of the war, we continue to accept this humiliating oppression, resisting only with the

vague pretense that we shall presently, progressively, by some mysterious gravitation, settle down to 1914 again, and President Harding's sacerdotal "normalcy."

What we have to realize is that although we may, of course, still look for guidance to past principles, there are many past facts which are facts no more. The truth seems to be that we are not going to get back to "normalcy"—not ever! Nineteen Fourteen was a climactic date. The world has changed, the situation of the United States has changed. Our very minds have changed; and "what is written with blood," as Edgar Quinet has said, "cannot be effaced with ink." "The new era," the American geographer, Dr. Isaiah Bowman, predicts, "will date from the year of the World War just as Medieval Europe dates from the fall of Rome, or as the modern democratic era dates from the Declaration of Independence."

Taking accurate stock of these changes, observing, analyzing, facing the circumstances calmly and without sentiment, our aim must now be rather to bestir ourselves at building the future, than to sit sighing over the past. In this new taking of stock, we shall, of course, find that, even apart from principles, there are many things which, — happily — have not been, and probably will not be, transformed. We shall find that there are even certain points at which we may still, with advantage and a fair prospect of success, endeavor to bring back 1914. But at a number of other vital points, we shall discover inevitably that the past has gone forever, and that the need is for adaptation, readjustment, initiative,—not so much for reconstruction as new construction; or, if you will, the new normalcy, a new world equilibrium, social, economic and

political; different from the old; worse, perhaps, or, perhaps, if we make it so—better.

There is scarcely an individual to whom these remarks do not apply. Workman, farmer, merchant, manufacturer, office employe and professional man—all may with profit take stock, ask how the war has affected their own community in its relation to the world, and themselves in relation to their own community, then boldly make the suitable readjustments. But what is true of individuals, is even more true of nations; and in particular, of the United States.

I say particularly the United States, because we, except for a few individual statesmen, and unlike most other peoples, have never, as yet, learned to think nationally and objectively, in terms of our situation and our interests. There was a day in the infancy of our independence, when this deficiency of ours in national thinking was threatening us with ruin. Wise policies of wise men, almost against our will, saved us. In the long, happy period of favorable circumstance prior to 1914, it did not seem to matter particularly, so far as our foreign affairs were concerned, whether we thought nationally or not. A time has now come, however, when, once more, it matters a great deal. As surely as the war of 1776 gave us our independence; as surely as the war of 1860 involved us in a protracted era of exclusively domestic development and preoccupations; as surely as the war of 1898 endowed us with colonial dependencies and responsibilities, and provoked a dim awakening again to a realization of our foreign relations, just as surely will the war of 1917 be found, sooner or later, to have given some entirely new orientation, profound, fundamental, perhaps decisive, to

our national existence. For us, as for other nations, the cataclysmic war has marked an end, and a beginning. The world-transformations which have taken place about us affect us vitally. How should it be otherwise? Yet up to the present, as General Dawes points out, it is as if we had made no serious endeavor, either objectively to understand, or definitely to adapt ourselves to our new situation.

THE PREJUDICE OF MORAL SUPERIORITY

IF open-mindedness is a virtue, then prejudice—which means the passing of judgment before the weighing of evidence—is a vice. If the one is to be sought after and cultivated, the other is to be ruthlessly rooted out, for they are not compatible.

There are just now two prejudices intervening between the people of the United States and an open-minded estimate of the requirement of our new position in the world. One is the belief that we are blessed with an inherent moral superiority over the other denizens of the globe. The second is the suspicious fear that by the very act of coming into touch with foreign nations, we lay ourselves open to being harmed, or tricked, or evilly entangled. Until we can eradicate these two prejudices, understanding quite well how they arose, but understanding also that we have no present use for them, there is little hope that we shall be able to take other than a distorted view of our foreign affairs.

In the preface to *America's Foreign Relations*, which, so far as I am aware, is the only comprehensive history of the subject yet attempted, Professor Willis Fletcher Johnson makes, of our notable deficiency in this respect, the following lively indictment: "The British nation, from which we are chiefly sprung, is often spoken of as 'insular'; but its insularity is

vastly and generously comprehensive, in contrast to the bigoted, parochial egotism of its gigantic offspring. From this excess of adulatory introspection, this sometimes smug and sometimes highfalutin' self-complacency, and this lack of appreciative perspective and proportion in viewing other nations and their affairs, have arisen many of our domestic and most of our external ills." At first, I was inclined to think that, as regards our egotism at least, Professor Johnson was indulging in a bit of entirely unacademic exaggeration; but there then came to my notice a statement made by President Harding, on accepting, in the spring of 1922, an honorary degree at Muskingum College, Ohio, and I understood at once what Professor Johnson had meant. "We Americans," confidently asserted our chief executive, "have contributed more to human advancement in a century and a half than all the people of the world in all the history of the world"—at which incisive speech I make no doubt that the bones of Prometheus, the fire-bringer, Cadmus of the alphabet, and Paul the Apostle, stirred in their dust.

There is no need to stress the point. Every American knows that we consider our customs, our institutions, our motives, and our state of progress to be far in advance of those of any other national group. So sincere is this faith in our own pre-eminent merit that we are rather at a loss to understand why the foreigners do not all hasten to imitate us. The obvious fact that they do not thus always hasten renders us suspicious. One may pardon the errors of a man who errs in ignorance, but of the man who continues to err, perversely, from choice, after the evil of his ways has been demonstrated to him—beware! We

have done our duty by the rest of the world, we think, in setting it a splendid example. If the world will not follow, the fault is not ours. Let us at least preserve our own health and integrity by keeping out of bad company!

Within certain limits, it is right and even vital, that we should believe invincibly in ourselves. Our customs and our institutions are indeed good; they fit us. Our motives, generally speaking, are really high-minded. Our state of progress, if not actually superlative, does at least compare favorably with anything existing elsewhere. Everything that is alive and healthy and energetic tends to reproduce itself; to extend its influence, to carry on, as it were, a perpetual missionary work in its own behalf. Moreover, self-confidence is a leavening force of such power, that to a nation of heterogeneous composition, like our own, it is really indispensable. This is the thought underlying the present "Americanization" campaign among our foreign-born residents, and it is a sound one.

When self-confidence, however, becomes self-complacency, that is another matter. We live in a changing world; and progress is a coquettish mistress, quick to abandon the pretender who no longer is assiduous in his courting. Given that we are at present leading the van, we cannot hope long to continue to do so, if we now sit down to doze comfortably under our laurels. It behooves us to be restless to ascertain unceasingly what others are planning and doing; and without going counter to our own proper character, and our own more salutary traditions, to adapt to our own uses whatever is good, wherever we may find it.

Again, are we inherently superior to other peoples,

or only temporarily and, one might ask, accidentally so? Or, conversely, are other peoples necessarily, by a kind of geographical and ethical predestination, our inferiors? or have they been outdistanced merely through the fortuity of circumstance? If the former, then, of course, we have no need to worry; the heaven of our self-satisfaction will continue cloudless, whatever our acts or omissions. If, on the other hand, the outlander's inferiority is found to be rather the result of changing circumstance than of an irrevocable decree of fate, vigilance is to be recommended, for the old breeds are by no means reconciled to falling obsequiously into second or third place; and the first to the goal, in the present and future, as in the past, will not be the runner who stultifies himself with over-confidence or the benumbing sense of moral superiority, but the swiftest, strongest, and most actively resourceful.

One may well be continually perplexed whether to marvel more at the differences which separate and diversify the various individuals and races of the earth, or at the profound identity by which, black, brown, yellow, and white, we are all united. To the alert eye and mind, the differences are undoubtedly the more striking; yet the identity, human and ineradicable, lies buried there under the outward appearance, ever ready to echo to the throb of a kindred emotion. In the main, after reading old books, and books of history, after more than a decade of observation among foreign peoples, it is my impression that in its emotional life, mankind is practically one. The mother with her baby is a universal symbol. Men differ rather in the expression of their emotions than in the emo-

tions themselves. "One race of men," says Elihu Root, "take off their shoes and keep on their hats, another race take off their hats and keep on their shoes under similar conditions, to express similar sentiments of respect." The Burmese, in his tropical jungle, can never fully understand the beloved associations which, in the Englishman's mind, center about the sacred word "hearth"; yet the Burmese is not unfamiliar with the emotion of comfortable and intimate security which the word "hearth," in sterner climes, connotes, and he expresses it by the phrase, half-meaningless to the Englishman: "The shadow of a great rock in a thirsty land."

Despite this fundamental identity, it would, of course, be fatuous not to take full account of our human divergences. People vary, both in kind and in the degree of their development. Most of Africa, parts of Central and South America, parts of Asia, are too primitive to have much meaning for us. Other parts of Asia and of Africa have civilizations so far removed from our own in kind that we are scarcely able even to raise the question of degree. Culturally, we are born of the religious inspiration of Palestine, and of the arts, laws, and philosophies of Greece and Rome. We belong to the great white race of Europe, which, in the last four centuries, in a magnificent burst of intelligent power, has suddenly established its dominion over most of the globe, exploiting, ordering, colonizing. Within this race our least affinities are with the peoples of Eastern and Southern Europe; our greatest, with the peoples of the self-governing British dominions. But both we and the self-governing dominions—and indeed, we to a greater extent

than the dominions—are vitally bound, racially, culturally, intellectually, to the divers peoples of Western Europe, forming with them, as it were, a single great dominant group, representing what is at least the highest material civilization the world has ever seen. Scotland, England, Ireland, Scandinavia, Holland, Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, France, Italy, even Spain and Portugal—these nations, for all their differences from us and from one another, are our intimate kinsfolk, over whom to pretend to an intrinsic moral superiority is to tread on treacherous ground.

I know Western Europe pretty well. I know, or think I know, the cunning distinctions of character, thought, and circumstance which separate these great and highly civilized groups of people. Much as I love and respect my country, great as is my faith therein, I cannot loyally say that, all things considered, I esteem one of these nations to be intrinsically superior, morally, to the others, or ourselves to any one of them. France, England, Germany—all have had their aberrations, all have at times been insufferable, yet all, at times, great and glorious. Perhaps we think we have never had our aberrations? Perhaps we think we never shall have an aberration? That is another matter. The fact remains that it will always be difficult for us to deny our nearest kin, even morally. Whether we like it or not, we are part and parcel of the great Western European civilization—a part, moreover, continually more important, in and to the whole.

“East is East, and West is West.” The view of life held by the civilized millions of Asia and of North Africa is so far removed from our own as to seem inscrutable. Only those endowed with the rarest gifts

of sympathetic and intuitive imagination can hope to cross this mysterious threshold of understanding. Eastern Europe, where orient and occident are still waging their age-long battle for cultural supremacy, and which partakes of the nature of both, is also profoundly disconcerting to our western minds. When we come to Western Europe, however, we find the fundamental attitude toward existence to be the same as our own. There are, of course, striking differences, but they are national—they can be explained. Nationality is still an important element, but not more so than geographic, historic, and economic circumstance.

In its higher spheres, in science, in art, in philosophy, the thought of Western Europe and of America is one, pursuing a common ideal of progress. The best books are translated back and forth, as they appear, acting and reacting upon the various national groups. Sculpture, painting, music here speak, not only in a common conception, but in a common language. And if we cannot claim a moral superiority for our artistic, literary, and scientific culture, neither can we make this claim for our commerce and industry. The business aims and industrial methods of the two continents, although not identical, are similar and are constantly interacting. There remains the possibility of our moral superiority in politics. Our theory of democracy, we owe, of course, to certain European philosophers. We were the first to put this theory into practice and to make it work. Here, however, Europe has not been slow to learn from us. Western Europe, which at the time of our national inception, was still largely autocratic, now has democratic institutions, some of which are more advanced than our

own; while as for European political theory, it has developed so radically as to leave us—fortunately—far behind, and to make us appear, to the more liberal Europeans, as, on the whole, a conservative people—“one of the pillars of the reaction,” in Lenine’s hostile phrase. Our political institutions were epoch-making, and have had a vast influence. But even this “splendid example” does not prove our moral superiority. In our internal politics, it is too bad to have to say, and **yet** it must be said, that we are at least as open to criticism as the leading European nations. In our external politics, we have taken the lead—and I hope we shall continue to lead—in certain international reforms. Our abstract ethical standards are probably higher than those of other nations. However, we have to remember that our situation has favored us. Our foreign problems have been less vital than those of the European powers, and our temptations, consequently, less great.

In short, except in a purely material sense, all that we in America have and are—our people, our principles, our culture—came out of, or was inspired by, Europe, subject merely to the adaptation and development of our national genius. To Europe, we belong; and Europe, to us. And although the peoples of Europe still drag the chain of centuries of history, while we have cut this chain away, and have carried out almost unfettered our vast, successful, democratic experiment, still the ideals of the parent races and of the offspring remain essentially the same, and in matters of the mind and spirit, co-operation is so natural as to be inevitable.

I am no advocate of that pale tolerance which ex-

pands so copiously in floods of universal sympathy, admiration, and imitation that the character itself is as if dissolved, and wavers to and fro in every vagrant current. To establish and to maintain its national character against all uncongenial influences should be the first care of every nation worthy of the name. It is quite possible, however, to guard intact one's own individuality, one's own convictions and principles, while at the same time appreciating and respecting the individuality, the principles, and convictions of others. A wise people will give its critical scrutiny as often to its own pretensions as to those of its contemporaries, and will be intent rather upon continual self-improvement than upon crusades of world-reform, or upon the nirvanic bliss of self-complacent moral isolation.

3

RIGHT AND JUSTICE

IN the pages of Thucydides, I find these judicious words, spoken to the Lacedemonians by the embassy from Mytilene: "There can be no solid friendship between individuals, nor any community of interest between states, if they do not reciprocally esteem one another to be virtuous."

Even granting that a certain provocation exists for belief in our inherent moral superiority, and not denying the practical utility, in domestic politics, of occasional demagogic appeals to this belief, there is yet an all-powerful reason why it cannot successfully be made a dominant principle in the conduct of our foreign affairs. This reason is that all peoples are secretly convinced of their own moral superiority. All peoples feel assured that their own cause is based firmly upon right and justice. Or, if they are accused, in suspicious circumstances, of playing unfairly, all peoples will immediately take refuge in counter-accusations, arguing that the end justifies the means, and that their course and their motives are at least no worse than those of their opponents.

So universal is this self-righteousness of the nations, that most governments, whatever they may say to their own people, long ago ceased trying to justify their conduct to foreigners upon moral grounds. The exceptions are the two Anglo-Saxon nations—Britain and

America—who solemnly continue the practice, but with so little good effect, that, by nearly all other peoples, they are taxed with hypocrisy. The “aggressive philanthropic crusade which serves British interests” is described by continental writers as “a favorite English sport”; and we Americans, in some of our recent brief turns upon the international stage, have been treated by our continental friends to more than one dash of the same sophisticated irony.

This Anglo-Saxon weakness, however, is not, in my opinion, hypocrisy, so much as literal-mindedness. The English school-boy, who reads in his lesson-book how, on being asked by a visiting rajah the secret of England’s power, Queen Victoria gravely laid her hand on the Bible,—this English schoolboy is doubtless edified, during the rest of his life, by the reassurance that there is a special providence over England’s domination of India; and when he reads of Indian revolts, he is perhaps shocked, not in his political, but in his religious, sensibilities. The American schoolboy, in the same way, is taught, and it seems to him quite credible and significant, that George Washington never told a lie. Yet these same hard-headed Englishmen and Americans, on coming into contact with the ebullient self-righteousness of the immature states and peoples of the Balkans, are surprised and aggrieved. No, this is not hypocrisy; it is deficient imagination. It is the naïve inability to put one’s self in another’s place, and to look, for a moment, through another’s eyes.

But as I have said, this does not mean that the British and the Americans are the only peoples who bask in a serene sense of their own superior virtue.

The others, from a kind of politeness, may not talk so much about it, but the feeling is there. The nation, like the individual, will always, and by no matter what tortuous sophistries, justify itself to itself. Germany's crude pre-war megalomania, which even now is not entirely eradicated, is a matter of common knowledge, and if there was one impossible demand made of Germany by the allies, it was that the German people should sincerely acknowledge their responsibility for the crime of causing the war, and should repent! Spain, in its half-decay, is still probably the proudest nation on earth. France is a smouldering volcano of vanity. Italy throbs with self-confident ambition. Poland, Roumania, Jugo-Slavia, all are conscious of great destinies and of even greater abilities; while Americans who followed the Washington Conference had an interesting exhibition of the superiority over one another in particular, and over the occident in general, felt by both the Chinese and the Japanese.

Not only are all nations, without exception purblindly self-righteous with regard to their own history and contemporary actions, but all, in estimating the history and contemporary actions of other nations, are apt to reach conclusions far from flattering to these others.

It is interesting, in this connection, to inquire how foreign peoples regard the rapid rise of the United States, in the brief space of a hundred and fifty years, from an inconsiderate position to world pre-eminence, and the hegemony of a hemisphere. Our own consciences are clean. We know that we have never committed a deed of which we have the slightest cause to feel ashamed. Our motives have been invariably right

and just—or at least more nearly right and just than those of the other peoples with whom we have had to deal. An American captain came to me, just at the end of the war, apoplectic with indignation. He had discovered, in a French school-book, a small paragraph entitled “American Imperialism,” wherein our rapid and unceasing territorial expansion was briefly summarized. He said this title was an outrage, and I believe he wrote a letter to the American ambassador about it. But the French have not changed the textbook. Just as we know things about “French imperialism,” of which the French are entirely unconscious, so they profess to know things about “American imperialism” of which we are wholly innocent.

Europeans, in fact, have their own opinions about what seems to us our perfectly right and natural expansion. They read in history of how, contrary to our agreement with France, we negotiated a separate treaty with Britain, after the War of Independence; how we inserted in this treaty a secret clause aiming to get the Yazoo lands away from Spain, for England or ourselves; how we tried, and failed, to annex Canada, by force, in 1812; how we seized both West and East Florida from Spain, practically by armed invasion; how we took Texas, New Mexico, California; how we claimed, and tried to obtain, all the Pacific coast, as far north as Alaska; how we got Porto Rico and the Philippines, and established our protectorate over Cuba; in what happy circumstances we secured the Panama Canal Zone—and it seems to them by no means merely “natural,” all this, but a very energetic and strong-willed policy indeed. They note that, in the face of tremendous moral issues, the United States

from 1800 to 1810, and again from 1914 to 1917, remained neutral, like Argos during the first ten years of the Peloponnesian War, and flourished as serenely at the belligerents' expense. They observe that, in like situations, we talk and act very much in the same way we are accustomed to reproach Europeans for talking and acting. The French, who, as a measure of national defense, would like to neutralize permanently the Rhineland, whence they have been repeatedly invaded, observe that we, also, as a measure of national defense, forbid, under the Monroe Doctrine, the establishment of any European power in South America—even in Patagonia, five thousand miles from our nearest seaport. They re-read our historic argument as to why we should take Florida from Spain, namely that "the acquisition of Louisiana made the acquisition of Florida inevitable, since it was intolerable that our commerce between the Mississippi River and the Atlantic, should have to skirt for hundreds of miles, the shores of an alien country, and should have to pass through a strait, both shores of which were held by a foreign, always antagonistic, and sometimes hostile power." And they smile over the uproar against "French Imperialism" which would doubtless arise if they themselves, who can use precisely the same argument with regard to their seaborne commerce between Bordeaux and Marseilles, should try therefore to overrun Spain and seize Gibraltar. The English do not forget that, at a certain moment, Jefferson wanted the United States to annex the entire Gulf Stream; and that, in 1795, fearing the seizure of Louisiana from Spain by Britain, and the encirclement of the United States, the same great

American statesman wrote: "A balance of power on our borders is not less desirable to us than a balance of power in Europe has always appeared to them (the British)." The European nations which possess colored colonies know how we treated the Indians of old, and what serious preoccupation our negro population is giving us to-day. The Eastern European nations, whom we reproach for their illiberal treatment of minorities, recall the conditions under which we proscribed the "Loyalists," after the war of Independence, expelling them and confiscating their property. The Dutch have not forgotten how we abandoned, as a belligerent, in 1917, those very rights which we had been so staunchly contending for, as a neutral, in 1914, 1915 and 1916. In short, most educated Europeans are so convinced of their moral kinship with us that even when we perform an act which seems, on its face, to be wholly magnanimous, such as the return of the "Boxer" indemnity to China, they begin to pry underneath, in search of a hidden and interested motive. We know that our motives, in contrast to those of other powers, are invariably just and pure; there is not one of these instances which we cannot explain entirely to our own satisfaction. They, as invariably, persist in suspecting our motives. This may seem malicious on their part, but they are human and they cannot help it.

Since it seems, therefore, to be generally true that all nations are inclined to believe, under all circumstances, in their own moral superiority, and to impugn the intentions of others, it ought to be self-evident that in a negotiation between two nations, the phrase "right and justice" is certain to receive two equally

sincere, but quite opposite, interpretations, and therefore to be of no utility.

Let me be fully explicit. I am a staunch advocate of the development and extension of international law. The fact remains that, despite the rapid progress of this later branch of jurisdiction, most of the disputes which arise between nations, are still held to be non-justiciable. Only rarely, as Prof. Barthelemy points out, do the problems of foreign relations present a strictly ethical character; and even when they do, no one people is qualified to decide the issue, "being at the same time judge and party."

There may be—there doubtless is—such a thing as "absolute right" in non-justiciable affairs, but the nation never lived which will admit that some other nation has a monopoly of it. For all practical purposes, it will be found best to take diplomatic controversies off the moral plane altogether, and to place them on a plane, if not of potential force, then of fact and of common interest. Let us continue to believe in our own problematic moral superiority; above all let us try to obtain and to maintain real moral superiority, and to act accordingly; but let us not obtrude our self-complacency upon others. They will not understand it and will find it disagreeable. We shall get along far better if we simply assume, ostensibly, at the outset, that all nations are high-minded and noble, and then proceed, with all due tolerance and courtesy, to look after our own business in a precise and concrete manner; without insisting that all the right and justice are necessarily on our side.

I sincerely trust that, in what I have been saying, I shall not be understood as in any degree opposing the

application of the precepts of morality to international problems. The moral sense is one of the most precious inheritances of the race. Without it, there is scarcely such a thing as character. Strictly speaking, its elimination is no more possible than desirable. The quality which I have here endeavored to show to be neither desirable nor practical in sound diplomacy, is not the moral sense, but the sense of moral superiority—a very different thing.

There exists an old, old story on the point. In a discussion of morality, even of political morality, I may be pardoned for quoting from the gospel of St. Luke:

“Two men went up into the temple to pray; the one a Pharisee and the other a publican. The Pharisee stood and prayed thus with himself, God, I thank Thee, that I am not as other men are, extortioners, unjust, adulterers, or even as this publican. I fast twice in the week, I give tithes of all I possess. And the publican, standing afar off, would not lift up so much as his eyes unto heaven, but smote upon his breast, saying, God be merciful to me a sinner. I tell you, this man went down to his house justified rather than the other: for every one that exalteth himself shall be abased; and he that humbleth himself shall be exalted.”

Of morality, in this truer sense, there is apparently little danger that our own or any other nation will even manifest a superabundance.

THE PREJUDICE OF FEAR

THE second great national prejudice which tends to distort our vision of present realities is our traditional fear of Europe and of European complications. This fear, not only in our early years, but right up to 1914, has been more fully warranted than most Americans understand. To keep out of Europe's quarrels, and at the same time to profit by them on every occasion, expanding and fortifying ourselves at Europe's expense—such has been our sagacious policy.

Looking back from the security of to-day, it is difficult for us to realize the dangers which on every side surrounded our young independence, a century and a half ago. As colonies, we had been necessarily involved in all Britain's wars. As a sovereign state, ill-consolidated, and shaken within by venomous partisanship, we found ourselves still hemmed in by the colonial frontiers of great European powers—Britain in the north, Spain in the south, with France ever alert to regain its own lost foothold. In addition, as an experiment in democracy we aroused the malicious enmity of all the crowned heads in Europe, for they rightly foresaw that the new form of government set up across the sea was a hard moral blow at the foundations of their own thrones. We had thus to fear, in the most immediate way, both for our form of government, and for our independence and territorial integrity.

As colonies, we had experienced one kind of "European entanglement." As a nation, still bound to France by a sort of permanent defensive alliance, we soon experienced another. No sooner were we free than French diplomacy tried to establish over us a kind of benevolent protectorate. This menace was scarcely abated when the outbreak of the French revolutionary wars threatened us with still other perils. What we needed above all, was a period of quiet in which to complete our consolidation. But the French revolutionary government considered that both because of the similarity of its democratic aims with ours, and because of the alliance, we were bound to take part in its fervent republican crusade against Europe. A large element in our population was responsive to the French appeal, and it was with the greatest difficulty that Washington's common sense kept us out of the torment, which, if we had entered it, would doubtless soon have encompassed our ruin. The longer the revolutionary wars and their Napoleonic sequel continued, the more clearly did our leaders realize the immensity of the peril from which we had so narrowly escaped. It was from this impressive early experience that Washington's warning against "permanent alliances," and Jefferson's warning against "entangling alliances," were derived.

Our first collective care had been to free ourselves from European sovereignty; our second, to free ourselves from European alliances and diplomatic attachments—always dangerous for a young, weak state; our third was to seize, by one means or another, as much as possible of the North American continent, thereby eliminating to a certain extent the chances of

complications with Europe; our fourth care, finally, in the face of the apparent intention of the Holy Alliance to support Spain in an effort to quell the revolts in the latter's American colonies, was boldly to proclaim the Monroe Doctrine, to the effect that we considered both American continents to be no longer subject to colonization by any European power.

The amazing thing is not so much that we had the wisdom to adopt these aggressive policies, as that we were able, with a fair measure of success, to have them respected. That we were so able was due less to our own strength and determination—though these were not negligible—than to the paralyzing rivalries of the principal European powers among themselves. There has never been a time, from 1776 to 1914, when we have not been able indirectly to profit by these rivalries. If France came to our assistance in the Revolution, it was not so much out of love for us, as out of hatred for England, which had just wrested Canada and India away from France. Napoleon, by continually threatening Britain, by keeping all Europe on edge for more than a decade, did us a number of good turns, indirectly, and I am not sure but what we ought to erect a statue to his memory. The failure of his Santo Domingo expedition, his chicanery with Spain, enabled us, by the merest hazard, to consummate the purchase of Louisiana. Between 1800 and 1810, while Napoleon and Britain struggled, we built up our fine neutral merchant marine, and laid the foundations of our prosperity. If England, after our abortive attempt to invade and annex Canada, in 1812, had not been still involved with Napoleon, the original British intentions to detach from us the entire Great Lakes

region, including Michigan, Wisconsin, Northern Indiana, and Northern Illinois, would almost certainly have been carried out, in spite of anything we could have done. The very exhaustion in which the end of the Napoleonic adventure left Europe was our own best guarantee; for it is scarcely to be doubted that, under other circumstances, the powers would by no means have been willing to resign to us the undeveloped parts of North America.

Britain, too, favored us both directly and indirectly. The Holy Alliance, in 1822, abandoned its South American schemes not so much in deference to our defiant warnings, as because Britain, the mistress of the seas, stood with us in the matter. It is a fundamental fact of our history that we were able to eject Spain from North America solely because Spain was weak; and that we failed in our aim similarly to eject Britain solely because Britain was strong. We could and did seize the Floridas, and annex Texas, New Mexico and California, but we had to forego our claim to the entire Pacific Coast as far north as Alaska, although our rights here were at least as well established as Britain's. Even when we took Texas, Lord Aberdeen, in order to insure Texas cotton to England, tried to persuade France to join in an intervention to prevent the United States from making the annexation. France refused. But suppose France had accepted? We have been accustomed, not without reason, to take it for granted that the French withdrawal from Mexico, in 1866, was due solely to Seward's ultimatum, backed by a veteran army. A contingent consideration, however, seems to have been that Louis Napoleon had just received word that Prussia and Austria were

about to go to war over the Schleswig-Holstein annexation, and that he felt the need, accordingly, of freedom, during the European crisis, from complications in America. Similarly, when England gave in to us so suddenly in the Venezuelan boundary dispute, in 1895, it was not apparently from sole fear of us, but also because, following Jameson's raid in the Transvaal, the Kaiser had just sent his telegram of congratulation to Paul Kruger, and Lord Salisbury feared German complications. Again, in 1902, when Roosevelt, at the height of our controversy with Germany over the Venezuelan claims, ordered the American fleet, under Dewey, to concentrate at Porto Rico, it was not merely respect for the United States which caused Germany to back down, but respect for Britain. For years, Germany, which considered the Monroe Doctrine "an international impertinence," had been asking for a free hand in South America. Britain always said no. But suppose Britain had consented? In fact, so long as the fleets of Britain and Germany balanced one another, we were safe, despite the smallness of our own navy, for neither of these powers would dare attack us, leaving the other as a potential enemy in its rear. It was apparently with a full realization of the vital utility to us of the European balance of power that Roosevelt sent an American delegation, in 1906, to the conference of Algeciras, with instructions to throw our moral weight there against Germany, and thus endeavor to preserve that balance. As for our victory over Germany, in 1918, it was, of course, not an individual, but an allied victory.

In a word, there has never heretofore been a time when our national safety and the success of our poli-

cies were not in large measure dependent upon circumstances which, indeed, we were able to exploit to our advantage, but over which we had little control. We have avoided Europe, politically—with the two exceptions of Algeciras and Versailles—first, because we were very properly afraid of Europe, and second, because, except for the gradually extending needs of our commerce, we had no interests there.

Now, suddenly, all this has changed. For the first time in history, we have become masters of our destiny; and the fear that once gave rise to a sound national policy persists merely as an empty prejudice. The phenomenon which has wrought this miracle is the war, the terrific cataclysm which, in disrupting the world, has revolutionized our relation to the world.

OUR NEW POLITICAL POSITION

THE impression is widespread among our people, that something like a priestly injunction, delivered upon divine inspiration by our forefathers, forbids us forever from entering into anything more intimate than ordinary commerce with the great or small powers of Europe. Whatever may have been the opinions of lesser and later men, this assuredly never was Washington's idea. He realized clearly that the only sound policy for any nation is the pursuit, by all fair means, of its just national interests. In those days it was our interest to have as little political relationship as possible with the Old World. He particularly feared lest we should allow ourselves to be bound by "artificial ties"—that is, by ties engendered in moments of passion or strong sentiment, rather than in the calm consideration of national aims and national interests. Knowing our weakness, and the potential menace which Europe then held for us, he desired that his country should chiefly seek to "gain time," in which, inevitably it should "progress" to that degree of strength and consistency which is necessary to give it . . . "the command of its own fortunes," and to permit us to "choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel."

If this true statesman were living to-day, he would certainly be among the first to decry the widespread

contemporary view that Europe, whatever our interests, and whatever the relative changes in our position, must always be anathema to us. In Washington's time, the extremists were too fondly inclined toward Europe; at present, they are too stiffly inclined away from Europe. Washington was as opposed to the one excess as to the other. "The nation," he observed, in his farewell address, "which indulges towards another an habitual hatred or an habitual fondness, is in some degree a slave. It is a slave of its animosity, or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest." Were he now alive, I should be surprised if Washington did not feel that the United States, in the last three years, has fallen perilously near to becoming the slave of its animosities.

For what is our international position, at the end of the old era, and at the beginning of the new, as marked by the war?

In the first place, democracy, which a hundred and fifty years ago was looked upon as a bold and dangerous experiment, has now conquered the world. France, for half a century, has been a republic. Britain, Belgium, Italy, Holland and the Scandinavian countries, Bulgaria and Greece, are constitutional monarchies, with strong democratic impulses. Switzerland is a democratic commonwealth. Germany, Austria, Hungary, Poland, Jugo-Slavia, Czecho-Slovakia, the Baltic States, Portugal, are republics. In Russia, although there is still a dictatorship, the czardom has seemingly gone forever. Latin America has safely preserved its republican institutions, and even China is republican—at least in name. If our forefathers, who were

scarcely to be restrained from joining France in its revolutionary crusade of 1793; who saw the revolution degenerate into Napoleonic imperialism; who stiffened their backs and prepared to fight, if necessary, against the extension to South America of the activities of the Holy Alliance, with its battle-cry of "legitimacy" and the "divine right of kings"; whose enthusiasm for the Grecian war of independence was so great that Monroe, in the same message which embodied his famous Doctrine, felt constrained also to express warm sympathy for Greece; who, finally, were so aroused by Kossuth that they were well nigh ready to fly to Hungary's aid against both Austria and Russia, in the very middle of Europe—if our forefathers, I say, could have witnessed the apotheosis of democracy which has been one of the most striking results of the World War, with what kindling pride and friendliness would not their hearts have swelled?

This triumph of republicanism, by the way, strikes at the root of the conception which grew up in the first half of the last century, and which has persisted down to our day, that there are such things as an American political system and as a European political system, the one fundamentally different from the other. However we may demur, the plain fact is that there were two distinct systems, one democratic, the other autocratic, but that the distinction has now completely broken down. Not only are we bound nearer by ship, cable, racial affinity and commercial interest, to Western Europe than to Latin America, but the analogy of our American form of government is much closer to the alert and energetic democracies of the Old World than to the somewhat special republicanism of

our Latin American neighbors. If Latin American institutions influence us, the influence is so slight as to be imperceptible; whereas, between Western Europe and the United States there is a constant interchange and interaction of political ideas. Indeed, if there is at present any dominant political system in the world, it is that formed by natural affinities, between the great democracy of North America and the great democracies of Western Europe, who have learned from us, and from whom we, in turn, are continually learning.

But though our moral position has been reinforced and consolidated by democracy's sudden overthrow of the last strongholds of autocracy, this change, for all its significance, seems meager, when compared with the tremendous transformation which the war has brought about in our political position. In 1914, we were a second-rate power. We had no military establishment to speak of, and our navy was inferior alike to that of Britain and that of Germany, while Japan gave sign of a desire to challenge us even for third place. Germany, after Britain, seemed desirous of testing out, on occasion, the solidity of our Monroe Doctrine. Mexico baited us with impunity, and the Japanese talked freely of the possibilities of invading our territory.

Since 1917, we have demonstrated that our resources for modern war, in rawstuffs, industries, manpower, technical skill, and organizing ability, are second to none. The demonstration was somewhat expensive, but it was worth the money, for there is not a power on earth that would dream, to-day, of attempting to invade us. As for our navy, the Washington agreement establishes its equality with that of

Britain, and consecrates its superiority to that of Japan. In an emergency, we are dependent upon nobody for anything. There are only four really strong military powers left in the world—France, Britain, Japan, and Russia, and not one of them, with the possible exception of Britain, can seriously hurt us. As regards this last, we are probably in a position to do it greater harm than it can do us. No one any longer meditates colonization in either of the Americas. There are at least three states in South America—the Argentine, Chile, and Brazil—which are apparently quite capable of looking after themselves. And in Article 21 of the covenant of the League of Nations, the Monroe Doctrine, which no nation except Britain had theretofore recognized, has received the formal acknowledgment of more than fifty states.

George Washington's ideal has been realized beyond his fondest expectations. The United States, after a vigorous and not uninfluential adolescence, has come of age. Endowed with vast resources, with a lively and enterprising population, with wise policies and high ideals, we can face the world, if we will, in utter calmness, intending no one harm, and fearing no one. The one weakness in our position is neither moral nor material, but psychological—the hesitation to take contact with other nations, even when such contact is clearly to our interest, lest we decline, in the process of association, from our imagined moral superiority, and lay ourselves open, in our innocence, to the machinations of foreign diplomacy. I have shown, or tried to show, that our assumption of moral superiority is probably gratuitous, and that it is of small practical utility except as a demagogic device in our home poli-

tics. I have shown also, I think, that there is not a nation in the world to-day of whom we need stand in apprehension, not one that does not respect our power, and sincerely desire our friendship. Since there is no one who can hurt us, of what are we afraid? Is it of soiling our hands? But no good reason is apparent why we cannot keep our own ideals immaculate, if we will, through any contacts whatsoever. Is it of being made to do something against our own better judgment? But who is strong enough to force us, and by what means? Is it of being tricked, of getting always the worst of the bargain? But are we then so stupid? What an ignominious attitude! I, for one, must protest against this implied defamation of our intelligence. If we are really so ignorant of how to conduct our affairs, then it is time we learned—and the sooner the better.

The truth is that our various fears and suspicions are idle. It is our duty and our interest to accept frankly that place of pre-eminence in the world to which circumstances, and our own gathering energies, have led us. Strong in our traditional policies, neither cringing nor bullying, neither meddling nor standing aloof, let us look to our interests wherever we may find them, and co-operate, as interest and good-will may dictate, with other peoples for the better ordering and more solid organization of that larger world in which we live.

INTEREST VERSUS IDEOLOGY

POLICIES whose foundations are sunk, not in the firm rock of national interest, but in such ideologies as prejudice, unjustified fear, sentimental affections or hatreds, the spirit of reform and crusade, the sense of moral superiority, are built upon quicksand. "It is a maxim founded on the universal experience of mankind," wrote Washington to Congress, "that no nation is to be trusted further than it is bound by its own interest, and no prudent statesman or politician will venture to depart from it." This is to say, that while sentiment is fickle, and betrays, interest is a true and faithful counsellor; that nations which act upon interest are sure of themselves, and may be depended upon by others, whereas nations acting upon sentiment are of a changing mind, hard to understand and harder still to co-operate with. This lesson, so simple to formulate, is nevertheless a difficult one for the nations to learn; and indeed, only the wisest statesmen—a Richelieu, a Washington, a Bismarck, a William Pitt—seem ever fully to have apprehended its profound significance.

What is dangerous to the world is not that nations should act reasonably, in accordance with their interests, but that they should act unreasonably, at the dictation of the reforming instinct, or of some megalomaniac dream. In glaring attestations to this truth,

all history abounds. Take France. In Richelieu's time, France was in mortal peril from Charles V, whose empire, comprising Austria, Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands, encompassed it on every side. The great cardinal thwarted his formidable opponent, and saved his country, and all Europe as well, from Hapsburg hegemony, by understanding that, in an era when other states were torn by religious passions and the spirit of crusade, France should be guided solely by its interest. In the century that followed, however, France became hypnotized by the "Austrian peril," and was completely dominated by hatred of the Hapsburgs, even after the Hapsburgs ceased to be dangerous. Toward the end of the reign of Louis XIV, Charles II of Spain died, bequeathing the Spanish throne to Louis' grandson, the Duke of Anjou, who then became Philippe V of Spain. Louis, dreaming empty grandeur, and obsessed by anti-Hapsburg sentiment, designed to unite Spain and France under a single Bourbon crown. As Spain then ruled over Italy as well, and still held its vast colonial empire, the Emperor of Austria challenged the Bourbon claim to Spain; and all Europe, including England, frightened at the prospect of French hegemony, joined the Emperor against France and Spain. There followed from 1701 to 1713, the War of the Spanish Succession, which ended indecisively in the Treaty of Utrecht. France thought it had its way in this treaty, for Philippe V was left on the Spanish throne, but only on condition that Spain and France should never attempt to unite—a reservation which, though the French seemed not to see it, made all the difference. The only power which really profited by this war was

England, which, guided by wise statesmen, had been consistently looking after its interests. The Treaty of Utrecht was the beginning of Britain's domination, and of France's decline. Britain had conquered and held Gibraltar and Port Mahon, and thus obtained control of the Western Mediterranean. By exacting the demolition of the French port of Dunkirk, it obtained control of the Channel. By neutralizing Germany, Italy, and Belgium, it effectively separated France from Austria, and re-established a continental balance. It imposed over the continental principle of legitimacy, the British principle of public law, born of the Revolution of 1688, that king's rights are limited by the interest and will of the people. It caused the cession of Bremen to Hanover, and the opening of Bremen, by Hanover, to England. From France it obtained Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and the Hudson Bay territory, thus preparing the conquest of Canada, which it successfully encompassed a generation later. Finally, it made Spain close its colonies to everyone except England, it obtained a monopoly of the slave-trade, and laid the foundations of its commercial domination of South America—all at the expense of France and Spain. And yet the French, obsessed by the age-long quarrel of Hapsburgs and Bourbons, were satisfied because a Bourbon prince now sat upon the Spanish throne! The war of the Spanish Succession is almost unparalleled as an example of a great nation, blinded to its own interests by a traditional prejudice. The French, however, have been prone in the past to obsessions of this kind. The crusades of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic period were sheer folly.

Nor is the inclination to act upon ideology rather than upon interest limited to the past. Germany, convinced of its own moral, material, and intellectual superiority, went crusading in 1914, for the purpose of extending its benefits to neighboring peoples, whether they would or no. The consequences are fresh in everyone's mind. Britain, which is usually less apt than other powers to betray its own interests, crusaded with Greece against the Turks for more than two years, to the end that it has set Egypt and all India by the ears, and made for itself a world of unnecessary trouble and humiliation. Woodrow Wilson went to Paris more intent upon setting up a League of Nations, than upon defending or advancing America's interests, with the result that his own people repudiated him, and that the entire peace settlement was thrown askew. From ideologic undertakings of this kind, unless they are first firmly rooted in national interest, little good can come.

Unless I am mistaken, we in America are particularly prone to be carried away by our emotions. It is perhaps our strength in war, but is our weakness in peace, that when we attempt to do a thing, we do it with our whole hearts, unanimously, and so create for ourselves a feverish atmosphere of mental suggestion which may be stimulating, but which is inimical to cool judgment.

I recall with what enthusiasm, a few years ago, to the slogan of "remember the Maine," we set ourselves to the expensive and entirely useless task of dragging up the wreck of that lost battleship from the bottom of Havana harbor. The incident is small, but not unnoteworthy. And especially, I recall the opening

day of the Washington Conference, when Secretary Hughes presented his plan for the limitation of naval armaments. Members of the House and Senate, crowding the galleries, stood up and clapped and stamped their feet, and shouted as if at a mass-meeting. All day, men went about shaking one another's hands in silent fervor, or looking ecstatically in one another's eyes and murmuring "Wonderful! Magnificent!" Cynical, veteran journalists, with gray temples, wrote in all seriousness flowery encomiums worthy rather of school-girls on graduation-day. The entire country was thrown into a flutter of facile humanitarian sentiment. It was obvious that, from this moment, the American people expected the Washington Conference to elevate itself into a sort of international revival, at which, one after another, to the singing of hymns and the shouting of "Hosannas," the worldly nations would march up to the mourners' bench and lay down their sins. The result was first that certain foreign diplomats, taking full cognizance of the situation, capitalized it, and used our own public sentiment for their own ends, against ourselves; and, second, that our own people, finding, as time went on, that their superlative optimism had not been fully warranted, put the blame on others, and fell into an equally unwarranted state of pessimism and disillusion, engendering futile emotions of suspicion, self-glorification and dislike.

Compared to such revivalistic debauches, a policy based calmly on national interest may appear sordid and sinister; but in fact it is neither. The republicans of revolutionary France did not have an interest to attempt to spread their doctrines by force of arms.

Napoleon did not have an interest to ride the war-horse over Europe, year after year, indefinitely. Kaiser Wilhelm did not have a real interest to declare war on Russia and France in 1914. Nothing is more resented by mankind than meddling and crusading. The nation which is most respected is the nation which, without interfering unnecessarily in other people's affairs, looks after its own affairs in a loyal and businesslike manner. Of course, the word interest is not to be understood in its narrower sense, I mean, not the small, immediate, plausible interest of to-day, which is apt to be misleading, but enlightened, far-seeing interest, which looks behind, and looks ahead, and takes account of every important element, both ponderable and imponderable.

Construed in this broader way, interest is not only the safest policy for the nation itself, it is the only sound basis for international co-operation. To some, the statement may sound paradoxical. Yet the truth is, as Washington well knew, that the formula or institution will never be devised which can yoke the nations and make them pull together, when their interests do not lie in the same direction. Internationalism is going to develop and hold what it gains, to just the extent that the nations, viewing the world in the loftiest way, find that they have interests in common. Where interest is lacking, good-will will soon vacillate and flag; and without good-will, no covenant is worth the parchment it is printed on, for the signatories will always find side-doors out of their engagements, and will convince themselves that in escaping so, their action has been wholly right and just. He who endeavors, therefore, to set up internationalism

on pillars of ideology, does the cause of peace and understanding among the nations a great disservice, for his tentative will be more likely to embitter than to reconcile. The true internationalist is he who is ever making analyses in terms of national interest, and who searches to discover those points, ever more numerous in our modern world, at which the diverse interest of diverse peoples converge.

OUR TRADITIONAL POLICIES

A CONCEPTION is current among us that our political traditions are opposed to the pursuance of an open-minded policy of interest, and that having to choose between the abandonment of an interest, and the following of that interest even into Europe, we should be well advised to let the interest lapse. This conception, in my opinion, is in reality a misconception, arising from a confusion between the principle and its application. The reasons why Washington, for instance, admonished us to avoid unnecessary involvements with Europe were, first, that we at that time had no interests there, and second, that Europe at that time was a danger to us. He certainly did not mean that we should continue to shy at dangers which have ceased to exist, or that we should ever fail to accept frankly the fact of our interests, whatever this fact might imply. The virtue of a good principle is that it can be readily adapted to changing circumstances. It insures unity and continuity, in the midst of diversity. What we have now to do, therefore, is not in any way to change our principles, but merely to understand and re-adapt them.

Indeed, to aid us to find our way through the complex situation suddenly bequeathed us by the war, we are fortunate, I think, in possessing a body of tradi-

tional policies of quite exceptional soundness and virtue. These policies were evolved, out of the national character and the national experience, by able statesmen, possessing a clear view of the political world in which they lived. They are policies which, in the main, have worked. It is under their benign action that we have become what we are. Not only have they worked, preserving our independence, and safeguarding our growth to strong and prosperous maturity but they express us—our hard-headed, straight-thinking commercial instinct, our democracy and hatred of privilege, our profound respect for law, our quick humanitarian sentiment. We can and should develop and adapt them; but to try to ignore or amend them would be an act as foolish as it would be futile.

These policies, eleven in number, may be grouped under three heads—political, economic, and moral. First, the political policies:

1. No permanent alliances; no meddling in affairs which do not concern us, whether in Europe or in any other part of the world. The trouble with permanent alliances, as we found to our distress in 1793, is that they tend to involve us, needlessly, expensively, dangerously, in other peoples' quarrels or vain crusades. The trouble with meddling, as Woodrow Wilson discovered in attempting to dictate a Fiume settlement in 1919, is that it is thankless, profitless, and inconclusive, making us enemies rather than friends. In short, the thought underlying this whole basic policy is that we should occupy ourselves with our interests, and only with our interests.

2. Temporary military co-operation for limited

ends. This is a corollary of the foregoing conception. It recognizes that when we have an interest to do so, we can profitably associate ourselves, temporarily, for a given purpose, with another power or powers, as with France in 1778; with Britain for the policing of the slave-trade off the African Coast, in 1842; with Britain, Holland, and France, for the opening by force of the Straits of Shimonoseki, in 1863; with Britain and Prussia, for the suppression of piracy in Chinese waters in 1870; with Britain, France, Germany, and Japan, for the relief of the Peking legations, in 1900; and with the Western European powers against the Central Empires in 1917.

3. The Monroe Doctrine. The essence of this famous doctrine is simply that, for reasons of its own national security, the United States cannot willingly permit any non-American power to extend its colonies on either of the American continents, or to infringe upon the independence of any American state. It does not imply that we ourselves intend in any way to infringe upon the sovereignty of any American state, or even that we will try to protect other American states from chastisement in war by non-American powers; but only that, for purposes of our own, we will try to prevent such powers from establishing themselves, or from expanding their existing establishments, by war or by any other means, in the American hemisphere.

4. Pan-Americanism. This is the doctrine that independent American states, having certain interests in common, should co-operate, on an equal footing, and without sanction of force, for the furtherance of these common interests. This co-operation does not preclude the United States, or any other American

state, from co-operating, at the same time, in any way it may think advisable, with one or a number of non-American states.

5. Territorial expansion, conscious or unconscious, first on the North American continent, later in the Caribbean and the Pacific. For more than half a century, the United States has renounced all idea of forcible territorial expansion; but, on the other hand, it has not refused the responsibility of new territories or protectorates whenever circumstances, or interest combined with circumstances, have placed them in its way. In President Harding's words, "The lure of the waters, or the march of empire, or the call of commerce, or inscrutable destiny," have led us on. There is little doubt that in the Caribbean, for example, where our interests, both economic and political, so far surpass those of any other power, "inscrutable destiny" has not yet spoken its last word.

Next, the economic policies:

6. Equal opportunity; the "open door." This is our protest, as old as our life as a nation, against international privilege, exclusive rights, and unfair discriminations. It is the battle-cry of our unending effort to obtain for our commerce the same equitable treatment which we accord to foreign commerce in the United States. It applies not only to the Far East, but to every part of the world; although of course we push it more energetically in those regions where we believe our rights in this respect to have been most clearly established. Incidentally, it implies the vigilant defense of these rights by diplomatic means.

7. The freedom of the seas and of international

waterways. This conception comprises not only a series of what we consider to be fair and just rules for the protection of our neutral seaborne commerce from the exaggerated pretensions of belligerents in time of war, but also a settled policy of exerting our influence for the opening of ocean fisheries and of international straits, canals, and rivers to foreign commerce on common terms in time of peace. We fought the Barbary States in 1801 and 1815 to force them to cease levying on our Mediterranean commerce. We led the movement which put a stop in 1857 to the exaction of tolls by Denmark from ships passing between the North Sea and the Baltic. We succeeded in opening the St. Lawrence, Yukon, Porcupine, and Stikine rivers to international commerce in 1871; the Uruguay River in 1853; La Plata in 1856; the Paraguay and Parana rivers in 1859; the Amazon in 1866; and we participated, in 1919, in the negotiation of those clauses of the Versailles treaty by which the Rhine, Danube, and other great international European waterways are similarly opened to foreign traffic.

Finally, the moral policies:

8. Non-intervention in the internal affairs of other nations, except to protect American lives and property. We believe that the people of any given country should be left free to settle their own affairs in the way that seems to them best; provided, however, that they duly respect recognized American rights and the recognized principles of international law.

9. Non-recognition of revolutionary governments, until they have made show of accepting in good faith their international engagements, and until they seem to have won the support of the majority within the

limits of their jurisdiction. In a word, we believe in law, in the sanctity of contracts, and in democracy.

10. International co-operation, without sanction of force, for the advancement of international law and justice, for the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, such as arbitration; for the purpose of restoring peace by the tender of our good offices; and, in general, for the promotion of common social or moral interests.

11. Protest, without threat, or implication of force, against gross inhumanity, wherever it may occur—though of course this policy, to avoid the appearance of mere meddling, has to be applied sparingly, and with discrimination; non-political material aid, singly, or in co-operation with other powers, to the sufferers from great catastrophes, of whatever race and clime.

I may add, that there was consecrated in Washington, in the year 1922, another characteristically American policy—that of limiting armaments by international agreement—a policy which, first timidly experimented with in 1818 by the Great Lakes agreement between the United States and Canada, taken up again in 1902 between Chile and the Argentine Republic, is now playing an increasingly important rôle on the stage of world-affairs. This principle, if it proves ultimately successful, will undoubtedly be absorbed into the body of American foreign policy.

Such, eliminating mere prejudice, and distinguishing between the principles and their application at any given time, is the legacy of the past, as revealed rather by our deeds than by our words. It is both noble and adequate. It holds no countenance for boisterous and ineffective assertions of moral superiority, for idle

fears or for petty and ungenerous suspicions. All of the political and economic policies—and even the moral policies, when looked at broadly—are seen to be derived from lofty considerations of national interest. No permanent alliances, temporary military co-operation for limited ends, the Monroe doctrine, pan-Americanism, territorial expansion, the open door, the freedom of the seas and of international waterways—all are dictated, not by sentiment, but by interest. Non-intervention, respect for international engagements, democracy, arbitration, the advancement of international law—these, too, though not derived primarily from interest, are not without an interested element, for their general recognition could not but redound to our advantage. Protests against inhumanity in other parts of the world, and aid to sufferers from catastrophes, are of course luxuries, but they are luxuries which we can well afford, and which, generally speaking, and in the largest sense, will do us more good than harm, for they will fortify our good name, and in so far as we avoid mere meddling, will make us more friends than enemies. All things considered, it is to the objective analysis of our national interests, as modified and elucidated by the war, and to the furtherance of these interests in harmony with our traditional policies, that we should therefore now scrupulously apply our energies.

OUR NEW POLITICAL INTEREST

BRUSHING aside the cobwebs of inherent prejudice, and assuming confidently that even our traditional policies command us to look, in an enlightened and far-seeing manner, rather to our interests than to our passing emotions, let us now inquire, objectively, what these new interests are which the war has bequeathed to us; for that such new interests exist, is rendered certain, even in advance, by the very grandeur of the upheaval. In opening this inquiry, we shall be well advised in keeping to broad outlines, to guiding principles, by which, amid the disparate and changing complexities of circumstance, we may test events as they arise, and accordingly orient our actions. Specific interests, let it be said, are in nearly every case little more than passing phases of some more general interest; the details of policy are ephemeral, and can properly be determined only from day to day, in relation to the main current of affairs. To such concrete questions, therefore, as our interests in China or Turkey, in the reparations controversy, or in inter-allied debts, no answers are here to be sought. What permanently matter are the more general issues; war or peace, order or disorder, expansion or contraction. Once these are fixed upon, the details become merely so many diplomatic problems, to be settled at the dictation of expediency. The bold, outstanding fact,

as I have already emphasized, is that through the war we have become a world-power—perhaps even potentially the greatest of world-powers; for Britain, although it has rich and varied imperial resources, is not so concentrated as the United States, and hence, in an emergency, is less fitted for rapid and unified action. Upon the moral implications of this new world pre-eminence of ours, I shall not dwell, for they are obvious. If there is duty at all between the nations, it is that of the strong to help the weak; it is that of the more powerful to assist the less powerful toward the settlement of their difficulties and their disputes. Rather does our attention require to be directed to the world-wide political and economic implications, for these, though equally inescapable, have been less clearly recognized.

Political and economic interests are not the same thing, certainly, yet to all practical purposes they are inextricably intertwined. The motives of nations, as of men, are mixed. Considerations of pride, ambition, fear, and considerations of money, act and react, the one upon the other. In the study which I made three years ago of *Balkanized Europe*, I demonstrated that whereas economic reconstruction is the urgent need of that unhappy region, economic remains contingent upon political reconstruction, for until the nations have consented to the new political order, they will not consent to co-operate in establishing the new economic order. What is true in Central Europe and the Balkans, is true in Asia and in America. Political relations and business relations affect one another. A little state like Portugal may perhaps claim to have eliminated politics from its foreign affairs, but only

because it has fallen almost entirely under the political influence of another state, Britain. For a large state, however, to pretend that its interests are solely economic, or solely political, is puerile. Inevitably, they are both. A merchant who believed that his prosperity depended solely upon the quality and price of his goods, and not at all upon the good-will of his customers, or upon his general standing in the community, would deceive only himself; and a great power which thinks it can limit its foreign relations to economics is the victim of no less a delusion. Our interests, therefore, such as they are, will be found to be both economic and political, if only because we live in an age when, to attain economic ends, it is often necessary to employ political means. We may place the emphasis either on the economic or the political aspects of our policies, as we may desire; but to deny the one altogether, would be as futile as to deny the other.

Although in practice, as I have said, it is next to impossible to separate political from economic motives, in theory, for purposes of analysis, a distinction is necessary. Let us take up first, accordingly, our new political interests, and put the main question at once: are we interested in any way in provoking or countenancing war, or have we rather an interest in the maintenance and ordering of peace?

For most Americans, this question is no sooner stated than answered. We have in the past profited by the wars of other peoples. Similarly, other peoples have to some extent profited by our own greatest struggle, the Civil War. We have also fought wars in which we ourselves profited, not least among which must be mentioned the recent World War, which has

so changed relative positions as to raise us to pre-eminence. Yet despite their incontestable military qualities, the people of the United States are peace-loving, in the main, and have always manifested a peculiar abhorrence of the losses and destructions of war, whether material or human. Moreover, we are now so strong that we no longer fear anyone. Britain could not attack us with impunity. Japan might seize the Philippines, but our resources are immense, and we have no doubt of our ability, in the long run, to recover those Asiatic islands, despite the width of the Pacific Ocean and the valor of our possible opponents. Since the formal dissolution of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in the Four-Power Pacific treaty, there is no individual power, and there is no group of powers, which we definitely desire to see weakened. Neither, from a different viewpoint, is there any people whose territory we so greatly covet that we should be ready to fight in order to take it away from them. The assertion may confidently be made, therefore, that we have now no direct political interest in promoting, participating in, or even countenancing, war.

Have we an indirect interest in war? With equal assurance, it may be asserted that we have not. What we want, as I shall show in detail in the next chapter, is to be able safely to trade and to make investments in all the great markets and all the great centers of resources in the world. We are already suffering economically because of the delay in European reconstruction. A new military shock, at least until present economic wounds are healed, might ruin indefinitely what are still some of the world's wealthiest and most populous markets, and thereby still further hamper

our own economic development—that is, our prosperity. Beyond this immediate danger, is one more general. So closely is the world now knit together by modern communications and modern commercial relations, that any war, anywhere, is henceforth likely to be a bad thing for the United States. The day of the professional soldier and the little chess-playing armies of Marlborough and Eugene, with their marching and counter-marching, taking a town here and a town there, and always avoiding battle—that day has gone! Modern science has rendered war unspeakably horrible and destructive. Modern democracy, with its doctrine that all citizens, even the women and children, are equally concerned in the national defense, has made war complete. Half the nations of Europe, in the XVIII Century, could remain in arms for a decade, and except that taxes were increased and a few unfortunate communities were ravaged, no one suffered greatly. But four years of war, in our own time, were sufficient to impoverish the richest civilization in history, and to throw the whole world out of gear, economically, for how long, none dare prophesy. The United States has not only to fear loss to its trade and investments, should foreign peoples again begin blowing one another to bits, but with the lesson of 1914-18 in mind, it has even to envisage the possibility of being itself once more drawn into the vortex.

There is, I think, no need to carry the argument farther. The United States has no interest, either direct or indirect, in war. It has, on the contrary, a strong interest in peace and to preserve the peace it may, and should, in defense of this interest, use whatever means the circumstances render expedient,

whether the dangers lie between itself and another power, or between two or more foreign powers. I shall have occasion later to enter more fully upon a discussion of the available means of checking or avoiding war. The conclusion to be recorded here is that the United States, from this time on, has a definite political interest in peace, in every part of the world, and is not to be considered as meddling, or as interfering unduly, when it asserts this interest, and acts in its defense. Indeed, given the pre-eminence of our position, both political and economic, we are far more likely henceforth to arouse wide-spread enmity in abstaining from the peaceful endeavors of the nations than by sharing in them.

In addition to this general political interest in peace which has accrued to it from the war, the United States has a number of other more specific pre-eminent political interests, notably in North and Central America, in the Caribbean, in the Pacific, and in the Far East, which are clearly understood by most of our people, and which still fully subsist. They have to do primarily with pre-occupations of national defense, or of economic expansion, and are in no sense compromised by our new interest in world-peace. If the contrary should be asserted, as for example, that by trying to help preserve peace in Europe, we should be provoking the Europeans to interfere, in return, in our own affairs, and so weakening our own general political position, I would say simply that, if we were plotting war in Central or South America, this might be true; but that as we are thinking only of peace, we need not be afraid, even if one or more of the European powers, in the course of some Mexican or South American

dispute, should volunteer to help us toward a peaceful solution: perhaps the aid so proffered would even be of use to us. In any case, if we did not want it, we should have only to refuse it. We are strong enough to be able to rest assured that no effort will be prolonged to force such aid upon us against our will.

OUR NEW ECONOMIC INTEREST

"RACE, yes; territory — country — yes; the heart thrills, the eyes fill, self-sacrifice seems natural, the moral motive for the moment prevails; but in the long run the hard pressure of economic truth comes down upon these with the tyranny of the despot."

If this philosophizing of that profound student of history, Admiral Mahan, is, as I suspect, fundamentally sound, it behooves us further to inquire with particular diligence what is, for us, the new economic truth, whose pressure, in the long run, may be expected to come down, as he says, so tyrannously.

The Great War intervened at a psychological moment in the economic development of the United States. Our country, though by no means fully developed, was netted with railroads assuring adequate communication and contained over 100,000,000 people. From having been chiefly an agricultural and mining, we were becoming also a great industrial power. Only about half of our population was engaged in agriculture. Our foreign trade, since 1830, had been doubling regularly every twenty years. Generally speaking, our chief exports were still foodstuffs and raw materials; but every year we were consuming more and more of our own raw products, and were sending abroad a larger share of our manufactures. In 1913, it was estimated that if our factories had been run at

their full capacity, their output would have been increased by twenty-five per cent. But we had no real enthusiasm for foreign commerce. We paid out large sums of interest annually for the capital which Europe had advanced to our railroads and industries; and we invested our own savings at home. We had no foreign banking facilities, no merchant marine, and a strong prejudice pervaded the whole country against taking up residence abroad for the purpose of representing American firms. It was felt that a man who thus courted exile was cutting himself off not only from friends and family, but from opportunity. The fact remained, however, that as events were then marching, it was only a question of time until the expanding industries of the United States would be obliged, in spite of prejudice, to look for markets afar. Unconscious as we were, our destinies were being molded none the less surely.

The war came, interrupting sea-borne commerce, and paralyzing, for the moment, Europe's purchasing power. People who had hitherto been contentedly ignorant of everything beyond the three-mile limit, suddenly discovered, to their surprise, that the United States already had a vast, if not a vital, interest in foreign trade, and that by far the greater part of this trade was necessarily with the thickly-populated and highly civilized continent of Europe. Our first lessons were in copper and in cotton. Europe stopped buying: the copper-mines of Lake Superior and the Northwest simply shut down; the price of our cotton fell to less than cost, and the entire South suffered a full year of intense economic depression. These circumstances led to a closer study of our economic situation; and

William C. Redfield, then Secretary of Commerce, announced that "our factories are so large that their output at full time is more than American markets can continuously and regularly absorb; and we know now that if we will run full time, all the time, we must do it by reason of orders we take from lands beyond the sea. To do less than that means homes in America in which the husbands are without work; it means factories that are shut down part of the time. And because the markets of the world are greater and steadier than the markets of any one country can be, and because we are strong, we are going out into the markets of the world, and get our share."

The war was our opportunity. Excepting ourselves and Japan, the world's chief trading nations were locked in mortal combat. We soon replaced these nations in many of their former markets, and we became the chief purveyors to the allies. During both the period of our neutrality and the period of our belligerency, our agricultural production was intensified, and our industries, especially our metallurgical and chemical industries, were increased by leaps and bounds. Within these few high-pressure war years, we anticipated our own economic and political development by several decades. Through no conscious effort of our own, we became suddenly the world's greatest military and economic power. As at the waving of a wand, our status was changed from that of a debtor to a creditor nation. We acquired a vast merchant marine. And we became so dependent upon these new markets of ours that a few years afterward, when Europe, embittered and impoverished, stopped buying again, millions of men in America were thrown out

of work, and there ensued the worst business crisis in our contemporary history. All things are relative. We ourselves poured billions into the bottomless pit of war. We ourselves made sacrifices. We ourselves are still driving our way stolidly through grave economic difficulties. But compared to that of the other great powers,—Britain, Germany, France, Italy—our situation is fortunate. Their ruin, or half-ruin, contrasted with our own energies and resources, has left us foremost. To-day, for the first time,—and is it to be only for a time?—we lead the van.

We shall be well advised to examine this new economic situation of ours in a few broad details. Our agriculture, as I have said, has been intensified. The cotton grower of the South is largely dependent, and the wheat-grower of the middle west, like the cattle-raiser of the southwest, is partly dependent on foreign markets for his prosperity. In the years 1910-14, our average export of cotton was 8,840,000 bales; in the year ending January 30, 1920, it was 7,870,000; and in 1921, 5,623,000 bales. In 1921, we exported 364,000,000 bushels of wheat, and 46,000,000 bushels of rye. Of ham, bacon, shoulders and lard, we exported, from 1910 to 1914, an annual average of 824,000,000 pounds; in 1920, 1,665,000,000 pounds. We also export large quantities of copper and oil, and we have begun to export coal. At the same time, against a premature exhaustion of our own resources, our great companies are seeking concessions abroad, not only in Central and South America, but in every part of the world. We control coal mines in Iceland, and we are interested in coal in China. Standard Oil groups are active in France, Roumania, Czecho-Slo-

vakia, Poland. The State department has vigorously undertaken the defense of American oil interests in Mesopotamia, Russia, and the Dutch East Indies. In 1914, we owned about 4 per cent of the world's merchant ship tonnage, to Britain's 41 per cent. In 1919, we had 25 per cent to Britain's 34 per cent. We have radio stations on the Asiatic mainland, cables in the Pacific, our own ocean mail lines. As for our manufacturers, not only are they establishing foreign offices and endeavoring to dispose of more and more of their own goods abroad, but they are also building factories abroad. The average annual total value of our foreign trade in the five years prior to 1914 was \$4,000,000,000; in 1920, the value was \$13,349,000,000, and in 1921, \$10,171,000,000. In 1889, the value of our export of manufactures of all kinds, including manufactured foodstuffs, was \$341,000,000, representing about 3.5 per cent of the total value of all our American manufactures; in 1919, thirty years later, this export was equal to \$5,120,000,000, corresponding to 8.5 per cent of our total American production. Moreover, this 8.5 per cent is not to be judged absolutely, but ramifies back through our whole industrial organism, affecting it in a hundred ways. "From the figures quoted," says a report issued in September, 1921, by the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, "we assume that no member will seriously consider . . . that the question of our foreign trade does not interest practically every business man, every farmer, and every worker in the United States."

Not less staggering to the mind, in their benumbing totals of billions, are the statistics relative to our sudden transformation from a debtor to a creditor state.

Before the war, it must be remembered, we were still drawing upon Europe's surplus economies to help finance our growth. Our own development is even now far from complete, yet so fantastic is the ruin of the great capitalist nations of Europe, that our whole position is reversed, and it is they, now, who look to us to help finance their reconstruction. To Europe, publicly, we have loaned \$10,000,000,000. Privately, we have loaned another three or four billions, and in addition we have repurchased and hold, in our own name, some five or six billions of dollars' worth of the securities formerly held by Europe. In short, after spending \$23,000,000,000 directly in the course of our own pursuit of the war, and advancing \$20,000,000,000 more as public or private loans, or for the repurchase of securities, we are still the first financial power in the world, the chief source of free capital, to which all turn, and will long continue to turn, in their hour of need. We may feel that we ourselves are needy enough, but we cannot obviate the simple fact that, considered relatively, our situation is munificence itself when compared with that of Britain, France, Germany, or Italy. Our financial stake in Europe at present is \$10,000,000,000, as a state, and three or four billions more as individuals, not to mention the hundreds of thousands which, as individuals, we obligingly contributed to the mark exchange swindle organized by the German government, or the millions more which we have invested abroad variously in city buildings, factories, and farm lands. And this outflow of American capital is certainly not ended. Every step which Europe takes toward the re-establishment of political equilibrium and of general confidence is a

fresh temptation to our investors, because of the solidity of our currency, when contrasted to that of the leading European countries. Over half the world's gold—far more than our normal share—reposes in our coffers. Indeed, we are the only great power, except Spain and Japan, which is able regularly to make its foreign payments in gold, and still keep its money on a gold basis. It is chiefly for this reason that, just as Spain ultimately supplanted Venice, and Amsterdam supplanted Spain, and London supplanted Amsterdam, so New York has now supplanted London, as the world's financial center. International business, which before the war was conducted largely in pounds sterling, is now conducted in dollars. This again is an incentive to invest abroad, for it attracts to the New York market the best foreign issues. Between January 1, and March 31, 1922, at a time when, according to some financiers, our powers of absorption were at low ebb, foreign securities, to a total of not less than half a billion dollars, were floated in Wall Street with instant success—bonds of Belgium, Brazil, Chili, Denmark, the Dutch Indies, France, Uruguay, and of several foreign municipalities. The great New York banks have established, since the armistice, important branches in the leading foreign capitals, and there is scarcely a tract of the globe where American financial power is not felt and respected.

Although there are of course sharp differences of opinion as to what concrete measures should or should not be taken in the circumstances, no thoughtful American any longer denies that the United States, because of its trade, its loans and its investments, has to-day a

real interest in economic conditions and their fluctuations, in every part of the world. On this point at least Republicans and Democrats are agreed. "The development of our industries requires, not simply that our foreign trade be maintained, but that it be persistently expanded," says the report of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States.

Unfortunately, at the very moment when, as I have said, through no particular forethought of our own, and owing almost entirely to the upheaval of the war, we have encompassed an enormous economic expansion, anticipating our normal advance by several decades, the entire world, owing also to the upheavals of the war, has been stricken with a disastrous economic crisis, which not only makes it impossible for us to expand our foreign trade as we should have liked, but which actually jeopardizes our entire new position. The cause and center of the crisis is Europe, where, for five years, all beneficent production ceased, giving place to an incomparable demolition of men, property and treasure, and impoverishing a continent. But so potent was, and is, the influence of that queenly continent upon the rest of the world, that Europe's poverty means hard times for all, reacting no less upon South America and Asia than upon the United States itself. On the one hand, there is this essential fact, that certain key industries, like the steel industry, which were already overdeveloped before the war, were enormously expanded during the war, for purposes of the war, in the United States, in Japan, in England, in Germany, in France, in Italy. On the other hand, there is this equally essential fact, that some 300,000,000 people are forced by poverty to

consume less than 30 per cent of what they consumed before the war, and that in consequence, world production is now proceeding lamely on something like a 50 per cent basis. Increased capacity for production, decreased capacity for consumption—this is the fateful anomaly which lies at the heart of the crisis. There are many attendant evils—the depreciation of currencies, the fluctuations of exchange, the burdens of debt and taxes, the disequilibrium of national budgets, but the heart of the matter is exactly as I have said—increased capacity for production, and decreased capacity for consumption. Until a balance is attained once more between these two factors, the crisis may perhaps be attenuated, but it cannot be entirely overcome. It would be pleasant to believe that, pending the ultimate restoration of the world's consumptive power, the world could maintain intact its recent productive power. The chances are, however, that there must be a leveling down as well as a leveling up. We are entering, it would seem, upon a period of long and difficult readjustments, in which, inevitably, many proud industries, now fighting with their backs to the wall, are going to succumb. The international struggle for survival in industry and in foreign trade generally, bids fair to drag on, intense and bitter, for a number of years. This is not pessimism; it is merely an attempt at logical deduction from given facts. I hope the deduction is wrong, but I am afraid it is right.

The United States is going to be involved—is already involved—in this new war of attrition—this economic war, in which the victor, as on the briefer, bloodier battlefield, will be he who can hold out the longest. The question before us is not, therefore,

whether we shall be able to increase our foreign trade, but whether we shall be able to maintain the gains already made—whether we shall not be out-manuevered, out-fought, and obliged to surrender a few decades of our sudden advance. To go forward, as we went forward, is easy; to go backward again is desperately hard. In other words, while re-adjustment up is pleasant, re-adjustment down is an infliction of pain, and in itself is therefore not immediately acquiesced in by any large element of population. Are we going to be able to keep even our present foreign markets? Are we going to be able to operate our new merchant marine? Is not London soon going to be able to wrest back the financial supremacy from New York? Our material resources, the natural energy of our people, the pre-eminence of our present international position, all are factors in our favor. But certain other factors, such as the continued depreciation of European exchanges, are against us. And especially, we have against us an element of our own psychology—our hesitancy in adapting old policies to new conditions, our uncertainty, our lack of unanimity of mind and will, in the face of this whole problem. In the saying “easy comes, easy goes,” there is a profound and disquieting truth. If we had battled our way inch by inch, year by year, to our new economic vantage-ground, no doubt we should stand as one man for its defense. But having achieved pre-eminence unconsciously, almost without effort, shall we therefore now, because difficulties confront and confuse us, relinquish all? The question may have a rhetorical ring; it is nevertheless of the most earnest and serious nature.

There can, I think, be but one answer. The gov-

ernment and people of the United States, being what they are, and having the traditions which they have, ought not to give up anything without a fight. We have an interest to increase, or at least to maintain, our foreign trade; we should not intend to overlook any suitable measure which might be helpful to this end. We have an interest to increase, or at least to safeguard, our investments abroad, and to defend our financial supremacy; the facts are becoming clear, and after a sufficiently prolonged study of these facts, in their broadest ramifications, we should intend to act, not once, but repeatedly and consistently, in accordance with this interest.

There was a time, seventy years ago, when the American merchant marine and American foreign trade were second only to those of Britain. The Civil War ruined this trade and this marine; the Great War has given them back to us with usury. We have come into our own. Whether we keep it, or lose it again, depends largely upon the speed and skill with which we adapt ourselves to our new situation.

ISOLATION VERSUS CO-OPERATION

Is there any trend in our traditional policies which runs counter to the frank recognition of these new interests of ours in peace and in economic expansion? I think not. Neither the one nor the other requires us to make permanent alliances; while at the same time our traditional policy of temporary military co-operation for limited ends enables us to associate ourselves with other powers to enforce sanctions against law-breakers and aggressors. Neither the Monroe nor the pan-American doctrine is now given by us any other than the most peaceful construction; and neither is longer challenged by any great power as being impertinent or provocative. Territorial expansion we have sought in the past, but in the strict sense of the word, we crave no more of it, if it cannot be had without bloodshed. Our old policies of the "open door," of the freedom of the seas, and of international waterways, go hand in hand with our need for economic expansion. Our belief in democracy and in non-intervention stands unchanged, but we are more determined than ever to protect our legitimate rights, and those of our citizens, in foreign lands. Our traditional impulses toward the settlement of disputes by peaceful means and toward humanitarian projects and endeavors have been, if anything, quickened, and tend

therefore to strengthen our interest in peace, as does our recent experiment in the limitation of armaments by international agreement. In short, contrary to the popular supposition, staid tradition by no means opposes what I have shown to be present interests, but conforms itself very well thereto.

Having established, therefore, that the main foreign policies of the United States should now be directed, on the one hand, toward the maintenance of world-peace, and on the other, toward economic expansion, we have finally to ask ourselves by what general means the attainment of these ends is to be sought—whether, that is, by isolation, or by international co-operation.

Both these means have been employed by us in the past, more or less in accordance with circumstances. We have remained isolated when it suited our interests, and we have co-operated when it suited our interests. Of the abstract arguments brought recently against co-operation, not one, in my opinion, can be successfully upheld.

It is said, for example, that co-operation means the surrender of our national sovereignty. But sovereignty, surely, consists in doing as one likes. If we like to agree to relinquish a right in exchange for an advantage, we are thereby exercising our sovereignty, not forswearing it. When we agree with Britain not to fortify the Canadian frontier, we give up a right, but so does Britain, and both are gainers. When we agree to limit the number and size of our capital ships, we again forego a right, but we do so for our own ends, and our sovereignty is fully asserted. It is only when one is forced to do something against one's will

that one's sovereignty is menaced, and this is not co-operation, but compulsion.

It is also said, rather feebly, that our Constitution inhibits us from co-operative agreements. But it has not done so in the past. I have already cited the relinquishment of our right to fortify the Canadian frontier, and of our right to have as many capital ships as we might build (Agreement of 1818; Treaty of Washington, 1922). There are plenty of other instances. We signed the Berlin Convention of 1884, relative to the Congo Free State. We ratified the Brussels Slave Trade Convention of 1890, and the Hague Conventions of 1898 and 1907. We participated effectively in the Algeciras Conference of 1905. We played the rôle of mediator in the Russo-Japanese War. We convened the Washington Conference in 1921. If, in the past, our Constitution has not debarred us from these forms of co-operation, why, in the present or future, should it debar us from similar or even other forms?

Our rather prudish, rather mawkish sense of moral superiority may act to deter us from association with European powers; the medium of international politics may seem to us unlovely; but surely it is a sound American sentiment that so long as the labor be honest and useful, the unloveliness of the medium is of no importance. And as for our fear of being tricked or entangled through co-operation, although I have discussed it at some length elsewhere, it may be opportune, just here, to invite a lesson from our Japanese friends.

The first Europeans came to Japan in the middle of the XVI Century, and were well received. But the

more the Japanese learned about Europe, the greater their disgust and their distrust became. They seem to have been well informed, and the spectacle of the Thirty Years' War, of Europe's religious intolerance and ruinous religious conflicts, was so far from reassuring, that they decided to rid themselves, at whatever cost, both of this dangerous Christianity and of the foreign traders and missionaries who were so disposed to quarrel over it. The Shimaraba massacre of Europeans took place in 1638, and from then until Commodore Perry's successful expedition, in 1853, Japan, maintaining an isolation as complete as even the most misguided Americans could aspire to emulate, remained closed to the outside world. But already, in those earlier days before the steamship and the ocean cable, isolation, if it brought external peace, brought also social degeneration and relative poverty. Japan began to decline. The population first increased, then, as famine succeeded famine, fell again. The aristocracy grew soft and corrupt. Even before European and American steam warships taught them the perils of falling behind in the methods of Western civilization, not a few Japanese leaders had begun to realize that the prolongation of the isolation policy was proving well-nigh fatal to Japan. An entire generation of revolutionary troubles was necessary, after 1853, before the Japanese fully abandoned the isolation idea; but having abandoned it, their observers went rapidly into all parts of the Western world, analyzing, studying, preparing to imitate; and as they had no prejudices, no preconceived notions, they were able to understand, and to reproduce for their own country, in a remarkably brief space of years, the essential elements

—diplomatic, military, administrative, industrial, financial—of the Occident's material progress. Japan is still an oriental country, psychologically no less than geographically; it is cognisant of its own mental and material separation from Europe, and of Europe's striking qualities and defects. But, instead of holding aloof from the world's counsels, as some Americans are inclined to do; instead of making this separation, this awareness of differences, a basis for renewed isolation, Japan is striving, by every possible means, to increase its influence in all international councils. Its diplomats—professionals, not amateurs like so many of ours—are present everywhere, in every great commission, conference, or international assembly. They do not concern themselves with idle disputes over abstractions. They are there to observe, to learn, to keep their government and their people quickly and accurately informed. In what does not concern them, they do not meddle; but wherever a Japanese interest is seen to be involved, their action is as prompt as it is firm and well directed.

If the Japanese, who have definitely abandoned isolation after a two-hundred years' trial of it, are able to co-operate without becoming unduly entangled, without being duped, and without being obliged to do things against their will, why cannot we? They have apparently learned more about cautious, cool-headed diplomacy in fifty years than we have learned in a century and a half. It is true they are an intelligent and able people; but are they, after all, abler and more intelligent than we? Without false modesty, a doubt is certainly here permissible.

Continuing the examination of the issue in its ab-

stract phases, we must acknowledge that the entire drift of the times, in whatever part of the world, is away from isolation, and toward co-operation; and our own successive statesmen have been among the first to recognize this drift. I do not speak of Woodrow Wilson. I will go back, for example, to James Blaine, who was fully aware—for the words are his own—of “that larger patriotism which constitutes the fraternity of nations,” and to William McKinley, who in his last public speech declared that “the period of aloofness is past” and that “no nation can longer be indifferent to any other.” If a further citation be expedient, I will take this one from John Hay, Theodore Roosevelt’s eminent Secretary of State: “The duty of sovereign states to promote international justice by all wise and efficient means,” he said, “is only secondary to the fundamental necessity of preserving their own existence. Next in importance to their independence, is the great fact of their interdependence.”

Given, then, that while in the past we have frequently sought isolation, we have also occasionally co-operated, and have clearly recognized the general drift of the world toward a closer structure and a better ordering; given, further, that our new interests lie in peace and in economic expansion, the question we have at last to ask ourselves is not whether it is abstractly permissible for us to co-operate, but merely whether these new interests can best be furthered by co-operative means, or by means of isolation.

To begin with, will isolation prevent war? It certainly will not prevent two or more foreign powers from fighting between themselves; and if the evidence of 1812 and of 1917 is to be considered conclusive,

it will not even prevent the United States from having to go to war in a cause not primarily its own. There is, moreover, reason to suspect that isolation indirectly encourages war. If Germany, in 1914, had not felt sure that Britain would remain isolated, it would not have set the match to the powder. If it had had the faintest idea that even the United States would feel forced to abandon its isolation, it would certainly have recoiled from the prospect. In short, the supposition that, whatever happened, Britain, and of course, the United States, would remain isolated, far from acting as a deterrent, was actually an encouragement to the aggressor. One may even speculate that if the United States, in the last war, had not persisted so long in its isolation, we should all now be better off, for the period of actual destruction would have been shortened, and the Russian revolution, with its attendant horrors of chaos and famine, probably would not have happened, or at least would have happened in quite different conditions.

But if there is no insurance against war in isolation, is this insurance to be found in co-operation? In a later chapter, entitled *The Will to End War*, the whole subject of the cause and prevention of war is discussed in detail. For the moment, it will be sufficient to enumerate the known checks upon war, and to ask how many of them can be made effective save by international co-operation. These checks are: democracy, open diplomacy, economic equity, joint as opposed to individual interventions, neutral zones, "buffer" states, limitation of armaments, codification of international law, arbitration, federation, the balance of power, treaties of guarantee and non-aggression, "cooling-off"

treaties, "good offices," commissions of inquiry, international conferences, the League of Nations, and popular education in international understanding. I will go so far as to assert that not one of these checks can be applied effectively by any nation, in the cause of peace, unless a similar application is made at the same time by other nations; for if it takes two or more to make a war, so it takes at least two to avoid a war. In particular, the constant co-operation of all the greater powers is necessary in connection with the more pretentious peace tentatives, such as joint interventions, limitation of armaments, the furtherance of international law and courts, arbitration, the balance of power, treaties of guarantee and non-aggression, "good offices," commissions of inquiry, international conferences, and associations.

Let us, then, ask a third question: can isolation aid us in the pursuance of economic expansion? The words "isolation" and "expansion" are self-contradictory. The only possible meaning to be discovered in such a question is the intimation that we might have an interest to stand aside while the Europeans ruin themselves in endless quarrels, and thereby fortify our relative economic supremacy. We may have had such an interest, to some extent, in the past. But, as we have recently had occasion to experience, it is sometimes difficult to stand aside, and, in any case, what good would our economic supremacy be to us in a ruined world, too poor to buy our goods, too exhausted to produce a surplus for our consumption? Our true aim is, or should be, to stand first, not in an impoverished, dying world, but in a rich thriving one.

The inevitable conclusion is that the only means

open to us of furthering our interest in world-peace and in economic expansion is that of international co-operation, the whole purpose of which is the better ordering and organization of the world, both for the preservation of peace, and for the facilitation of commerce. No nation can keep the peace by itself; it has to associate its endeavors with those of other powers. Nor is foreign trade possible except on a basis of definite understandings. The delicate political and economic mechanism of 1914 having been shattered by the war, it is necessary, as all men will concur, to set up a new, solider, completer mechanism, partly temporary, for purposes of present reconstruction, but in large part, permanent, for the future. In order that nations may make the exchanges on which their prosperity depends, there must be commercial, financial, and transportation agreements. In order that the nations may establish a peaceful and peace-loving public morality, there must be agreement upon certain broad principles of national right, upon what is known as international law, around which in case of political disputes or offenses, world opinion may crystallize. Individual agreements between two states are not enough. There must be also group agreements, corresponding to special geographic or economic interests; and universal agreements, corresponding to uniform universal interests. The establishment of these various agreements, which everyone in principle recognizes to be right and necessary, implies at the same time the establishment of organs of supervision, execution and reference; international courts, tribunals, boards of arbitration; international boards of control, councils, bureaus, institutes, commissions, international confer-

ences, and assemblies; and with all this, a constant endeavor at co-ordination and simplification, to prevent confusion, waste, the over-lapping of effort. Such, briefly, is the ideal of co-operation which the world, I take it, is just now confusedly striving to achieve.

In so far as we in the United States persist in refusing to co-operate in this vast movement, we are not only restraining a natural and generous tendency inherent in our people, but we are also acting against our own enlightened self-interest. Our interest to prevent and avoid war, our interest in economic expansion, can neither of them be effectively pursued save by policies of continuous and widespread international understanding. We may not always agree with the precise methods proposed; but in such a case, our aims should be rather to seek to modify these methods in practise, than to abstain altogether—childishly, as it were—because of some minor dissent.

The anomaly of our position is obvious. We have an interest in the establishment and preservation of world-order, which is as great, if not greater, than that of any other power; and in our hearts, we know it. Yet, because we are not entirely willing, as yet, to take a hand in the complex and difficult work itself, our immediate disposition is to stand by and encourage the others, in the hope that they will do the organizing, and that we may profit thereby. "Europe must first help itself," said President Harding, "then we will help."

A weak and bastard policy of this sort does not readily commend itself to an energetic popular mind like that of America, and if only for this reason, it cannot endure. The chief trouble with it, however, is

that it will not work. We return here to the fundamental point—the change in our situation effected by the war. So long as we were a second-rate military power, a debtor nation, with no great interest in foreign markets, we could afford to stand aside, assured that the world would nevertheless steadily run its course, and that others would see to the necessary ordering. But what is possible to a second-rate, debtor nation, is not always possible to a first-rate, creditor nation. When the strongest military power, the one with the greatest economic and financial resources, the one to which all the rest owe money, the one most ideally situated, materially and morally—when this foremost power stands aside, how are the others to get together? What arrangements can they make between themselves which are not half-farcical, so long as they have neither the participation nor the approval of the pre-eminent power? For world-organization implies both a common interest, and the development of a world-opinion whose disapprobation will be felt as a strong pressure by malcontents and recalcitrants. But among the other nations, a common interest in which the United States does not share, almost ceases to be a common interest. And so long as the strongest, most-respected nation stands aside, malcontents and recalcitrants can also, with impunity, step aside, assured thereby, not of falling into a difficult and painful isolation, as would be desirable, but of finding themselves in very excellent company indeed. World-organization without the active participation of the United States is therefore a practical impossibility. It may take both the world and ourselves some time to find this out, but the conclusion is inescapable. Our abstention

means not world-order, but a prolongation of that disorder for which, in withdrawing our co-operation after the war, we ourselves have been largely, if indirectly, responsible.

I am entirely confident that, once our people come to realize these implications of our new pre-eminent situation, they will soon order our policies accordingly. Shaking off empty prejudices, not meddling or crusading, but following our interests boldly into whatever part of the world; respecting our traditional policies, yet not hesitating to adapt them to changing circumstances, we shall find, I think, a faithful touchstone, a sure and friendly guide, in the broad principles of foreign relations which have been here enunciated: peace and economic expansion, by means of international co-operation. What is discordant with these principles, we should reject, but what harmonizes with them, is fitting to our new position and requirements in the world, and may be safely followed.

PART II

DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN
POLICY

THE CRISIS IN OUR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

THE brilliant and cynical political thinkers of the XVI Century could scarcely find strong enough words to express their contempt for the ignorance, the blind passions, and ungrateful impulses of the crowd. By the kindlier men of the XVIII Century, however, from whose theories our own faith in democracy is to some extent a derivation, it was commonly assumed that the mass of the people is naturally endowed with sense and perceptions of so high an order that the mere institution of popular consultation in great public questions would automatically do away with most political ills. After an experience of a hundred years, our present endeavor is to strike a just balance between these two extremes. The bulk of the people, we hold, is neither so ignorant and malicious as was supposed by Machiavelli, nor so eminently endowed as was fancied by Rousseau. Our axiom now—and although it is probably not above criticism, at least we succeed in making it work—is that the masses are apt to be right, but only in the long run, after protracted public debate, and adequate campaigns of education.

In foreign, even more than in domestic affairs, the axiom carries with it a suggestive and illuminating implication. Clearly, for the statesman to work out and announce what seems best for the nation, is not enough; before his conclusions can be brought down into prac-

tical application, the nation itself must be convinced. "In dealing with a democracy," as Sir Mountstuart Grant-Duff remarked a couple of generations ago," you must not only *be* right, but *seem* right." The principle may be sound, the analysis mathematically accurate, the information thorough, the deduction irrefutable; all is of no avail if you have not also the support of opinion. And the point in this: if the public is assumed to be right, not immediately, but only ultimately, then between the time when a few men see what ought to be done, and the time when a majority of the people see what ought to be done, a considerable period may intervene. This period will be one of crisis, when the pull of the new interest in the one direction, and the pull of traditional or prejudiced sentiment in another, tend to bring about a general paralysis of policy.

The United States, it so happens, is only just now struggling to emerge from a great crisis of this kind. The national interest devolving from our new situation after the war, lies, broadly speaking, as I think most non-partisan students of practical politics will agree, in the three principles of peace and economic expansion, to be furthered by means of international co-operation. Public sentiment accepts abstractly the ideas of peace and of economic expansion, but is not entirely willing, as yet, to accept the idea of international co-operation, which is the necessary corollary and vehicle of the other two. Interest commands that we should associate ourselves with other nations for the achievement of our own aims; sentiment is still prejudiced in favor of isolation and abstention. Sentiment in a democracy ruling supreme, interest is held in abeyance, and the crisis drags on.

Nearly four tormented precious years have elapsed, as I write, since the middle of 1919, when the paralysis in our external relations began. A lesser, weaker country might have paid heavily for such protracted incapacity; but so great are our wealth and resources, so pre-eminent—in spite of ourselves—is our position, that, to us, the loss may be reckoned chiefly in terms of time. But time itself, both politically and economically, is of importance, even to us. When the re-establishment of political stability, and consequently of economic stability, are unnecessarily delayed in Europe, it is not Europe alone which suffers, but we also, in our trade and our general finances. It may be that we should not have been able to hasten European reconstruction; the fact remains that we have not made a serious effort. And this is a grave thing to have to say regarding a nation which, being willy-nilly the greatest and strongest in the world, must inevitably, in the end, accept responsibilities proportionate to its power. In any case, sooner or later, the essential harmony between our interest and our sentiment will have to be restored; for the alternative, the indefinite protraction of impotence, is unacceptable from any point of view. With restored harmony, will come political health again, and renewed capacity for action.

How is this restoration of harmony to be brought about? The analyses of interest here set forth are founded on what appear to be existing circumstances. Either there is some fundamental flaw in the induction, a possibility which the writer, having acknowledged, must waive; or else our interest does positively repose, as has been said, in peace, economic expansion, and international co-operation, and this is a fact, and is

not subject to change at will. Setting aside, therefore, the idea of drifting indefinitely down the line of inaction, as being both unworthy and unsatisfactory to us, there remain only two alternatives: either we must conform our interest to our sentiment, or our sentiment to our interest. But since our interest derives from our circumstances, then in order to conform our interest to our aspiration toward detachment from the rest of the world, it would be necessary to change our circumstances. Although the moral drawbacks of isolation are certainly great, the theme, philosophically, may be worth arguing; practically, however, it is not. Practically, isolation implies self-sufficiency. There is perhaps no nation so nearly equipped for self-sufficiency as the United States. Yet behold the consequences. We should be obliged, in the first place, to rely solely on our own army and navy, and not at all on international agreements, for our defense, and for the avoidance of war. This system spells heavy armaments and is the negation of the principles established by the Washington Conference. We should be obliged, in the second place, so to readjust our existing national economy—the crops and acreage of our farms, the extent and kind of our factories—that radical transformations would be brought about in present currents of commerce and exchange, and doubtless also in the proportion of industrial to rural population. Readjustments on this vast scale might be conceivable, but they would prove so painful, economically, to such large elements of our population; they would involve such an exercise of almost superhuman strength of will, that they may as well be dismissed at once. We are not going to attempt them, not voluntarily, at any rate.

Since it may be assumed as dogmatic that we are not going to impose on ourselves the afflictions necessary to make our interest conform to the desire for isolation, it follows that we have no other recourse, if sentiment and interest are to be reconciled, than to educate present sentiment to conform to present interests. No contemporary task in politics is more urgent or more fundamental; for the problem has to be solved, not only specifically, with respect to the existing crisis, but generally, as well, with a view to preventing or to overcoming similar crises in the future.

PRESIDENT AND SENATE

THE argument has been advanced, that a constitutional machinery which lends itself to the development and protraction of political crises is outworn, and requires revision. Men have an old way, however, of attributing to institutions and to external events, failings which really spring rather from human indolence or carelessness. Certainly, it is good to have modern and well-adapted machinery; but too often, when the machinery is being blamed, the fault lies not there, but in the power, or spirit, which should be animating the machine. To vote a constitutional amendment may be easier than to arouse a great population to an enduring sense of civic duty; yet unless the sense of duty is manifest, no democracy, however carefully constituted, can function properly.

So much having been said, let us proceed to examine briefly the particular mechanism provided by our American Constitution, inquiring first how this mechanism was intended to work, second, how it has actually worked, and finally, whether the deficiency, if deficiency there be—is inherent in the mechanism itself, or is not to be charged rather against the spirit behind and within the mechanism.

The problem of foreign policy, in a democracy, consists in this: to secure, on the one hand, efficiency without dictatorship, and, on the other, popular control

without factionalism or demagoguery. The framers of our Constitution saw that while the initiative in diplomacy is properly an attribute of the executive, the conclusion of the treaties in which most diplomacy sooner or later terminates, is, in part, of legislative essence, for treaties have the effect of law, and are generally considered to take precedence over ordinary domestic legislation. Obviously, there must be some kind of legislative control over, or co-operation with, the President, in the making of treaties. But how is such supervision to be conciliated with that "secrecy and dispatch" which our earlier statesmen accepted as fundamental requisites in the conduct of foreign affairs?

The formula ultimately written into the Constitution declares that the President "shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur." The dignity of maintaining relations between our country and other countries is thus invested upon the chief-of-state, the peer, in international law and usage, of emperors and kings. "Secrecy and dispatch" are assured. The initiative, in foreign policy, is left to the President. So long as he does not finally commit the nation, he may take such action, open or secret, and give to our affairs such orientation, as may seem to him wise and expedient. Before finally committing us, however, he must solicit the advice, and obtain the consent, of the Senate. Here enters at once a safeguard against possible dictatorships, and an assurance of legislative participation in the making of treaties.

Some members of the constitutional assembly, strong Democrats, felt that the House, as well as the Senate,

should be consulted. Hamilton, in *The Federalist*, explains why this could not be: "Accurate and comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics; a steady and systematic adherence to the same views; a wise and uniform sensibility to national character; decision, secrecy and dispatch, are incompatible with the genius of a body so various and so numerous." The Senate, on the contrary, as Jay thought he foresaw, would be composed of a small number of carefully selected men, of the sort "who best understand our national interests." And Madison expounds how the way of election of the Senate, indirect and renewing only a third of the members at one time, gives insurance against mutability, especially in foreign policy, where, everyone then felt, mutability would be decidedly detrimental.

Practically, the mechanism of our foreign relations seems to have been imagined by the constitutional fathers as follows: a wise and pre-eminent President, the ablest man in the nation, and clothed with all the national dignity, consulting and collaborating continually with the twenty-six wise, eminent, and experienced senators, for the greater good of the commonwealth. The constant preoccupation of those earlier statesmen was so to devise, that the best human quality available would be brought forward, especially in the Presidency and Senate, which would therefore be animated solely by the highest ideals of justice, morality, and national interest. The President's initiative would make for efficiency. The senators' control would not only guard against possible presidential aberrations, but would introduce, even into foreign policy, the principle of democracy. The insistence upon the concurrence of

a two-thirds majority of the senators present was intended to circumvent the spirit of faction, and at the same time to eliminate the dangers of obstructionism. For most of the authors of the Constitution, Montesquieu, with his doctrine of the separation of powers, was a kind of bible. It is worthy of note that whereas in all other points they adhered strictly to this doctrine, in foreign affairs, in the face of other nations, the executive and a branch of the legislative were to collaborate. The qualities which Hamilton denied to representatives, he obviously felt were assured in senators: knowledge of foreign politics, continuity of view, accurate reading of public opinion, "decision, secrecy, and dispatch." He probably fancied the President and Senate sitting together in executive session rather frequently, around a good-sized table. Altogether, Hamilton felt, this was one of the very best features of the new constitution.

Unfortunately, the reality has been somewhat different. The House, for one thing, has never quite abandoned its original pretension to participate. Having the power to declare war, why, the Representatives ask, should they not also have the power to declare peace—that is, to share in the ratification of peace treaties? The House has at times endeavored to exert control over foreign policy by refusing to vote the appropriations necessary under certain treaties. Webster took occasion to warn the executive against making commercial treaties containing tariff agreements, lest this also should seem an invasion of the House's prerogatives. The whole subject is still highly controversial; and now and again, the House asserts its temper by voting about some foreign matter a resolu-

tion intending by an expression of opinion to influence the conduct of negotiations.

Moreover, the increase in the number of senators from twenty-six to ninety-six, as state after state has been added to the union, has quite ungeared the original conception of men like Hamilton. It is reasonably expedient to confer and co-operate with twenty-six senators without loss of secrecy or impairment of dispatch; but scarcely so with ninety-six senators. Nor has the quality of the Senate always risen to the lofty elevation originally foreseen. "Even leading statesmen," observes Bryce, "are often strangely ignorant of European diplomacy, much more the average senator or congressman."

The observation is confirmed by Admiral Mahan. "I apprehend," he wrote, "that nowhere does the separation between the co-ordinate branches of our government operate more disastrously than in the sphere of foreign relations; for this is the subject from which the average congressman most easily releases his conscience, because it is of the least interest to his constituents and its importance has not come home to his own consciousness."

Senators are human—sometimes too human. In 1854, Lord Elgin, then Governor General of Canada, visited Washington to hasten, if possible, the adoption of a reciprocity treaty which Marcy, the American Secretary of State, favored, but which the Senate opposed. It took Lord Elgin precisely two weeks so to ingratiate himself with leading senators that the treaty was promptly ratified. On more frequent occasions it is not to ingratiation that some senators have been susceptible, but to blind prejudice and xenophobia, which,

in their way, are no less injurious to the national interest, and to the requirements of practical statecraft. The Johnson-Clavendon convention for settlement of our Civil War claims against Britain was rejected by the Senate, in 1869, by a vote of forty-four to one, because the Senate insisted Britain should be made to pay half the entire cost of the war, or at the very least, \$2,000,000,000. The Senate neglected to indicate, however, just how Britain should be made to pay; and an identical criticism may be directed against the policy sponsored, in 1871, by Charles Sumner, then chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, who solemnly conveyed to Hamilton Fish, secretary of state, the injunction that Britain would have to withdraw entirely from North America!

As for the constitutional provision that treaties must be ratified by a two-thirds majority, it has tended rather to encourage than to prevent senatorial factionalism. Bryce, writing in 1888, has fully described this danger, "that the Senate, or a faction in it, may deal with foreign policy in a narrow, sectional, electioneering spirit." Party solidarity is generally the motive. "Some of these senators who care more for the party than for justice or the common interests of the country, rally to the cry, and all the more gladly if their party is opposed to the President in power, because in defeating the treaty they humiliate his administration. Thus the treaty may be rejected and the settlement of the question at issue indefinitely postponed. . . . And whereas the executive has usually an interest in settling diplomatic troubles, whose continuance it finds annoying, the Senate has no such interest, but is willing to keep them open so long as some political advantage

can be sucked out of them. The habit of using foreign policy for electioneering purposes is not confined to America," concludes the British statesman. "But in America, the treaty-confirming power of the Senate opens a particularly easy and tempting door to such practices."

The testimony, upon this point, of Warren G. Harding, who, before he became President, had seen long service in the Senate, is illuminating. In presenting the Washington conference treaties for ratification, he said: "I alluded a moment ago to my knowledge of the Senate from personal experience. Since that experience I have come to know the viewpoint and inescapable responsibility of the executive. To the executive comes the closer view of world relationship and a more impressive realization of the menaces, the anxieties, and the apprehensions to be met."

Presidents have perhaps not risen any more uniformly than senators to the high level of statecraft ideally desirable. In weak Presidents, there has been a tendency to attempt too little, and in strong, a tendency to attempt too much, to override the senators' "advice," and, by confronting it with accomplished facts, to compel its "consent." Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that the constitutional provisions have operated more effectively to prevent the assumption by the President of dictatorial powers, than to prevent factionalism and obstruction in the Senate. The President, whatever his deficiencies, is apt, with the help of a good Secretary of State, and because of his inevitably greater sense of responsibility, to aim closer to the true national interest, regardless of prejudices and of passing opinion, than is the Senate. This

statement may call for exceptions: as, for example, when the Senate, in 1900, staunchly preserved to us the right to fortify the Panama Canal; but in the main, it can be sustained.

Given, then, that the constitutional mechanism for the conduct of our foreign affairs has not always been as brilliantly successful as its authors anticipated—that the House has a tendency to interfere, that neither all Presidents nor all senators have proved to be true statesmen, that their knowledge and experience of international politics have often been deficient, that the President's choice and direction of negotiations have sometimes been doubtful and his effort to co-operate with the Senate often inadequate, that the senators' democratic control has degenerated too often into mere factionalism and obstruction, and that its struggles to stay the dictatorial tendency of a President have sometimes resulted in a long and undignified, not to say injurious, paralysis of policy—given all this, are we to conclude, therefore, that the mechanism itself should be changed?

I do not think so. For what should be the nature of the revision? A presidential dictatorship? A senate oligarchy? We do not want either of these. Nor is the genius of our government in other respects compatible with the introduction of the European system of a responsible premier and council of ministers. The requirement of a two-thirds majority for the ratification of treaties, while it has abetted obstruction, has at least obviated the possibility of party rule in foreign affairs. In short, it is difficult to see how any mere readjustment of mechanism could, in itself, greatly improve or facilitate foreign policy. The principles on which the

existing mechanism was erected are sound and good. What we now require is to make them truly operative; and this, I may indicate at once, is a matter, not of constitutional reform, but of public opinion; not of the machine itself, but of the democratic power animating the machine.

Surely, there is no need to dwell here upon the truism that democracy itself, as we conceive it, means government by popular opinion. When opinion is falsified or flags, the hand on the wheel weakens, the sails begin to flap in the wind, and the task of making headway along the right course becomes impossible. The President's power is checked by the Senate; but the only check upon the Senate is popular opinion. Opinion can bring about, if it likes, that the best men available shall be elevated to the Senate and the presidency. Opinion can give or withhold its approval to or from broad principles of policy. And in time of crisis, when the executive and the Senate, instead of co-operating, are deadlocked in stubborn combat, opinion, by manifesting in favor of the one or the other, can alone resolve the crisis.

The greatest evil that can befall opinion, in a democracy, is indifference. "It may be thought," remarks Bryce, "that a party acting in this vexatious way (of senatorial obstruction) will suffer in public esteem. This happens in extreme cases; but the public are usually so indifferent to foreign affairs, and so little skilled in judging of them, that offenses of the kind described may be committed with practical impunity." Besides, he adds, "it is harder to fix responsibility on a body of senators than on the executive." Much has happened since the eminent commentator set down

these words. We have fought the Spanish-American War, extending our possessions into the Caribbean and the farthest Pacific; we have opened the Panama Canal, and so obtained control of, and responsibility for, one of the great highways of international trade; we have fought the World War, freely shedding American blood on European soil, and by so doing, have risen, in a flash of magnificent moral and material energy, to world pre-eminence. If these circumstances do not avail to stir our opinion out of its old lethargy in foreign matters, then—short of some catastrophe to ourselves—nothing will avail. Further insistence upon this point is useless. American opinion is already awakening to a sense of its responsibility in this comparatively new field of foreign affairs; and there are reasons for trusting that the old days of careless indifference are vanished forever.

Assuming, therefore, as I think we are justified in assuming, that American opinion, presently and henceforth, will assert an active interest in all major questions of foreign policy, it is easily possible to foresee how, without any constitutional changes whatever, our present mechanism can be made to work harmoniously in accordance with the principles of the fathers themselves, for the effective and sagacious development of our exterior relations.

The public should insist upon the ablest and most public-spirited candidates, not only for the Presidency, but also for the Senate—men who can be depended upon to place the national interest above considerations of party. The President should consider the Secretaryship of State as the most important post in his Cabinet, and should appoint thereto the most capable

man he can find, regardless of minor political complications. The Secretary of State, supported by an experienced non-partisan diplomatic staff, both in the State Department and abroad, should devote the whole of his energies to counselling the President in foreign affairs, sifting information and devising practical policies. His field is a great one, for it is the world, and he should not be swayed in this momentous task by movements of domestic politics, but solely by an enlightened care for national interests.

The Senate is now too large to give expert and consecutive attention, as a whole, to foreign affairs. This duty has already devolved largely upon the Foreign Relations Committee; and it is right that this should be so, for the work is highly specialized. To keep an understanding eye upon the complex of American interests across the earth, requires experience, and restless vigilance. Appointment to the Foreign Relations Committee, and especially to be chosen as its chairman, should be considered the highest honor to which a senator can look forward.

As for the President, he should never forget that he is the Chief-of-State, and that as such, the initiative in foreign affairs lies wholly in his hands. He should exercise his discretion concerning the policies recommended by his Secretary of State, and having made up his mind as to what seems best, he should take an early opportunity of explaining his projects, in confidence, before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, or before some of its principal members. The ideal would be consultations between this committee and the executive of such frequency that they seem practically uninterrupted. The senators, after hearing

the President's plan, should propose such amendments, or alternatives, as they believe to be required by our best traditions, by our interests, or by the prevalent color of opinion. And as politics is less the science, or art, of absolute solutions than of immediate possibilities, the President, whenever he is convinced of the soundness or utility of the senators' suggestions, and even, perhaps, whenever he is convinced of the deep earnestness of the senators' convictions, should modify his plan accordingly, in the cause of harmonious cooperation. If irreconcilable differences arise—and this might occur in even the happiest auspices—public opinion must be taken as the supreme arbiter. It goes without saying that both President and senators should adopt every occasion to invite the public as fully into their confidence as the discretion incumbent upon their responsibilities will allow. And all men being human, therefore prideful, therefore sometimes jealous, it is the pressure of opinion, and this alone, which, in the long run, will force upon executive and senators that spirit of true collaboration, inspired solely by national interest, and the highest international morality, foreseen by the authors of the Constitution.

PARTY POLITICS

"All that the claim that foreign affairs should be kept outside party politics means is this: Not that there should be no criticism, but that the criticism passed upon it should not merely be party criticism. In other words, if a policy is initiated by the Government of the country, the attacks which may be made upon it, if they are made, should be open, candid, and fair, rather than factious, spiteful, and partisan."

—MARQUIS CURZON.

THE crisis in our foreign affairs, arising out of the conflict between national interest and national sentiment, is, at bottom, a crisis in democracy itself. The trouble lies, not in the machinery of our government, but in the motive power—in public opinion, which, on the one hand, is not sufficiently alive to its responsibilities, and on the other, has not as yet demonstrated its ability to distinguish between policy in the higher sense, and mere common prejudice. Put bluntly, what we have to ask ourselves is whether our people are competent to exercise wisely in the domain of foreign affairs the same sovereign control which they have hitherto more or less successfully maintained over affairs domestic. The past is no criterion, for foreign policy, in the last sixty or seventy years, has not seemed important to us. The experiment is one which concerns rather the present and the future; and as there is, at least, no proof of disability, the only reasonable attitude to assume would seem to be one of confidence

and faith. I believe that democracy can be made to prevail, that public opinion can become alert and discriminating even in external relations; but certainly it cannot become alert and discriminating, and therefore worthy to prevail, unless a sufficient number of individual citizens are willing to make the considerable effort, over a considerable period, without which a grasp upon the complex problems of foreign affairs is not to be obtained. The first and most immediate obstacle to be overcome is that of factionalism. There are others—the difficulty, notably, of keeping adequately informed, and the difficulty of developing adequate leadership. These, I shall also discuss. But factionalism, which, undoubtedly, is responsible for much of the present confusion in the public mind, may perhaps be profitably considered first.

The party system, highly developed by practice and tradition, has become in our form of government a factor in some respects more important than the institutions created by the Constitution itself. It has its advantages, and its disadvantages. When sincere differences of doctrine arise between our two great parties, certainly these differences must be respected, if only because of their sincerity. Indeed, theoretically, the central, if not the sole, reason for the existence of parties at all is that they may, by their organization, facilitate the education and expression of varying opinions. But when loyalty to party, and the desire for party success, overshadows loyalty to country and the desire for national success, this is factionalism—party politics in the worst sense, not a benefit, but a bane. Its ravages in foreign policy have been and still are terrible. We are a youthful, a virile, and a

sportsmanlike people, and it is perhaps inevitable that a certain number among us should come to look upon politics as merely a great and exciting game, in which vital issues are to be kicked back and forth between the contending teams like a football on a gridiron. The idea that this gambling or athletic spirit can be eliminated from our public life borders on prudery. But if it cannot be eliminated, it can, and it must be restricted. It must be restricted to the field in which it can do the least harm, notably, to the domestic field. Our borders are wide, we are heirs to the best part of a continent, surely there is room enough here for the exercise of our sporting instincts, without jeopardizing our national interests by allowing these instincts full swing in the field of foreign relations as well! An old saying passes current among the players in Washington, that politics stop at the three-mile line. The time has come for the elevation of this easy saying into a firm American principle. I can think of no finer test of the disinterested quality of our statesmanship.

So lyrical are our school-book histories with indiscriminating praises of our ancestors and our institutions, that there are probably few Americans who realize to what an extent some of these ancestors were the victims of party politics. The worst form of factionalism—the form which it readily takes in small, new, or relatively weak countries—is that of direct inspiration at the hands of foreign governments or their agents; and from such dangerous influences we ourselves, in our early days, were not exempt. Our first political parties were known as Anglican and Gallican, the one moderately pro-British, the other vociferously pro-French. As such, they became unavoidably the

half-conscious instruments of foreign intrigue. The French Revolution, because of the violent partisan sentiments it aroused, was to our people a spiritual trial of the first order. The disruptive agitation against Jay's treaty with Britain, in 1794, the disgraceful and humiliating Genet episode, in which a French revolutionary agent, relying on the sympathy of our Gallicans, defied our neutrality proclamation, and gave himself up, upon our own soil, to acts of defiance against our own government—these tendencies to follow blindly under foreign leadership, might well have proved fatal to our young independence, had it not been for the courage and the cool common-sense of men like Washington, Hamilton, and Jay.

Thanks to these events, whose inner significance profoundly influenced later statesmen, we have never again been so greatly imperiled by foreign-directed factionalism. Yet even this lesson was not learned completely. For example, Clayton, as Secretary of State, did not scruple, in the course of negotiation with Britain, in 1849, to beseech the aid of Bulwer, the British Plenipotentiary, against the American Senate, whose political hostility Clayton feared. The result was a treaty regarding the respective rights of Britain and the United States in Central America, which has given us little but trouble ever since; and in which Britain's claim to what is now known as British Honduras was established, despite the Monroe Doctrine and our formal opposition, by an ambiguity of wording which deceived even the suspicious senators.

On the whole, however, foreign influence in American party politics has assumed, in these later years, a more insidious character. With the influx, in the last

half of the XIX Century, of large bodies of immigrants, from Ireland, Germany, Britain, Scandinavia, Italy, and from Poland, and other Eastern and South-eastern European countries, politicians have been led to cater obsequiously to the "foreign vote,"—that is, the vote of individuals, foreign-born, or of foreign descent, who, having acquired American citizenship, have nevertheless reserved for the land of their origin their sympathy and a part of their allegiance. The fact that the bulk of American voters are so nearly evenly divided into Republicans and Democrats has given to certain of these "foreign" groups, in certain localities, an altogether disproportionate influence, enabling them to cast the decisive ballot. For a long time our people seem to have looked on at this situation with a kind of amused and fatalistic tolerance. It did not occur to them that they were countenancing a form of disloyalty. John Hay, as Secretary of State, suffered pathetically from the strait-jacket imposed upon our foreign policy by these minorities of semi-foreigners. To John W. Foster, in the days of the Boxer Rebellion, he wrote: "Every senator I see, says: 'For God's sake don't let it appear we have any understanding with England!' How can I make bricks without straw? That we should be compelled to refuse the assistance of the greatest power in the world, in carrying out our own policy, because all Irishmen are Democrats, and some Germans are fools, is enough to drive a man mad." Worse than the anger and the lunacy, he might have added, is the humiliation. What becomes of our vaunted democracy and our independence, when a handful of "foreigners" are permitted to hold the balance of power in the United States?

With the outbreak of the World War, came an awakening. It was suddenly borne in upon us that the fire under the melting pot had been burning low. The fusion was incomplete. The "hyphenated American" was suddenly revealed in a new light, not as an interesting counter in a political game, but as a national danger, a quick-conductor of un-American influence and of foreign intrigue. Then we entered the war, and for a time the problem disappeared, submerged in successive surges of patriotic enthusiasm. But no sooner was the armistice signed than foreign influence was uncovered again, subtly radio-active through all phases of the national life. Our Italian-Americans were outraged by Wilson's attitude in the Fiume controversy. Our Russian-Jewish-Americans began their campaign of hatred against Poland. Our Irish-Americans redoubled their anti-British agitation. Our German-Americans, plucking up courage, began the patient and tenacious propaganda against the peace treaties in general, and against France and Poland in particular, which has done so much to blind our people to our own responsibilities, and to cloud our vision of the European situation.

At a time when the country was filled with talk of the need of education in "Americanism," it might have been supposed that these various foreign-inspired movements would meet with general reprobation. But not at all! Certain Republican leaders, desiring above everything to overthrow Wilson, and to get the Democrats out of power, were only too glad to ally themselves with the principal groups of "hyphenates." Russian-Jewish hatred of Poland and France; Italian hatred of Wilson; Irish hatred of Britain; German

hatred of Britain, France, and Poland—all these furnished excellent shock-troops to the Republican party in its campaign of opposition to the peace treaties and of irritation and suspicion against our late allies. In the 1922 senatorial campaign, a notorious “hyphenate” issued to the German-American voters of a great middle western state, a circular letter urging them to vote against a certain Democratic senator on the ground that he had actively supported Woodrow Wilson in having America “save England and France and destroy Germany,” in 1917. “Two years ago,” said the letter, “the American people showed Wilson the door, mainly thanks to the united Germans. May the Germans of———strengthen this political influence by keeping a good memory!” The senator in question was defeated; but it is evident that he aspires to run again, as soon as possible, and also that the “united Germans” have taught him a lesson, for little more than a month later, he was to be heard filling the country with violent anti-French speeches.

Meanwhile, our British-Americans have been endeavoring, with the eager support of the British government, to saturate our opinion with the idea that, quite apart from certain interests which we obviously have in common with Britain, there is, in the fact of our common language and our partially common origin, a mysterious affinity which must tend gradually to draw us within the orbit of the Empire, and so repair the “error” of 1776! And if French voters existed in America in any considerable numbers, I have no doubt a formula would also have been found to prove to us why we must necessarily move henceforth in the orbit of French foreign policies.

This whole vast movement to subject our foreign relations to the will and pleasure of our foreign voters has been allowed to go to extraordinary lengths. Our own people, intent upon domestic affairs, have tended to overlook it, and our politicians, in part at least, are frankly afraid to oppose it. My readers will hesitate to believe me, for the thing is unbelievable; but when I was urging recently upon one of our leading senators the necessity of our taking an active interest in European affairs, he gave me to understand that the thing is quite impossible, because the diversity of our "foreign" population is such that we cannot touch a European question without discontenting some element in America! We should rather, he implied, concentrate our animosity and our external activity against the Japanese—an attitude in which he foresaw it would be easy to unify our opinion, the Japanese being yellow and disposing of no votes in America! I understand the senator's solicitude. If constrained to declare himself in a matter of policy toward Europe, he might lose some of his German or Irish support, and so fail of re-election; which would, of course, be a national catastrophe, for we have not many statesmen who are capable of reasoning about foreign policy in this profound way! Yet one may question whether it is really as imperative as he thinks, that the great majority of the inhabitants of the United States, whose allegiance is single, should be obliged to submit their interests abroad to the dictation of small minorities distinguished precisely by the fact that their allegiance is not single. I suspect that when the people, as a whole, become aware of this situation—and the time is perhaps not far distant—they will recognize "hyphena-

tion" for what it really is—a form of subversion—and will allow it short shrift.

To this tendency to bow to the will of "foreign" minorities, add now our sporting inclination to make of foreign policy a political football, and the full depredation of factionalism in our external relations begins to be revealed. To some of our legislators, and even to some of our voters, the knowledge that the opposition leaders or party favor a measure, is sufficient reason to be against it, whether the measure is obviously good and desirable in itself, or not. In 1868, from sheer hostility to Johnson, the Senate refused to ratify Seward's treaty with Denmark for the purchase of the Danish West Indies. Our strategic need for these islands nevertheless persisted; and whereas we could have had them originally for \$7,500,000, we were finally obliged to pay, in 1916, the sum of \$25,000,000. This is expensive partisanship; nor is the incident unique. A far more striking example, vividly present in everyone's mind, is to be found in the political history of the last four years. In the legislative elections of 1918, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, called upon the voters, for patriotic reasons, to return Democratic in preference to Republican candidates. Wilson's instinct that the country ought to be united in the approaching peace negotiations was sound; but his method was factional and wrong. In subordinating the national interest to party advantage, he succeeded, not in unifying the country, but in dividing it, with results whose evil repercussions have not yet lost their force. The Republicans, victorious, in spite, or because, of Wilson, took up his challenge and began their partisan

activities against the impending peace settlements. Some Republican leaders were undoubtedly conscientious and patriotic in their fight against the treaties; but others were asking themselves rather how they might best serve the interests of their party, than how they might best serve the interests of their country. Much of the Republican election campaign of 1920 was based upon an appeal to the lowest popular passions—xenophobia, narrow nationalism, calumny of our late allies, deliberate misrepresentation of the meaning and intention of the treaties. The work of prejudiced excitation was so thoroughly done that the Republicans since coming into power and having in turn to accept national responsibilities, have been handicapped by it, in matters of foreign policy, at almost every turn. Indeed, their chief problem, even to-day, is how to restore, in American public opinion, that spirit of confidence and of friendly co-operation which, in the heat of partisanship, they so wantonly destroyed, and without which a truly constructive foreign policy remains, and must remain, impossible. The Washington Treaties, themselves, in the spring of 1922, were only saved from being made into a political football by a manifestation of public opinion, so virile and so unanimous that in the very midst of their factional dialectics the politicians were sobered and cowed.

From this overwhelmingly partisan viewpoint, there has arisen again and again in our history the paradoxical notion that with each change of administration our foreign policy can be and should be "reversed,"—or, in other words, that our national interests are not constant, not consecutive, but vary periodically, in a

kind of four-year rhythm. To "reverse" the foreign policy of a great nation, however, is not easy—even for American statesmen. The first to attempt it was Jefferson. What he actually reversed was not our policy, but himself! Before he was elected, his sympathies were Gallican; he was against "entangling alliances," was for "peace at any price," was opposed to expansion, and did not want a navy. After taking office in 1801, and upon coming face to face with the realities of our situation in the world, his sympathies became Anglican; he advocated an alliance with England; he argued for war; he bought Louisiana because of our "manifest destiny" on the American continent, and he saw the need for a navy. More than one hundred years later, Warren G. Harding, on succeeding Woodrow Wilson, also announced an impending "reversal" of our policy. But our interests do not depend now, any more than they did in Jefferson's day, on the idiosyncracies of individual senators or even of Presidents. The whole endeavor of the Harding administration was therefore to do piecemeal, and in a spirit of suspicion and isolation, the very things which the Wilson administration, in its better moments, wanted to do all together, in a spirit of cordiality,—namely, organize world-peace and advance our economic interests abroad, by means of some practical form of international co-operation.

To all who are interested rather in serving the United States as a whole, than in serving this or that party, the story of the last few years, in which enlightened self-interest is overclouded by narrow and paralyzing prejudice, and in which patriotism is made to pay ignominious tribute to partisanship, cannot be

other than disheartening. As long as the "spirit of faction, ready to sacrifice national interest to party advantage," prevails, our constitutional machinery will be crippled, and any attempt at establishing a wise democratic control over our foreign policy will be illusory. What we have to understand is that factionalism, whether foreign-inspired or arising merely from the inclination to treat politics as a game, is wholly reprehensible. Serving not our own interests, but those of our competitors and our enemies, it is in reality an indirect form of treason. Let those who are tempted, either by their foreign origin or by their party affiliations to subordinate the highest national interest to any secondary considerations whatsoever, think well upon this ugly word. A realization of the true significance of factionalism and partisanship, in questions of foreign policy, cannot have other than a salutary effect upon the bulk of our opinion.

THE RÔLE OF THE PRESS

"There is a human way to prevent a people from having an erroneous opinion. That way is to furnish the whole people, as a part of their ordinary education, with current information about their relations to other peoples, about the limitations upon their own rights, about what has happened and is happening in international affairs, and about the effects upon national life of the things that are done or refused between nations; so that the people themselves will have the means to test information and appeals to prejudice and passion based upon error. . . . It so happens that our own people have been peculiarly without that kind of education in foreign affairs." —ELIHU ROOT.

AFTER factionalism, the next important obstacle to a wise democratic control over foreign policy is the difficulty which the average citizen experiences in obtaining adequate information, adequately presented and interpreted, regarding foreign peoples and their affairs; for obviously, opinions based on incomplete knowledge, or on misinterpretation of facts, are falsified at the source and are as worthless, and as dangerous to democracy, as are opinions based on mere partisanship.

Generally speaking, the vigor of public opinion may be measured by the extent and intensity of political discussion. In other words, unless the citizens are sufficiently interested to inquire continually among themselves as to the significance of events, democracy falters. But their discussions will beat the void, and their inquiries come to naught, if care has not first been taken to verify the facts. In domestic matters,

this may be relatively easy; in foreign matters, much less so. Knowledge, of whatever variety, may be acquired either directly by personal experience, or indirectly by the spoken or written word. Personal experience, public speakers, books, magazines, newspapers—these are the sole available well-springs of political information. Having regard, in particular, to foreign affairs, let us examine briefly, in turn, each of these.

Experience is by all odds the best teacher, vivid, positive, durable. But even in home affairs, in our vast and increasingly complex country, the contact of the ordinary citizen with public men and events becomes abstract and vague. The aforesaid citizen votes less for a human being, whom he has scrutinized and tried to gauge, than for a photograph, a catchword, a party. How much more difficult, then, to invoke personal experience in a question of foreign affairs, whose reactions—except in war time—are indirect, and whose solution involves consideration of strange peoples and unfamiliar viewpoints! The reason the southern planter and the middle-western farmer cannot sell their cotton and their corn may lie hidden in a political situation four thousand miles around the globe; yet the planter and the farmer, if they rely merely on their five senses, will blame the railroads or the local congressmen, and declare for abstention from European affairs. It is true that some hundreds of thousands of Americans travel every summer to Europe, visiting mighty seats of commerce and of power. Not more than a handful, however, know how to utilize the opportunities thus provided them. Ignorant of languages, untrained in observation, un-

accustomed to think in terms of national needs and national psychologies, the majority, unprepared and unheeding, pass through London and Paris as if these were great amusement parks, instead of great capitals, and form their generalizations of mighty peoples—if at all—not upon commercial, financial, political or military data, but upon some pleasant street scene, some disagreeable frontier incident, or upon the quality of the lodgings into which they may have happened to stumble. As for those who do not travel, they are in even worse case, for their personal experience of the Far Eastern question is apt to have been limited to the Chinese laundry, or the chop-suey restaurant; re-nascent Italy is perhaps personified to them by a banana-peddler, and the most that they have noted of the Balkan imbroglio may be the low brow and fierce moustaches of the Greek candy merchant at the corner. Their foreign sympathies and antipathies may be drawn from no profounder sources than those of John Byrnes, the New York fireman, in O. Henry's tale, who was Japanophile until he chanced to see a cossack ride bareback, but then straightaway became Russophile. All this is human enough; it is even useful, as far as it goes. But it does not go very far; it is not politically adequate. The more public-spirited traveler might possibly be persuaded to seek profounder cognizance of foreign places and peoples; but the task is involved and onerous at best, and I have no confidence that any considerable number will ever be willing to make the necessary sacrifices of time and effort. The acquisition of information in foreign affairs by the direct means of personal experience must therefore remain the prerogative of the specialist.

Of the indirect means, the most influential is undoubtedly the public-speaker. We in America like "talks." It is not only that the indolent or overworked mind finds it easier to be told what to believe and to think, by somebody else who professes to know, that to undertake, independently, research, and the confrontation of opposing theses, but also that we believe in giving every good cause a hearing, and that we are perhaps peculiarly sensitive to the element of personality. The eyes, the voice, the human poise upon the platform, make abstract or far-off issues seem near, concrete. The same words which the glance passes quickly over in the days' newspaper will excite and impress, when delivered to a responsive audience, with resonance and an air of conviction, after luncheon or dinner. A tremendous impetus is given to popular interest in scores of important questions by the innumerable noonday talks and the afternoon and evening lectures which now characterize our country. Yet here again, in the matter of foreign affairs, there are grave and perhaps irremediable lacunæ. For one thing, an easy catholicity, a lack of system, is noticeable. We are ready to hear almost anybody talk about almost anything; but there is no scruple, for example, after hearing the Irish side of the Irish struggle for independence, to insist also upon hearing the English side. The initiative in such a case will perhaps be left to chance, or to the ingenuity of rival propagandists, with the result that our judgments may begin to form before we have listened to the prosecution as well as to the defense. For another thing, the custom of putting questions to the speaker at the conclusion of his address has not been sufficiently developed. By this

omission, misunderstandings which might readily have been dissipated are allowed to subsist and statements which will not bear closer scrutiny are too often permitted to go unchallenged. Finally, there is the natural danger that by the poor presentation of good cause, or the good presentation of a poor cause, or the pleasing or displeasing personality of a given speaker, the truth, in the minds of the audience, may be gravely prejudiced. In short, while our taste for public speaking is in itself commendable, being indicative of a lively curiosity in questions of the day, it wants systematization, or adaptation to ends more definitely conceived; it wants to become more critical; and above all, it wants to be counterbalanced by judicious reading, in order that greater weight may not be given to personalities than to facts.

Books, magazines, and newspapers may be thought of as a pyramid, of which books are the apex, and newspapers the base. The student desirous of investigating a given question, or the condition and policy of a given country, should go first to the library for broad general orientation, then to the magazines, for special viewpoints or presentations of special problems, and finally work down to the newspapers, to make sure of having touched ground—of having really seized upon living principles, and of being as nearly as possible up-to-date.

Theoretically, all valuable public research or experience should culminate in a book, in which the benefits of one man's endeavors would be placed freely at the disposal of fellow workers. Practically, we in America are farther removed from this ideal than are the peoples of Western Europe, where the habit of

book-writing, in the non-fiction field, is more general, and the expense of publication considerably less. In France, paper-covered books on foreign countries and problems of foreign policy appear continually, and may be had even now at from fifty cents to a dollar the copy, when similar books in America, bound in boards and more elegantly printed, cost from two to five dollars. The continental traveler, pausing at a newsstand before going on a railway journey, may choose, for about the same outlay, between a magazine and a book, and will take the one as often as the other. In America, the popular magazine seems to have pre-empted the serious book, as far as casual sales are concerned. A leading publisher told me recently he did not reckon there are more than a few hundred people, out of all our 105 millions, who could be counted upon to buy a studious volume upon foreign affairs. Yet the increase in recent years of excellent American books upon all phases of foreign questions is notable; and if the sales are not more extensive, it is difficult to believe that the high prices asked by American publishers are not responsible, at least in part. The calculations of our publishers seem to be based partially upon sales to libraries, to which certain books will always be indispensable, at almost any price. It is true that the American free library system far surpasses in excellence anything of the kind existing elsewhere, and makes the question of price, to the earnest student, a secondary consideration. Books on foreign questions will certainly never appeal to many of our people; any more than will books on philosophy or sociology, or other specialized subjects. If they are read, on occasion, by the student, the expert, the pub-

lic-speaker, the magazine and newspaper editor, and the more public-spirited type of traveler, they will have served their purpose.

For years, we have published in America technical journals dealing with every conceivable subject, from hardware and textiles to pragmatism and political economy, but it is only recently that reviews and magazines dealing especially with foreign affairs, have begun to appear, and whether the best of these are actually going to be able to subsist is still doubtful. As for the more popular weeklies and monthlies, they, as a whole, are publishing more good foreign affairs articles than they used to, but they are still apt either to be amateurish in tone or to be colored too strongly by some un-American school of thought, as, for example, by British liberalism, whose peculiar tenets seem to have taken a quite special hold upon the minds of some of our editors. What is needed, both in the specialized and in the more popular reviews, is a treatment lying closer to practical politics, excluding alike the over-simplified "common-sense" of the amateur, and the vague humanitarianism or juvenile "exposures" of the doctrinaire.

There remains the newspaper, which for the specialist as well as for the mass of the people, in country and in city alike, has been, is, and must continue to be, the best source of continuous information, not only in domestic affairs, but in foreign. I make this assertion in full cognizance of the newspaper's many deficiencies, for I am confident that most of these deficiencies—some of which are grave—can in time be overcome, provided the public, whose influence in the matter is greater than is commonly supposed, will do its part.

All students of political science, tacitly recognizing the inadequacy of personal experience, of public speaking, of books and reviews, are agreed, I think, that without the newspaper—the cheap, continuous, universal purveyor of public intelligence—democratic government, in a large modern state, would be impossible. The newspaper, appearing every day, has room enough, when properly edited, for everything. By its news reports, it informs, and by its editorials, it reflects and also guides, opinion, digesting, analysing, indicating—amid the confusion and disproportion of day-to-day events—the broad currents of continuity, and the inexorable workings of the law of cause and effect. Most important of all, the newspaper is, or should be, relatively independent, free alike from narrow factionalism and from governmental control, acknowledging subservience to one master and one master only: the duty and the interest of the commonwealth, as it conceives this duty and this interest.

Foreign news is supplied to the American public by three vast news agencies, the Associated Press, the United Press, the International News Service, and by the full cable services of the *New York Times*, the *New York World*, the *Chicago Daily News*, the *New York Herald* and the *New York Tribune*, to which are now added the similar services, organized since 1917, of the *Chicago Tribune* and the *Philadelphia Public Ledger*. These leading newspapers between them cable thousands of words a day to the United States at a cost of hundreds of thousands of dollars a year, from special correspondents maintained in the principal capitals of Europe and Asia. Several other newspapers, as the *Boston Transcript*, the *Brooklyn*

Daily Eagle, the *Newark News*, and the *Detroit News*, receive a certain amount of exclusive foreign correspondence; and there are two or three syndicates which dispense European articles and features by mail. Taken all together, the effort is admirable. No press, except that of London, expends its substance so generously in furnishing its readers with foreign news.

But if the situation is satisfactory with regard to quantity, it is less so in two other respects, namely, quality and distribution. We arrive here at a matter which casual critics too often overlook, but which is fundamental. A newspaper is a commercial undertaking. In order to live, it must make money. Indeed, the more money it can make, the more independent it becomes, and the greater its potential value to the community. The way American newspapers make money is by the sale of advertising space. But the value of this space depends on the number of readers the paper can boast, that is, on circulation; and this in turn depends upon the skill with which the editor is able to gratify the tastes of his public. Contrary to what is generally assumed, it is not so much the newspaper which forms the public, as the public—or at least the editor's idea of the public—which forms the newspaper. The competition to win circulation is so keen among leading newspapers and magazines that a tendency has developed among editors to test all "copy" by the formula: will this appeal to the average reader? Incidentally, I will say that the opinion which the average editor privately holds of the average reader's tastes and intellect is not very flattering. If it is true, as foreign observers aver, that our press is characterized by a kind of uniform vulgarity, the

reason is to be found just here: in order to appeal to all readers, the editor must seek, not the best kind of reading matter, but the kind which will be welcomed by the lowest common denominator in the community's literary appetites; so that actually, in practically all newspaper offices, events dealing with crime, sex, scandal, adventure, are valued above mere sociological, scientific, or political events, however significant, and an ordinary editor will devote incomparably more money and effort to hounding the principals in a sensational divorce case than to reporting events of national or international importance.

In consequence of the foregoing, many American newspapers, even in some quite large and otherwise pretentious cities, feel that it is a waste of wealth and space to give their readers any foreign news at all, beyond a few brief agency telegrams. And even in those newspapers which pride themselves upon their foreign cable correspondence, there is an ever-renewed pressure to limit "dull political cables" to a minimum, and to "brighten up" the foreign service so that it will appeal to more readers. "Brightening up" is accomplished by including a larger proportion of foreign crime, scandal, and curiosities, and by so distorting or over-simplifying the international political news as to make more colorful headlines.

These defects in the distribution and the quality of foreign news are serious impediments to the formation of a sound public opinion in matters of foreign policy; but fortunately, the courageous initiative of several of our newspapers, small as well as large, proves that they are by no means irremediable. I will venture a word on the subject, first, with regard to the news-

paper-owner, second, with regard to the editor, and, finally, with regard to the public, for the collaboration of all three is here necessary.

The ambitious and public-spirited newspaper-owner should understand at once that under ordinary conditions, foreign news, even sugar-coated, even consisting entirely of murders and scandals, will not increase circulation directly, for of this class of "copy," the domestic production is still ample and will be preferred by most readers, under the law of propinquity. Foreign news, in ordinary conditions, will never interest more than a minority of readers, composed, on the one hand, of persons of foreign origin or sympathy, and, on the other, of the better class of business and professional men, and of persons sincerely curious of international affairs. There are nevertheless several excellent reasons why he should take pains to secure, by one means or another, a good foreign service for his paper. In the first place, from time to time, really sensational events—an earthquake, a famine, the assassination of a king or president, a revolution, a war—do occur. The paper which has made its arrangements in advance then has a distinct advantage over its competitors, and as often as not will be able to hold the gain in circulation made at such moments. In the second place, quantity is not the only thing to be considered, even in the matter of circulation; there is also quality. The purchasing-power of the more intelligent kind of citizens is superior, in the main, to that of the more vulgar kind, and a paper read uniformly by the people of superior purchasing-power is more valuable to many categories of advertisers than a paper recommended by mere numbers. A good foreign service makes for

prestige, and other things being equal, it is prestige which wins and will hold the better sort of readers. Finally, granted that foreign news is an expensive luxury, and that the public in many American communities seem scarcely to miss it when it is not offered them, we do well to remember that man does not live by bread alone. The finest thing about our American press is its ideal of public service. All papers profess this ideal in local affairs; why not also in national and international affairs? How are those few readers, who really are patriotically interested, to obtain the necessary information, if their home newspaper does not help them? And if the good-will of even these few is paralyzed, what becomes of the government by public opinion of which we are so proud? Let it not be said that space is lacking. The space is there, in even the most modest newspaper, if the owner will give it; and it can be spared to this act of public service without detracting from the other merits of the paper. Indeed, by giving greater variety and greater contrast, it will even improve most papers. In any case, here is a responsibility to be met, here is a public duty to be performed, which the far-sighted newspaper-owner will find it difficult to overlook.

The editor, as well as the owner, must get it out of his head that by sugar-coating foreign news, he can somehow make it palatable to people who are not really capable of being interested in foreign affairs. The reader's curiosity is to be aroused not by sensationalism and distortion, but by showing him the significance of these far-off happenings, their possible reactions upon his business, his taxes, his hopes of peace, his desire for a better world, and a better or-

ganized world. The mere brief statement of events is not enough, for the reader is not capable of making his own deductions in matters of which he has had no experience, and of the details of whose background he is necessarily ignorant. The event must be objectively analyzed and interpreted; the reader must be told not simply what has happened, but why it has happened, and what it may lead to. But this is a difficult and complicated task, requiring experience, tact, and certain special aptitudes. The good foreign correspondent is in the highest sense an expert in whom are to be desired not only technical capacity, but those rarer qualities, initiative and judgment. A touch of human interest, now and then, is not misplaced, but it must never be made at the expense of accuracy and proportion; for in playing lightly with foreign affairs, one plays with dynamite; of this stuff wars are made. For all these reasons, the editor should no more think of trying to "brighten up" the foreign political news than the domestic political news or the business news. Imagine an editor who should determine, for example, in order to appeal to woman readers, to inject a little "human interest" into the financial page! The misconception here involved is widespread in America, and warrants the most serious consideration. Personally, I had rather see no foreign news than see foreign news sugar-coated or wilfully distorted; and I think the community would be no worse off in the one case than in the other.

Finally, as for the public, it would be astonished, I think, and a little appalled, if it realized the power of tyranny which it unconsciously exercises upon newspaper-owners and editors. Practically every objec-

tionable characteristic of the contemporary press is attributable less to incapacity or to ill-will than to the conviction of the newspaper-makers that this is what their readers want. Editors, in their effort to gauge the popular taste, are often wrong; they share the American habit of thinking and acting with a kind of regimental uniformity, when what is wanted is courage and an open mind. But in following the leader like sheep in a gateway, they are merely paying homage to public opinion, which, if it does not clearly manifest its wishes, has to blame, not the editor, but itself. For example, the reader who desires that his paper should publish more and better foreign news should write a letter saying so; far from being ignored, his words will be heeded with almost too great anxiety, so tensely is the ear within the sanctum strained to catch the least faint echoes of pleasure or displeasure from the world outside. I am not trying to absolve the newspaper-makers. I consider that their rôle should be to lead as well as to follow, and that they should make it a matter of conscience to mix with what the public supposedly wants, a reasonable dose also of what the public really needs. But the public must do its part. It must show that it resents being deprived of adequate national or international political and economic news. It must show that it is capable of discrimination between an analytic dispatch, whose data are false and whose conclusions are erroneous, and a dispatch whose data and conclusions are verified by subsequent events. It must show that it knows the difference between a paper which caters to its baser instincts, and a paper which also occasionally appeals to its higher. For, as Charles E. Hughes wisely insisted in a recent speech,

"it is what one brings to his newspaper that determines the value of what one takes from it. With the incessant flow of sensational narrative, with attention fixed on stories of crime and human frailty, what proportion of our voting population is able to observe with intelligent discrimination the course of political events and is prepared adequately to discharge the duties of citizenship? How many of the relatively few who have had the advantage of high-school or college training, know their American history? How many have the necessary equipment of information which enables them to appraise the actual workings of our system of government—to discern defects and to judge of remedies?"

There is a saying that peoples always get the government they deserve; certainly, a community can always have the kind of newspaper it likes. It has but to make known its wishes; the editor will be only too alacritous to gratify them.

In spite of everything, the movement toward better information in foreign affairs is quickening rapidly, and there is no need to be discouraged, as yet, as to the future of democracy in this respect. Travel and public speaking do stimulate interest, and what with books, magazines, and newspapers, the citizen who cares to make the effort will not lack excellent material for study. In the great centers, the quantity of foreign news is already sufficient; only the quality invites criticism. In the smaller centers, there is still much to be desired, both in quantity and in quality; but this is a condition which can be remedied whenever the smaller communities decide to give it their attention. No great international event can happen to-day without

the American people being informed of it. If our interpretations of the events are too often faulty, the blame lies largely with ourselves, because we have not yet learned to discriminate between the hardy guesses of the amateur and the less sensational but more instructive analyses of the trained expert.

THE NEED FOR LEADERS

THE rise of new social theories of a collectivist tendency has made it the fashion to criticise democracy, which indeed has seemed not to be, in practice, the panacea which its protagonists believed it, a century ago. But to nearly all the proposed amendments or substitutes, the same objection may be made: they attempt to cure by a mere change of form what is really a defect of the spirit. For centuries, men have been seeking absolute solutions. There are no absolute solutions. Collective, like individual, life demands that every day shall mark its compromise and take its toll of vigilant effort. For centuries, men have been striving to compose the magic formula which would shift the responsibility once and for all from the shoulders of the weary or indolent individual onto the broad surface of some document or the deep foundations of an institution. There is no such formula. From time to time, the seekers tire, and resign themselves into the hands of a dictator, who rules until a rival overthrows him, or until his egoism and errors provoke a democratic movement again, and the hateful burden of responsibility is saddled back upon the shoulder of the private citizen. In our own democracy, what fault there is must be attributed, as we have seen, not to the Constitutional machinery, but to the failings of public opinion—that is, of the in-

dividual voter. He is the sovereign; let him wield the power which is his; but let him wield it consciously and responsibly. After that, we shall see what readjustments, if any, may be necessary in the machinery itself.

What is public opinion? How is it formed? No crowd can digest facts and formulate issues; all it can do is to decide between the issues which may be presented to it. Then who is to formulate and present the issues? We come here to the heart of the problem of democracy—the need for leaders. For there must be leadership, else there is chaos. Moreover, this leadership must be not merely philosophical and intellectual, but warm and human. Abstract theses mean nothing to the crowd until they are emotionalized and incarnated in leaders. Indeed, as a French writer points out, “the fortunate formula of a popular man sometimes suffices to divert to a sure aim the forces, theretofore anarchic and contradictory, of a democracy.” Everybody who has attended a meeting knows that, on pain of endless confusion, the program must be prepared in advance by the leading spirits; and what is true in the microcosm of the club committee is true in the macrocosm of the nation.

Bryce distinguishes three classes of citizens: the unthinking followers; those who are interested, but passive; and, finally, the serious students of public affairs, legislators, journalists, private citizens who actually take the trouble to learn the facts and to marshal the issues. The mere unthinking followers he considers to be useless to the commonwealth, valuable not even as ballast. Unless the great majority of the people manifest at least a passive interest, de-

mocracy is an empty name. But given the passive interest in the majority, then all else depends on the courage, energy, and persistency of the serious students and leaders. There must be not merely a few, but "many vigorous minds" which are constantly preoccupied with current problems, and which serve as a leaven in the process of the formation of public opinion.

Applying these generalities specifically to foreign affairs, it is obvious, and most authorities in political science are, I believe, agreed, that opinion can never presume to control the details of policy. Opinion can determine in what sense the house is to be built, but afterward it must leave free scope to the architect. Or, to repeat the figure employed by Prof. Barthélémy: "The ship's proprietors have the right to indicate the port of destination; but after it has started, the captain is responsible for the navigation and should not be obliged to consult the passengers each time a difficulty arises." If, however, as an English student, D. P. Heatley, rightly declares, "the actual conduct of foreign affairs must be committed to the hands of a few," it is also, he continues, "now clear to many who had given little thought to the matter before 1914, that there are grave dangers in keeping the bulk of the electorate uninstructed regarding the general character and imperious demands of our foreign connections."

Who is to undertake this popular instruction, which is certainly as necessary in the United States as in Britain? Who will trouble to learn the facts, marshal the arguments, and present the issues? Principles are good and intelligible only in so far as they

repose upon the realities of moral and material interests. He who ventures to enunciate a principle must first have examined these realities. In short, although principles, not policies, are the concern of the crowd, before the crowd can get sufficient hold of the issues involved to enable it to decide even as to principles, somebody must have done the preliminary work of detail—the work of analysis and synthesis. Who?

At first glance, this task would seem to be peculiarly appropriate to the government; or, in the case which more immediately concerns us heré, a branch of the government, the Department of State. Indeed, the government is doing much, and might do more. From its agents in all parts of the world it receives masses of detailed economic and political information. The economic information is probably sounder and more complete than the political; and there is some question, also, as to how skilfully the wealth of material is sifted, compressed, and digested. Moreover, some of it is inevitably of a confidential character and could not be divulged without indiscretion. Much, however, is even now, in one way or another, placed at the disposition of the public. The relations between the press and the Department of State are cordial. The handsome magazine published by the Department of Commerce, giving foreign economic news, is a happy initiative. At the same time, no free people likes to be wholly dependent upon its government for its information. And when the question arises of formulating issues for the judgment of public opinion, the temptations of partisanship are here naturally so great that no administration can honestly be expected to resist them. The conclusion therefore imposes

itself that the preliminary work in the formation of opinion must be, in the main, extra-governmental.

This work, at the present time, is in fact left largely to the two great political parties, but the results are lamentable. No longer do the parties exist for the issues, but the issues for the parties. Factionalism rules supreme. The party platform is written neither out of conscientious conviction, nor out of a studied national interest, but out of expediency. If a thing is popular, both parties will be for it; if unpopular, both will be against it; if opinion is divided, Republicans and Democrats alike will flirt coyly with the issue, calling it soft names, covering it with sophistries, advancing, retreating, temporizing—anything to avoid a plain yes or no. The result is that the two parties tend more and more to become vast organizations for the holding of office, otherwise scarcely distinguishable one from the other. Some voters who balloted against "Wilsonism" in 1920 were against the League of Nations, others were for it; still others thought the Republicans could amend it better than the Democrats. In the 1922 legislative elections, some Democrats were for prohibition, the soldiers' bonus, and the League of Nations; others were against them; some Republican senatorial candidates favored, and some opposed, the bonus, the League, prohibition, the ship subsidy bill. For which issues did the voters actually declare themselves? Who dares to say? In brief, the political information disseminated, and the issues framed by the great political parties, whether in foreign or domestic affairs, are so partisan in spirit, so glossed over and confused by opportunism, that for the true purposes of democracy more harm than good is ac-

complished, and short of a reform in this matter so radical as to be almost beyond hope, the solution to our question must be sought elsewhere.

Walter Lippmann, in a recent study of the weaknesses of rule by public opinion, makes the interesting suggestion that, to supply the public with true facts and sound analyses, expert non-partisan intelligence bureaus should be attached to all the great departments of our government. In the bank, the great corporation, the editorial office, the government service, experts are necessary, certainly, and I see no objection to this experiment being made; but even if it proved successful, it would not be adequate. Intelligence bureaus are too formal. From the word "bureau" are derived the ominous noun "bureaucracy" and the adjective "bureaucratic." The spirit of American democracy is not consonant with officially-sifted facts, and official analyses. Expert methods, expert thinking, are of course to be cultivated, and if it is obvious that such methods and such thinking are permanently beyond the reach of the crowd, it is equally obvious that even the energetic and public-spirited minority, who do think methodically, cannot all aim to embrace the whole of public events within their attention, but each must choose his specialty. This in itself, however, by no means justifies the abandonment of private democratic initiative in favor of the bureaucrat or the permanent official. The most absolute autocracy may have excellent officials; it is the essence of democracy that it depends for its initiative not upon an official or a ruling class, but upon the individual private will and capacity. Whoever has a good idea, let him talk it, let him bring it forward;

whoever has time or money, or intelligence to give, let him give it to the service of his country, in the best ways he can devise. In such a public spirit, and nowhere else, is to be found the true beneficence of democracy, failing which, one might as well give the wheel another spin, and try something else.

Flattery is the favorite arm of those who, whether courtiers or politicians, seek elevation to office by patronage. When the sovereign is a king, they flatter the king; when the sovereign is a populace, they flatter the masses. We in America have perhaps been too much cajoled by our public servants. The desirable thing is not to be called great and wise, but actually to be great and wise. Let us, as Emerson urges, "leave this hypocritical prating about the masses. Masses," continues the rugged American sage, "are rude, lame, unmade, pernicious in their demands and influence, and need not to be flattered, but to be schooled." Emerson's thesis is unexceptionable. The strength and salvation of a country is never in its masses, but in its élite. It was the proscriptions, some historians think, which, more than any other single cause, prepared the downfall of Greece and Rome. The Inquisition, the expulsion of the Moors and the Jews, the military expeditions to America, deprived Spain of its best brains and its sturdiest characters. In two centuries its population fell from thirty, to a bare seven, millions. Russia, wantonly destructive of its élite, first in Czarism, then in Bolshevism, wallows in protracted misery. Lacking a numerous élite, whose ability, patriotism, ambition and public-spirit incline them to lend their talents to the commonwealth without other emolument than their increased power and

the approbation of their fellow-citizens, no state can be said to succeed; and the success of the state may even be measured by the disinterestedness, energy, intelligence, and numbers of its best citizens. Nor is this conception undemocratic. Democracy implies not a dead-level of equality, but equality of opportunity. In America, any citizen of average understanding, whether laborer, employe, farmer or professional man, who is willing to make the necessary contribution of time and effort to the study of some great public question, will soon find himself, in a modest way, distinguished. By his conversation, or, if he becomes more ambitious, by his writing or speaking, he will begin to influence the formation of opinion in his community. Having schooled himself, and having begun to understand, in a wider and deeper sense, his duty as a citizen, he will have ceased to belong to the masses; he will have begun to emerge into the more limited, but more potent, fellowship of the élite. We cannot, in our democracy, have too many such men. Wealth, social station, place of residence—these are secondary. What tells is native ability thrust forward by perseverance and the sustaining power of public spirit.

Not, then, in the government, not in the political parties, not even in bureaus of experts, are to be found the leaders, the élite, who, as we have seen, are essential to the education of a sound public opinion, whether in home affairs, or in foreign; not there, but in the free and public-spirited initiative of private citizens. It is true that the study of foreign affairs, like that of any other great governmental problem, can easily occupy the whole time of trained men, and still leave

tempting vistas unexplored. Yet even with a little leisure, economized from the playing of golf or bridge, one can do much, provided this leisure be applied with concentration and with continuity. In every considerable community, there must be citizens who perceive the immense significance of foreign policy to our present stage of development, and whose minds are naturally attracted to the important and fascinating problems thus evoked. Let these citizens choose a line of approach, and begin at once to read and converse upon these topics. They will interest others. Small groups will begin to cohere, committees will be formed. Teachers, doctors, lawyers, journalists, writers, speakers, business men, bankers, labor-leaders, skilled workmen, clergymen, politicians, legislators—in all these categories there must be some one or two, everywhere, who are capable of a sustained interest in our relation to the great outer world. Chambers of commerce, political or literary clubs, churches, universities, labor, business or professional organizations, all may have their committees on foreign affairs.

The work of these committees will be, first to educate themselves, then to educate and lead opinion in the community. They will search and sift facts; they will analyze situations, thresh out issues, suggest solutions. They will stimulate discussion, organize lectures, seek out good books and magazines, encourage the publication of foreign news of good quality in the local press. They will check the misleading statements of propagandists or of careless correspondents. They will stand for the highest national interest, against partisanship and narrow prejudice. Finally, they will undertake to arouse, in Bryce's second category,—the

citizens who are interested, but passive,—a comprehension of the moral, political, and economic significance of the problem involved. In the end, it is of course the mass of voters who will decide; but the decision will have been made possible for them, the issues will have been elucidated, by the voluntary work of these leaders, of this alert and public-spirited élite.

Even after the élite have formulated the issues, and the masses have made up their minds, the problem of how public opinion is to find due expression remains, and presents serious difficulties. The ballot, at present, is as we have seen, an almost useless indication, because of the disinclination of the two great parties to allow the issues to be clearly and cleanly presented. The idea of a referendum on one or two major issues, whenever there are national elections, and regardless of party, is attractive in a number of ways. It works well in Switzerland, and it could be made to work in America; but care would have to be taken to limit it to really vital matters, and even to as few of these as possible, else we should soon be mired in complexities. What is even more necessary, in my opinion, and more immediately practicable, is an unofficial method of registering and analyzing the flow of opinion, not merely at election time, but continually. Two branches of our Federal Government, the Legislative and the Executive, are chosen practically by direct suffrage; and may be said to represent our people. I believe that, in the main, both the President and the members of Congress are sensible of their trust, and are sincerely desirous of carrying out what they conceive to have been their mandates. Failing scientific methods of analysis, they easily deceive themselves, however, as to the current

drift of the popular will in this or that problem, and too often, they become aware of their errors only when it is too late. I should like to see attached to the Executive an expert, permanent, non-partisan "public opinion" bureau, whose services would also be placed at the disposal of cabinet members, legislators, and other duly authorized persons. The aims of this bureau would be to analyze, for the President's benefit, the trend of national opinion upon vital issues. The analysis should be by regions, as New England, the Middle West, the Southwest, and so on, and by categories, as labor, the churches, the banks, industry, business, the grain farmers, the cotton farmers, the stock-raisers. Regionally, the bases of the analysis would be the editorial expressions of the local press, for American newspapers, as we have seen, tend more often to follow than to lead opinion, and are a by no means negligible political mercury. Categorically, the bases of the analysis would be the reports, resolutions, recorded speeches, and recorded votes of the great labor, church, banking, business, and farming organizations. The results of the analyses would, I am convinced, be most illuminating, and would be far more accurate than those obtained by the empiric estimates and congressional "intuitions" now made to do duty in Washington. If the government cannot create such a "public opinion" bureau, perhaps it could be established on private initiative, by means of a fund or foundation. I conceive, however, that the great national organizations to which I have referred need by no means await the formation of such a bureau before exerting their efforts toward the clarification of great issues. The reports and resolutions of these organizations

are already increasingly important, and promise progressively to become more so.

Indeed, the suggestions here offered are the more plausible as they are not at all original, but have already been half-consciously discovered by our people and are already being put into effect. During the Washington Conference, the organized churches made their influence heavily felt. The bankers and the farmers have both recently done the country valuable service in connection with foreign policy. An Institute of International Relations, with round-table discussions and eminent foreign lecturers, is held every summer, thanks to the laudable initiative of President Harry A. Garfield, at Williams College. The universities are extending their courses in political science to include foreign affairs. Committees on foreign affairs have been formed by so-called radicals or liberals in both New York and Chicago. The Chambers of Commerce of the United States have their able foreign affairs committee. The Chicago Association of Commerce recently published a notable report on foreign policy, drawn up jointly by one real-estate dealer, two corporation presidents, two lawyers, one experienced international journalist, two bankers, one iron-master, one economist, three merchants, and one packer. This, it seems to me, is precisely the way in which the problem of democracy and foreign policy should be met. I know not how many other similar groups have been established and are exerting their influence upon opinion; but the movement is under way, and is sure to grow. The essential public-spirited élite is even now developing. All that needs to be done is to quicken this development somewhat, and to improve somewhat the prevalent methods of study and analysis.

A METHOD OF STUDY

SOME citizens who otherwise are well disposed for the study of foreign affairs are perhaps deterred from this study because of its complexity and its supposedly esoteric nature. In vain they read the newspapers and magazines; one writer delivers one judgment, another controverts it diametrically; one incident reveals a tendency in one direction, another seems to drift on quite an opposite wind. The current of days, each with its confusion of events, sweeps unfalteringly onward, and at no point does the neophyte feel that by dipping in his hand he would be able to grasp anything real or enduring. One must sympathize with this hesitation. International politics, wide as the world, are certainly complex, if only because of this vastness of scope. So many elements enter in! How is one to seize them all?

Yet this protean and forbiddingly esoteric exterior is in some respects misleading. Like all other phenomena, foreign affairs are subject to certain laws or principles, whose light, once these laws are understood, illumines the obscurity. Like all other branches of human knowledge, foreign affairs cannot withhold their secrets from the student who is patient, who perseveres, and who is armed with a well-tried method.

In politics, two types of temperament are distin-

guishable: the idealist and the realist; the revolutionist and the evolutionist; the preparer of ultimate solutions, and the preparer of immediate solutions; the absolutist, who will yield not a jot to opportunity, and the relativist, who believes in gradations and compromises; John Brown and Seward; Mazzini and Cavour. The student must make up his mind at once to which type he properly belongs, for the two are rarely to be found coexistent in the same persons. Both are doubtless necessary. The poet, the prophet, the idealist, keep hope alive in the human heart, indicate desirable if distant goals, and prepare men's minds for better things to come. But when this dreamer's temperament, with its divine and inflammatory power, mixes in practical politics, either a ludicrous fiasco, or tragedy and disaster, with perhaps more retrogression than progress, are the not exceptional results. Thus are revolutions made, thus martyrdoms. In the long march of the race, revolutions and martyrdoms have perhaps been of a certain utility. The reader will agree or disagree, according to his philosophy of history; but for my part, I consider that there are very few revolutionary reforms which could not have been accomplished as well, and with much less suffering, by a slower method. Violence should not be thought of, save as a last resort. Let the prophet and the preacher, therefore, keep to their pulpits. They will have achieved their maximum good if they succeed in stimulating the aspirations and the higher energy of the individual. Leave practical politics to the realist. His realizations may be good or bad, as his skill is great or little; but at least he will have his feet on the ground, and his eyes on the road before him. The

prophet may prepare the instrument, but it is the statesman who must utilize this instrument.

We in America do not lack for prophets, reformers, and doctrinaires; indeed, it may almost be said that we specialize in their production. There may be forty ideal and wholly impracticable solutions put forward in the discussion of current problems, to one which is pragmatic. A tremendous amount of power and goodwill is expended annually in urging beautiful schemes which never should and never will be carried out, perhaps because they are too advanced for our poor times, perhaps because they run counter to some fundamental human trait. I am not the enemy of prophets, even of false prophets, so long as they keep to their hill-tops; they are perhaps, as I have said, even necessary. But if only to keep the balance, let us have henceforth a few more realists also, who will seek practical solutions, based on well-ascertained facts, and who will attune our lives, not perhaps to eternity, but to the present. Who knows, after all, but what these two, eternity and now, are one? In any case, for better or for worse, the suggestions which follow are addressed rather to the realist than to the idealist, and are aimed at showing the bases of foreign policy rather as they are than as they perhaps ought to be.

Before proceeding to discuss what it is that makes the life of a nation, and how the student may learn to compass by his mind this national life, it will perhaps be advisable to develop briefly three guiding maxims, which he will find of a sturdy utility.

1. Nations do not always act reasonably in accordance with their interests. Nations sometimes mis-

understand their interests. Nations are sometimes penny-wise and pound-foolish. Swayed, like individuals, now by mind, now by matter, now by political considerations, now by economic, nations are uncertain, erratic, human. At the same time—and this is the point—it would be a mistake to assume that a nation is acting either entirely altruistically, in the cause of humanity, or in entire blindness, under the empire of hallucination. The student will do well to assume, until he has, or thinks he has, conclusive evidence to the contrary, that a nation is acting consciously in its own interest. He will endeavor to find out what this interest is. And for this purpose, he will give heed, not so much to what statesmen say, as to what they actually do. Those who speak for a nation always try to explain themselves in the best light and the highest moral terms. It is their actions which count, not their words.

2. It follows that the endless political game conducted by the nations between themselves, in their struggle for the power of wealth or of prestige, is a hard, close game, warranting the sharpest vigilance and the most careful scrutiny of motives. But this most emphatically does not mean—and here is the point—that one is to lapse into vulgar xenophobia, slander of other peoples, universal suspicion. One may keep one's eyes wide open and yet avoid the absurdity of seeing a plot in every act, or a conspirator in every stranger. Do not therefore judge too quickly. Whatever your suspicions, do not lose your temper. Do not be deceived, but until you are really convinced that harm is intended, give the foreigner the benefit of the doubt. Even then, avoid reckless

chauvinistic statements. As the baiting of foreign governments tends to be a weakness with some of our editors and legislators, it will not be amiss to cite, in this connection, the opinion of two eminent contemporary statesmen. First, Bryce, who particularly takes to task the editor:

"Newspapers," he insists, in *Modern Democracies*, "have, in all countries, done much to create ill-feeling and bring war nearer. In each country they say the worst they can of the other country, and these reproaches, copied by the newspapers of the other, intensify distrust and enmity. All this is done, not as sometimes alleged, because newspapers gain by war, for that is not always the case, since their expenditure also increases, but because it is easier and more profitable to take the path of least resistance. The average man's patriotism, or at least his passion, is aroused. It is comforting to be told that the merits are all on his side; nor can there ever be too many reasons for hating the foreigner."

And now Charles Evans Hughes, in his speech of March 17, 1922:

"In the field of international affairs, recklessness of statement is especially injurious to the interests of the country. Some of our editors and public men write and speak as though what they said of foreign peoples and their governments could not be seen or heard beyond the three-mile limit. The first duty of a people that desires peace is to cultivate good-will and the only cure for intemperate statement is the resentment of an intelligent community. Let it be understood that those who indulge in diatribes against foreign peoples and their governments, who hold

them up to ridicule, who impute to them base motives and asperse their honor, are enemies, first of their own country, and as such deserve universal censure."

Consequently, the rule for the student should be vigilance, but in calmness and in courtesy. Upon this score we might take a lesson from the Turks and the Japanese, whose civilizations may be "inferior," but who are capable of politeness even to an enemy.

3. Finally, the student will study one thing at a time—one nation, one foreign policy, one problem in international economics. This method may seem slow, but it is thorough, and it is sure. And in the thing studied, he will endeavor to analyze out the essentials and to hold stubbornly henceforth to these. In this way, he will be able, in the midst of contradictory details and events, to keep his head steady and his eyes alert. The propagandist cannot fool him, nor the "hyphenate" lead him astray. Independent, fair, courteous, penetrating, he will judge of the world in which he lives only by the standards of the highest patriotism, and of the highest international morality.

THE LIFE OF A NATION

"THE thing now most needed by the people and its representatives," writes Bryce, "is more knowledge of the facts of the outside world, with a more sympathetic comprehension of the minds of other peoples. The first step to this is a fuller acquaintance with the history, the economic and social conditions, and the character of other peoples."

It is my intention here to supplement the foregoing observation by setting forth what facts it is which constitute the life of a nation, and which must therefore be learned. I make no general distinction between political and economic phenomena, because—whatever certain partisans in America and other countries may maintain—politics and economics are phases of the same thing, and are separable only intellectually, never in practice. An economic policy necessarily has political implications, and a purely political policy cannot sever itself from economic reactions. Moreover, let me emphasize, in Bryce's remark, the word "sympathetic." Without the penetrating impetus of sympathy, no knowledge of whatever subject, can be thoroughly acquired. Fortunately, in most cases, the very effort to learn awakens sympathy. In the study of foreign countries, imagination is indispensable. One must be able to put oneself in another's place, to

wear, for a time, the other's colored spectacles and see the world as he sees it. Afterward, the spectacles may be laid aside, the rôle discarded, and an objective critical judgment formed—afterward, but not before. Nor is the trick so difficult as the uninitiated may be tempted to imagine.

Here, then, is the method of approach which I have to offer. It is personal; it is even, in some respects, a bit arbitrary, but it covers the ground, and may boast this merit, at least,—that it has been proved by use.

1. *Historical outline.* This should be brief, keeping to main events. Its purpose is to give perspective—to reveal the direction of the curve of political development or of political retrogression.

2. *Geographical situation*, with a particular view to national defense and foreign commerce. What is the country's size? On what seas does it look? What are the natural advantages or disadvantages of its frontiers? Who are its neighbors? What is its climate?

3. *Population.* Total.....?

(a) Races. Show what different races are confined within the state, and in what proportions.

(b) Religions. Show how the population is divided according to sects and religions, as these often have a deep political significance.

(c) Rural and urban. Show the proportion of rural to urban and industrial population. This is sometimes a primordial factor in foreign policy.

(d) Distribution and density. Where do the most people live, and where the least? Ele-

ments of strength or weakness are sometimes thus revealed.

- (e) Social structure. That is, are there distinct classes, as serfs, privileged minorities, castes, an hereditary aristocracy, a class-conscious proletariat?
- (f) State of consolidation. That is, to what extent do the foregoing factors influence the fundamental unity and homogeneity of the people?
- (g) Vital statistics. Ascertain the rate of increase or decrease of the population. Overcrowding or depopulation sometimes contribute to the outbreak of wars.
- (h) Immigration and emigration. Immigration, on any large scale, may change the most intimate character of the state. Emigration on a large scale tends to create "colonies" in the region settled and is a factor in foreign relations.

4. *National character.* Try to seize the salient traits of the people as a whole, their capacities, their disabilities, their peculiar psychology.

5. *Economic life:*

- (a) Natural resources. From the lack or plenty of certain essential raw materials may be estimated a country's potential dependence or independence upon or of other countries.
- (b) Agriculture. Is the country able, or not, to feed its people? Has it a surplus for export, or does it import agricultural products? Is its agricultural general, or specialized? What are the principal crops?

- (c) Industry. What are the principal industries? Is there a deficiency, or a surplus of manufactured goods for the supply of the home market? Do the industries provide all that is necessary for the army and navy? Are the raw-stuffs employed by the different industries native or imported?
- (d) Transportation and public works. Are the railways and waterways adequate to the needs of national defense and of commerce? Are there good roads? Is there a merchant marine? Are there good ports, well situated? What great public works are under way or projected? And how will they affect the national economy?
- (e) Foreign trade. What is the foreign trade balance? What are the principal exports and imports? To and from what countries, and why? What markets, if any, are coveted?

6. *Social Life.*

- (a) Standard of living. Is it high, or low?
- (b) Education. What percentage of the people can read and write? Do they neglect or encourage educational opportunities? If they tend to finish their higher studies abroad, in what countries?
- (c) Labor situation. Is labor relatively well remunerated or not? Is it, as a class, patriotic, or an element of civil dissension? Is it well organized, or not? If numerically important, what is its program, and what are its foreign affiliations? How are labor troubles, if these exist, dealt with?

7. *Form of government.* Is the country a republic, a kingdom, an empire, a principality? How are the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary chosen, and what are their powers? What is the nature of the written or unwritten constitution? Does the principal authority repose in the executive, the legislature, in a special class or party, or in public opinion as a whole? Of what strength and influence is public opinion? How is it manipulated, if at all?

8. *Colonies and protectorates.* These may be highly important to foreign policy. Enumerate them, giving location, area, the kind, number and temper of population, and the principal value to the metropolis. Are they loyal? If not, with what foreign peoples do they tend to knit intrigues?

9. *Public finances.*

- (a) Debt. What is the national debt; and how and where is it held? What new loans, if any, are contemplated?
- (b) Currency. What is the gold reserve, and the general condition of the currency?
- (c) Budget. Does the budget balance? If there is a deficit, how is it being met? And to what does it seem to be due? What proportion of the annual national income is being taken in taxes? Is the financial administration honest and efficient?
- (d) Credit. What is the credit of the country on the international bourse? Is it able to borrow money? Why? Why not? Has it loaned money abroad? To whom?

10. *Army and navy.* These are the instruments of defense and offense, of self-preservation and of politi-

cal expansion. Their strength and organization is generally proportioned directly to foreign relations and foreign policy. Study the size and organization of the army, its armament and technical equipment, the training of men and especially of officers, and their reputed worth in combat. Nearly all white men, and many kinds of colored men make excellent soldiers if properly equipped and led, so that the problem is often chiefly one of officers and equipment. Study in a similar way the size and organization of the navy, not overlooking the distribution of bases, dry-docks, and supply stations. The final estimate of the value of army and navy will be derived not alone from size and efficiency, but from their apparent degree of adequacy to the particular problems of defense or attack which they might have to meet.

11. *Interior political situation.* What are the tendencies and relative influence of the leading political parties? Who are the political leaders of the day, and what is their apparent orientation? What political changes, if any, seem imminent, or possible?

12. *Foreign relations.* With what other countries is the country chiefly in relation, politically, culturally, or economically? Which of these relations are warm, and which cool, and why. What seem to be the traditional foreign policies, and what those of the government in power? What is the attitude of opinion with regard to foreign affairs? Are the machinery and personnel of the country's diplomacy smooth and skilled, or not?

13. *Analytic conclusion,* with regard, of course, to international relations. To what extent is the country dependent, and to what extent independent? What

are its salient advantages and disadvantages? Is its tendency toward contraction, consolidation, and introspection, or toward political, economic, or cultural expansion? Is its foreign policy based soundly upon interest and capacity?

Here, then, is a good, full schema. It may of course be shortened or modified, as circumstances require; but I think that for nearly all cases it will be found both comprehensive and suggestive.

But how, the student may ask, are these data to be acquired? The best way, obviously, is to go to the capital city of the country under consideration, and there collect the material from official publications and reports, from conversations with representative people, from newspaper editors, foreign consuls, and diplomatic representatives, and from personal impressions. However, travel is not essential. Much can be done, provided there is a fairly good public library, while staying right at home,

The library will supply histories, encyclopædias and annuals from which a mass of fundamental facts may be extracted. There may even be two or three more or less excellent books available, devoted in part or wholly to the desired country. A file of consular reports, or of the magazine of the Department of Commerce is sure to yield economic information. Some of the New York banks publish reports of foreign financial situations, and there are one or two financial newspapers or magazines worth consulting. Familiarize yourself thoroughly with the best maps you can get, for maps are sometimes illuminating. Watch the best magazines for special articles. Talk to travelers, and read regularly a newspaper having a good

foreign service. Clip everything which concerns your subject, and file it away, to be sorted and pieced out at leisure. Write to the nearest consul of the country studied; ask him for whatever economic or other brochures his government may issue for propaganda purposes. Finally, for insight into the national character, look into the country's novels, poetry, philosophy, and art, which are invariably revealing. It is astonishing how much good information can be collected in these various ways in a relatively short space of time. I know a man in Chicago who has never been outside of the United States and who is nevertheless an authority on China. Not only does he read everything he can get upon the subject, but scarcely a Chinese student can pass through the city without my friend seeing him, and he has gradually extended his relations, until he now has at least one faithful correspondent in every province of the Celestial Empire.

Having studied a country conscientiously in this thorough and methodical manner, the student, as I have said, will no longer be confused or disconcerted by the daily current of events. Propaganda he will welcome, for he will be able to gauge its value and its intention. Under the insidious remarks of the partisan or the hyphenate, he will perceive the spirit of faction or of malice, and will not be misled. In all weathers, his knowledge of essentials, of basic conditions, will guide him aright. Knowing at last the nature of the principal pieces, and how they are fitted to move, he will be able thenceforth to follow the great chess-game of world-politics, not with the groping bewilderment of the amateur, but with the eye of the specialist, steady, methodical, clear.

THE UNITED STATES ANALYZED

By way of illustrating the method outlined in the preceding chapters, an objective analysis may appropriately be made of a country with whose fundamental conditions the reader is doubtless already familiar—namely, the United States.

Britain's American colonies declared their independence in 1776, and with the help of a French alliance secured in 1778, won by arms Britain's recognition of this independence in the treaty of 1783. In 1788, under the name of the United States of America, they adopted the federal constitution which has survived to this day, unmodified save by amendments. From 1789 to 1860, the new country enjoyed a period of economic and political expansion, which is without precedent in history. Extending its dominions westward from the Atlantic seaboard, it rapidly took possession of the best part of the continent, acquiring the Louisiana Territory by purchase from Napoleon I in 1803; the gulf coast, from the Mississippi eastward to beyond the Alabama River, by pressure, from Spain, in 1810-13; Florida, by raids, infiltrations, and purchase, from Spain, in 1819; Texas, by infiltration, insurrection, and annexation, from Mexico, in 1845; Oregon, Washington, and Idaho, by settlement, and by compromise of conflicting claims with Britain (Canada), in 1846; California, Nevada, Utah, Arizona,

and New Mexico, by conquest, from Mexico, in 1848. It had profited meanwhile, by the Napoleonic wars, to develop a great merchant marine, second only to that of Britain. Its vessels sailed all seas. The Americans, wrote Toqueville, "are born to rule the seas, as the Romans were to conquer the globe." The United States profited by Britain's victory in the "Opium War" to conclude a treaty of commerce with China in 1844, and it forced open Japan to its commerce, in 1854, at the cannon's mouth. Alaska was purchased from Russia in 1867; but generally speaking, the first great period of expansion was brought to an abrupt end by the fierce Civil War, 1860-65, in which the southern slave-holding states endeavored unsuccessfully to secede from the northern "free" states. This war ruined the South and cost the North heavily. At the same time, the steamer began to replace the sailing-ship and the American merchant marine gradually withered away. A long period of internal reconstruction, development, and consolidation intervened. Prosperity was gradually restored, the nation grew in power. In 1898, war with Spain broke out, over the question of Cuba. The United States was rapidly and easily victorious, and the old rhythm of expansion was at once resumed. From Spain were acquired the Philippine Islands, Guam, and Porto Rico. A form of protectorate was established over Cuba. In the same year, the Hawaiian Islands were annexed. A part of the Samoan group of islands was obtained by treaty with Britain and Germany, in 1900. The Panama Canal Zone was secured in perpetual lease from revolutionary Panama in 1903. The Virgin Islands were purchased from Denmark in 1917. Amer-

ican marines have in recent years been obliged to occupy, provisionally, Haiti and Santo Domingo; and American influence over the small republics of Central America is not inconsiderable. In 1917, the nation enthusiastically plunged into the World War on the side of the allies, tipped the scales of victory, and consecrated its rise to world-power. Subsequently, it refused to ratify the peace it had negotiated in common with the allies; it made a separate treaty with Germany, and is at present undergoing a reaction of isolation and non-co-operation.

The country occupies an area of 2,973,890 square miles, in the richest part of the North American continent, with a climate ranging from temperate in the north to semi-tropical in the south. It has a long and magnificent coast on the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and on the gulf of Mexico. It has only two land frontiers. That in the north, which separates it from the British Dominion of Canada, extends the width of the continent. With the exception of a part which follows the upper St. Lawrence River and the Great Lakes, this entire frontier is marked by no natural boundaries. By agreement, dating from 1818, it is undefended on either side, and armament on the Great Lakes is limited. The population of Canada is only 9 millions, concentrated mostly in the regions adjacent to this frontier, the more northerly parts of Canada being unopened forests or icy wastes. The southern land frontier is with Mexico. It extends from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific, following the Rio Grande about half the way, then striking westward without natural boundaries. It is more or less defended and is patrolled by troops on both sides. Mex-

ico has a population of 15 millions, mostly of Indian or mixed Spanish and Indian blood. The regions adjacent to the frontier are thinly populated, both in Mexico and in the United States, some of these regions being veritable deserts. There are three main railway lines between the United States and Mexico, and seven or eight between the United States and Canada.

The United States itself has a total population of 105,710,620, with an average density of 35.5 to the square mile. The bulk of the people live along the Atlantic Coast and in the rich agricultural and industrial belt extending across the Mississippi valley, just below the Great Lakes. The south is moderately populated. The western third of the country, excepting a fertile strip along the Pacific, comprises great mountains and high, desert plateaus, and is thinly settled. There are throughout many thriving towns and cities. Almost 52 per cent of the population is reckoned as urban. The rapidity of the increase in numbers, both by birth and by immigration, is amazing. There were 4 million people in 1790, 31 millions in 1860. The increase between 1900-1910 was 16 millions; between 1910-1920, 14 millions. In 1920, with a total of 105 millions, the annual increase of births over deaths was 672,740. No part of the country can as yet be said to be really over-populated.

The original racial stocks were predominantly British, and despite heavy immigration from continental Europe, these original stocks have continued to dominate the racial mixture. The principal parent stocks, in order of importance, may be said to be English, Irish, Scotch, German, Welsh, Dutch, Scandinavian,

and French, with strong unassimilated contemporary infusions of Slavs, Eastern European Jews, and Italians. Of the present population, 10,463,131 are negroes, descendants of former slaves, of whom there were four million in 1860. There are 244,437 Indians, 111,010 Chinese, and 61,639 Japanese. Of the total white population of 94,820,915, some 13,712,000 were foreign born, principally in England, Ireland, Germany, Poland, Russia (Jews), and Italy. Those born in the United States, but of foreign-born parents, chiefly German, Austrian, Irish or Jewish, number 12,916,311; and those having one parent foreign-born number 5,981,526. If only those citizens be esteemed full-fledged Americans both of whose parents were American born, then the number of unassimilated whites may be put at the formidable figure of 32,610,591, leaving as the thoroughly Americanized white population 62,210,324.

The predominant religion is Protestantism, of which the largest sects are the Methodist and the Baptist, but Roman Catholicism counts fifteen million communicants, and is increasing, especially by immigration. Excepting the negroes and the unassimilated foreigners, who are regarded as somewhat inferior, the population is remarkably homogeneous, without castes or hereditary classes, and without class consciousness. Each citizen inclines to feel that there is no limit to the heights of wealth and power to which he may aspire. There is economic, but no real political regionalism, owing doubtless to the extraordinary manner in which the people move about from one region to another, seldom taking prolonged root in any particular community; so that, in a sense, a large

part of the population may be said to be in almost continual solution and flux. The negroes and the yellow races are regarded as permanently unassimilable, and a strict "color line" is drawn. The foreign whites offer a problem, but little doubt is felt that they will all ultimately be assimilated, even the Jews. After 1900, the average yearly immigration exceeded half a million, while in one or two years, there were more than a million new-comers. Since the World War, immigration has been restricted by law, on a nationality quota basis. In 1921, there were 805,000 immigrants, but in the same year 248,000 foreigners returned from the United States to their own countries. As for the Americans themselves, although they are active travelers and traders, they do not emigrate to any extent, except into Canada, where they feel more or less at home. There are 303,680 Americans living in Canada, and 28,639 in Mexico.

Contrary to what might be imagined, there has emerged from this medley of racial stocks, a strongly marked national character, which, if it has certain British traits, is nevertheless distinct, and is not in any profound sense to be denominated as Anglo-Saxon. The American spirit is so strong that, up to the present, it has easily succeeded in possessing and in gradually molding the ceaseless stream of immigrants. The children of colonists, settlers, pioneers, frontiersmen, adventurers, uprooters of ancient ties, far-seekers of fortune, the Americans are enterprising, energetic, direct, open, aggressive. They combine, with a shrewd, hard, somewhat narrow practical ability, unusual qualities of sentimental idealism, and react now to the one tendency, now to the other.

They are charitable and moral, greatly given to reforming and crusading. Lacking common labor and a servant class, accustomed to do things for themselves, they are inventive, ingenious, pragmatic, efficient, with a strong penchant for machinery and for mechanical organization. Their lively individualism is counterbalanced, and is at times threatened, by a remarkable faculty for self-imposed discipline, organized mass-movements, accompanied by a profound respect for majorities and for material success. Economically, they love bigness—big projects, big combinations of capital, big expenditures, big returns, big risks. The standard of living is high; each desires the best; hence they promptly disburse what they earn, and are a little contemptuous of savings. Intellectually, they are specific rather than abstract; stronger, perhaps, in applied than in pure science; somewhat lacking in the power of syntheses and of generalization; but quick, direct, and constructive in the face of material problems. Esthetically, their efforts, until quite lately, have been directed rather toward comfort and utility than toward beauty, though their taste is of a high order. They are sociable, friendly, hospitable, with unfailing resources of a somewhat dry good-humor. Their temperament is nervous, impatient, swift, active, and in the mass, impulsive, emotional, changeable. With respect to foreign-affairs, perhaps their most significant traits are their self-confidence, their optimism, and their devotion to the idea of youth and progress. They have a highly developed cult of the child, and even their old people try to be and to look young. They have never been defeated in war. They have never been nationally

disillusioned. They have little or no historic sense, but estimate everything in terms of an unlimited progress. Their national pride is immense. They believe firmly that they represent the future of the world. They think, one might almost say, that there is nothing they cannot do.

The territory of the United States is particularly rich in natural resources. There are fertile fields and broad pastures. The great forests are disappearing, but are not yet entirely destroyed. There is plenty of water-power. There are vast deposits of iron, coal, copper, and oil. In fact, the only minerals lacking are such minor ones as tin, nickel, and manganese, and such fertilizers as nitrates and potash. Agriculture and industry are both highly developed. The crops are diversified. Immense crops are raised of corn, oats, wheat, and cotton. Not only is the yield sufficient for home consumption, but large quantities of wheat, cotton, tobacco, canned fruits and vegetables, and packed meats are exported. The only essential food deficit is in sugar, of which only half enough is produced to supply the enormous demand. The surplus of manufactured goods for export is rapidly increasing. The great metallurgical industries export, as do the packing and canning industries. The chemical and textile industries are growing. For the latter, there is of course plenty of cotton, but raw wool, flax, and silk have to be imported. Another great industrial import is rubber, of which the United States takes about half of the world's output. In any event, the heavy industries are adequate for all the requirements of the army and navy. There is an elaborate railway system, but it is seemingly insufficient for the nation's

needs, and the least crisis disorganizes it. Good waterways have yet to be developed. A water route from the Great Lakes to the Gulf, by way of the Mississippi, is projected, and another from the Lakes to the Atlantic, by way of the St. Lawrence. The roads, since the tremendous vogue of the automobile, have improved, but still leave much to be desired. There are good ports on all three seaboards. There is once more a merchant-marine, built largely in war-time, second only to that of Britain, but a good part of it lies rotting in harbor. It apparently cannot be profitably operated, because of a law prohibiting any save high-priced American labor to work on American ships, and because the legislature refuses to accord a ship-subsidy, or an appropriate substitute therefor. Telegraphic and telephonic communications are excellent. Submarine cables are being laid and there are powerful wireless stations.

Foreign trade has fluctuated from a total of two billion dollars in 1900, to four billions in 1913, nine billions in 1917, thirteen billions in 1920, and seven billions in 1921. The fall in 1921 was due to the world-wide economic crisis, and the delay in European economic reconstruction. The excess of exports over imports was \$652,000,000 in 1913; \$4,016,061,058 in 1919; and \$1,975,883,786 in 1921. The principal exports are wheat, cotton and cotton goods, copper, automobiles, coal, machinery and metallurgical goods, leather goods, oil, tobacco, and packed meat, to Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Belgium, Japan, Germany, Holland, Spain, Sweden, Norway, Cuba, Mexico, the Argentine, Brazil, China, and Australia. The principal imports are coffee, rubber, sugar, wool, raw silk,

textiles, hides, skins and furs from Britain, France, Holland, Italy, Canada, Cuba, Mexico, the Argentine, Brazil, Chile, the East Indies, Japan, China, and Egypt. The competition of Canada, the Argentine, and Australia with American wheat exports is growing, as is the competition of Egyptian and Indian cotton. Trade with Asia is developing, and with South America is stationary. Both these markets are much sought by American business men, but the principal foreign market, nevertheless, remains Europe, which provides thirty per cent of the United States' imports, and takes over fifty per cent of its exports.

The standard of living is higher than in any other country in the world. Education for both men and women is good and general. Less than eight per cent of the people are illiterate, and these are mostly foreign-born or negroes. Up to the time of the World War, the chief foreign influence in American education was German. There is now little, if any, although some American university graduates are seeking degrees in England or in France. The American universities, for their part, are attracting numbers of Chinese and Japanese students, but very few Europeans. Labor, in so far as it is American, is well-remunerated, patriotic, and not conscious of class. It is well organized, but on an economic rather than a political basis, and has no foreign affiliations. Most common labor, however, is foreign born, or colored. Labor troubles, in which foreign workmen are often led by Americans, tend quickly toward violence. There is much experiment at co-operation between labor and employers, but these experiments, in any general way, have not been carried so far, for example, as in Britain.

The United States is a federal republic, in which the states still have a large measure of autonomy, although since the Civil War the central government has been ceaselessly acquiring wider authority. The President, the legislature, and a part of the judiciary are chosen by direct or semi-direct male and female suffrage. There is no "ministry" in the European sense. The President is elected for four years, and during this period cannot be removed. He appoints his ministers, or "secretaries," and they are responsible only to him. The direction of foreign policy is entrusted wholly to the President, but he cannot conclude treaties, or appoint ambassadors without "the advice and consent" of the Senate to the extent of a two-thirds majority; and only the legislature can appropriate money or declare war. The real authority, however, reposes in public opinion, as expressed in elections, popular agitations, and the press. Public opinion, which is probably more potent here than in any other country, is manipulated, if at all, by cumulative publicity campaigns, by intense propaganda, by sentimental or emotional appeals of a crusading or reformatory tendency.

The non-contiguous territorial possessions of the United States fall naturally into two groups—those in the Caribbean Sea and those in the Pacific. The gateway between them, as well as between the east and west coasts of the continent, is the Panama Canal, the country's most vital strategic possession. This great canal crosses the Isthmus of Panama by means of a lock system permitting the passage of ships up to 35,000 tons. The Canal Zone extends for ten miles on each side of the Canal. It is in reality merely

a fortified military reservation of the United States. If the rich islands of Cuba be considered independent, despite the virtual protectorate maintained over it by the United States, then the chief possession of the latter in the Caribbean is the island of Porto Rico, which has an area of 3,606 square miles, and a population of 1,297,772. Sixty per cent of this population are white, chiefly of Spanish stock. The island has a foreign trade of \$250,000,000, largely with the United States. It exports sugar, tobacco, coffee, and tropical fruits. The Virgin Islands, which prolong to the southward the strategic defense of the United States around the Caribbean, are of no economic importance. Over the island on which are the independent negro republics of Haiti and Santo Domingo, the United States keeps a close watch, with troops in occupation almost periodically. Its marines have also been in occupation of Nicaragua, on the Central American mainland.

On the Pacific, at the northwestern point of the continent, where America and Asia nearly touch one another across the Behring Straits, the United States has a great, wild, bare half-arctic territory called Alaska, whose land frontier is with Canada, and is undefended. With an area of 540,881 square miles, Alaska has a population of only 54,899, half of whom are Indians and Esquimaux. There are, however, important seal and salmon fisheries, and gold, silver, and copper mines, while the Aleutian Island chain, reaching far into the Pacific, is of potential strategic importance. In the Pacific itself, the greatest possession is the Philippine Islands, some five hundred miles off the southeast coast of China, between Japan and the

Dutch East Indies. The area of these islands is 114,400 square miles, and the population 10,350,730. The inhabitants are nearly all of the Malay race. About ninety per cent are Roman Catholics, the rest Moslems or pagans. They express discontent under American rule, and ask for independence, but they desire American protection for fear of being absorbed by Japan. Their foreign trade—imports, \$107,000,000; exports, \$113,000,000—is nearly all with the United States. They export rice, hemp, coconuts, sugar-cane, and tobacco. About a third of the way from San Francisco toward Manila lie the Hawaiian Islands,—area, 6,449 square miles, population, 265,800, half of whom are Japanese immigrants, the rest Hawaiian natives, Chinese, Portuguese, Americans and others. Sugar and pineapples are exported; imports total \$63,000,000, and exports, \$104,000,000; but their chief value is strategic: they dominate the Eastern and Central Pacific. A little more than half way from Hawaii toward Manila is the Island of Guam, a potentially important naval station. Between Hawaii and Australia lies American Samoa, another naval station.

Financially, the United States is to-day the first power in the world. The national debt totals \$23,813,547,430, or \$220.32 per capita, and bears an annual interest of \$1,029,434,648. It is being gradually reduced, and no further loans are contemplated. It has been held generally, but is drifting more and more into the hands of the wealthier classes, who appreciate the exemption from taxation accorded government bonds. The currency is on a sound gold basis; the American dollar has replaced the English pound as the standard of international exchange.

More than half the world's gold is said now to be concentrated in the United States. The total federal financial operation for the fiscal year ending June 1, 1921, showed receipts of \$14,912,934,104, and disbursements of \$14,113,978,775. The ordinary receipts were \$5,572,602,684, and the ordinary disbursements, \$4,367,898,373. The financial administration is excellent. Nearly one-tenth of the total national income is taken in taxes, but some slight tax reductions are now being effected. The country's credit is perfect. Since the war, the United States stands out as the chief creditor nation. Government loans to foreign states made during the war total nearly \$10,000,000,000, and are outstanding as follows: Belgium, \$349,214,467; Cuba, \$10,000,000; Czecho-Slovakia, \$61,256,206; France, \$2,997,447,800; Britain, \$4,227,000,000; Greece, \$15,000,000; Italy, \$1,648,034,050; Liberia, \$26,000; Roumania, \$25,000,000; Russia, \$187,729,750; Serbia, \$26,780,465; total, \$9,597,518,741. These war loans were largely in the form of credits for the purchase of war materials in the United States, after the latter's entry into the war. The only European debtors which have as yet funded their debts and begun to make payments are Britain and Finland.

As the United States has no dangerous land frontiers to defend, its first line of defense is on the sea. The army, nevertheless, has been reorganized and greatly ameliorated in theory since the war. All able-bodied males between the ages of eighteen and forty-five are liable for service in time of war, but there is no universal training. The framework of mobilization is as follows: first, a volunteer standing army,

which is being reduced to 125,000 men; second, a national guard of volunteer state militia numbering theoretically 180,000, but actually only 60,000; third, the Officers' Reserve Corps, chiefly World War veterans, liable for fifteen days' training each year, and now numbering 68,232; fourth, the Reserve Officers' Training Corps, consisting of eighty-eight thousand volunteer high-school and university students, subject to six-weeks' periods of training in summer camps until graduation into the Officers' Reserve Corps. The armament and technical equipment are good. Plans exist for a complete industrial mobilization in case of war. The professional officers' schools are excellent. The American people make good soldiers, with nerve, initiative, and physical vigor. The American general staff estimates that full military mobilization could now be effected within a space of six months, during which time the country would of course depend for defense upon the navy.

The navy, under the 1916 building program, was about to become the first in the world, when its advance was arrested, for reasons of peace and economy, by the Washington treaties of 1922. By these treaties, the tonnage of capital ships of the principal naval powers was limited thus: the United States, 525,000; Britain, 525,000; Japan, 315,000; France, 175,000; Italy, 175,000. On secondary craft, no limitations were placed. Japan and the United States both agreed not to augment the defenses of certain strategic islands in the Pacific. Theoretically, under these treaties, the British and American navies are equal. Practically, they are not, for the United States' navy is undermanned, and is inferior to the British in secondary

craft and in auxiliary cruisers. As only capital ships are capable of offensive action at a great distance from their bases, and as secondary and auxiliary craft are useful principally for defense, the general effect of the treaties is to leave the United States supreme in American waters, Japan supreme in Far-Eastern waters, and Britain supreme in European waters; although Britain's general position is strengthened by the possession of good naval bases in all seas, and is weakened by the fact that secondary craft, in Europe, owing to the short distances between powers, are weapons not only of defense but also of attack. On the Atlantic coast, in the Gulf of Mexico, in the Caribbean, and in the vicinity of the Panama Canal, the American navy has good bases. It could not, however, undertake an offensive in European waters, against the will of Britain, without a continental ally; and it could not prudently undertake an offensive in Far Eastern waters, against the will of Japan, even if it had an ally on the continent of Asia. Its establishments on the Pacific coast are inadequate. There is a good base at Pearl Harbor, in the Hawaiian Islands, but of the other bases essential to efficient action in the Far East, the Aleutian Islands are unfortified, Guam is practically unfortified, and Corregidor, in the Philippines, is insufficiently fortified; and none of these potential bases, under the new agreements, can now be developed. The United States, including the Panama Canal, is probably safe, but the Philippines are practically left at the mercy of Japan, as a gage of good faith and of peaceful intent.

There are, in the United States, two great traditional political parties, known as Republicans and

Democrats, which are of very nearly equal strength, and which may be said to alternate, somewhat irregularly, in the holding of power. The distribution of these parties is general, but the Democrats are stronger in the south, where the negroes are Republicans, and the Republicans are stronger in the north. Both parties are more interested in holding office than in great issues and principles; but in general, it may be said that the Republicans, with respect to the tariff, to labor legislation, and to foreign affairs, are slightly more conservative than the Democrats. Between the two parties there is a wide margin of independent voters which really holds the balance and decides elections. Within this margin, certain recognized groups of foreign origin—Irish, German, Polish, Italian—though small in number, are powerful strategically. In 1920, the Democratic party which, under Woodrow Wilson, had held power during the victorious war, and which favored the League of Nations and international co-operation, was defeated by overwhelming majorities, partly for reasons of party politics, partly for reasons of reaction and of resentment against "Europe," partly because of an adverse "foreign" vote, and most of all, because of popular resentment against the dictatorial personal methods of Mr. Wilson himself. The Republicans, with Warren G. Harding as President, swept into power with a majority of 23 in the Senate, and of 166 in the House of Representatives, on a somewhat ambiguous platform, the general trend of which was, however, hostile to the League of Nations and to international co-operation. In the 1922 legislative elections, the Republican majority, in both the Senate and the House were reduced to only a few odd

voices. The nucleus of a somewhat radical third party appeared—a “farm bloc,” the effect of which is still further to weaken the Republican hold. There is popular discontent with the Republican administration, which has allowed the control of foreign affairs to pass from the hands of the President into the hands of the Senate; which has not been able to restore national prosperity quickly enough to suit the impatience of the voters; and which, in general, except in the case of the Washington Conference, has manifested timidity, hesitation, lack of initiative. It is a curious fact that there are in the country at the present time no great leaders, no dominant political personalities, whether Democratic or Republican. The Republicans who are considered to have shown in foreign affairs the most statesmanlike qualities, are Elihu Root, Charles E. Hughes, and Herbert Hoover, but not one of these three has had the courage to strike out boldly in the sense of his convictions and assume the responsibilities of popular leadership. A Democratic victory in the 1924 elections is considered possible.

The United States is friendly to Canada, and is attempting to reach an agreement with the revolutionary government of Mexico. It is dominant in the Caribbean and in Central America, and aspires to the friendly leadership of South America, though the Latin American republics all regard its growing power with considerable suspicion. Since the Washington Conference, it has seemingly abandoned its former rather aggressive Far Eastern policy. It regards Japan with less suspicion, and while it is still, theoretically, the warm friend and potential ally both of

China and of Siberian Russia, practically, it is disgusted with the prolonged political chaos of China and with Siberian Bolshevism. Its status in the Pacific is regulated by the Four-Power Pacific Pact, signed by the United States, Britain, Japan, and France, which is in effect a vague form of mutual guarantee. In the Near East, it professes economic and moral (missionary) interests. With continental Europe, it claims economic solidarity, but disclaims political solidarity. Its relations with Germany have improved, but are still cool. It is passively hostile to Russian Bolshevism and is suspicious of French military supremacy. It wants "Europe" to "disarm," and to hasten economic reconstruction, but is unwilling to accept political responsibilities of any kind in Europe, whether within or without the League of Nations, which it refuses to join. The world-power with which it has the most contact, economic, political, and cultural, is Britain. The latter greatly desires an entente, either written or tacit, with the United States, and to this end is making an effort to liquidate all outstanding issues between the two countries. Naval competition, the Irish question, the Anglo-Japanese alliance, have now all been eliminated as points of difference. The funding of the British debt to the United States has been successfully negotiated. There are similarities of view between the two powers in the Near Eastern question, in the reparations question, and now even in the Russian question. However, to what extent the United States will ultimately respond to Britain's advances, the result of which might be to raise a continental "European bloc" against the proposed "Anglo-Saxon bloc," is still doubtful. In general,

American foreign policy was expansive up to the Civil War, contractive until the Spanish-American War, expansive until the end of the World War, and has since been contractive. Opinion, however, seems once more to be evolving slowly in favor of international co-operation and a more active foreign policy. The American diplomatic service is undermanned, ill-co-ordinated, and inexperienced, but contains elements which will permit its rapid development when the country decides really to make practical use of this vital service.

In short, by reason of its great population and resources, its economic and financial strength, the energetic and aggressive character of its people, the potential strength of its army and the actual strength of its navy, the United States is perhaps to-day the world's pre-eminent power. Its vigorous history, its rapid expansion, its superb strategic situation, its increasing development in all directions, the self-confidence and ambition of its people, its new interest in foreign trade and investment, all point to the conclusion that the present reaction of hesitation, isolation, suspicion, and narrow prejudice is merely temporary, and that its people, gradually grown conscious of their new situation, will presently force the government to embark, in all quarters of the globe, upon a vigorous policy of economic expansion, and of political and cultural influence.

THE END OF THE CRISIS

THE recent and still perceptible crisis in our foreign affairs, occasioned by the conflict of our sentiments with our interests, is due, I have sought to show, not so much to the machinery of our government, which is adequate though slightly cumbersome, as to the failure of public opinion to perform satisfactorily those functions which are the essence of democracy. The necessity of educating opinion to act, in foreign affairs, less upon prejudice and emotion, and more upon expediency and consciousness of interest, is evident. I have recommended, as the chief steps requiring to be taken, the elimination of factionalism from foreign policy, a better quality and distribution of foreign news, and especially, the formation of an élite, drawn from all walks of life, who, each in his own sphere and his own community, will study foreign affairs persistently and objectively, and who will thus be able to mold and to guide opinion, giving it that element of continuity and of consistency in which it is now lacking.

I wish to emphasize that these salutary measures are so natural, so obvious, so little esoteric, and so plainly practical, that they are already being taken by our people. The outcry against factionalism has been raised, and will not be allowed to die down again until the quarry is overtaken and overcome. The foreign

information and analyses in our newspapers and magazines have improved greatly within the last two or three years. The demand for such information is increasing. Our old provincialism is passing away. Regardless of what other peoples may or may not do, we intend to inform ourselves about the world we live in. Everywhere in America, committees are forming for the study of foreign affairs, and already, in a vague way, opinion is responding to the new impulse, evolving toward new curiosities, wider horizons, a more generous and more energetic temper. The passing of the crisis may therefore be now considered to be merely a question of a little more time.

The pressure of opinion in favor of a more active participation by the United States in the solution of the world's perplexities is even viewed with a certain alarm, by not a few leading Americans, because they fear that this opinion, escaping from a sage control, and giving rein to its crusading instinct, will quickly involve the nation in a series of reckless or ineffective undertakings. The danger certainly exists; but it is not to be escaped by retreat. If we are inexperienced, it is precisely because we have not heretofore ventured forth for the purpose of learning. The sooner we now go forward, the better; for there never has been a moment in our history when we could so safely as now run the risk of making mistakes. Nobody is going to hurt us—not at present, anyway; and so long as we do not actually provoke a war, we cannot even hurt ourselves very much. Indeed, the circumstances are such that we risk more, economically, politically, and morally, by prolonging our inaction, than by acting—I had almost said, however temeriously.

The sudden outburst of Turkophobe enthusiasm in the fall of 1922, when the very people who, a year before, had been wanting us to sink our navy in the cause of peace, were urging the government to oppose the victorious Turks by arms, was checked without great difficulty by the discretion of the government and the common sense of the majority of our citizens. The various committees which are being formed for the study and debate of just such issues as that so abruptly raised in the Near East, will serve more and more as a steadying weight upon opinion, pressing it forward when it lags, but detaining it when it begins to rush forward too furiously. The government can and should use its authority for precisely the same safeguarding of sane equilibrium. Between the one and the other, I feel confident that, once we have begun that active furtherance of our interests and our ideals which our new situation demands, sobriety and expediency will quickly prevail over prejudice and the blind rushes of passion. Our people, at their best, are supple, adaptable, and fair. No qualities are more nicely suited to the successful control of a democracy over its own foreign policy.

By the eminent authority of Charles W. Eliot, president emeritus of Harvard University, the principal contributions of the American people to civilization have been thus enumerated: peace, religious toleration, manhood suffrage, a "greater tenderness and deeper reverence toward women and children," the "co-operation of private citizens for public ends," the "diffusion of well-being" and "amelioration of the average lot," the support of international justice, and the development of international charity. It is to our interest,

and it is to the general interest, that these notable gifts should be extended, so far as is tactful and possible, to the rest of the world. I do not speak of the rich pleasure, the serene inward satisfaction, which is the spiritual reward of a helpful deed or of a helpful policy. Peace is our material interest. Religious toleration, in so far as it furthers peace, is our material interest. Manhood suffrage, that is, democracy, is to our political interest. The general raising of the standard of living, the organization of international law and of international hygiene and sanitation, are also to our interest, both moral and material. Dr. Eliot asserts, and I most earnestly agree with him, that the sulking, suspicious mood of isolation which has lately been upon us is unworthy of us, and unworthy of our traditions. The "co-operation of private citizens for public ends" must be mobilized now in the service of foreign policy, as it has been mobilized in the past in the service of domestic policy. It is time that we should enter the councils of the nation, and offer these gifts of ours, modestly but whole-heartedly; placing our organizing abilities and our practical ingenuity at the service of that better world in which we believe, and acknowledging in turn the fine and high qualities, of the same or of a different order, which are the dower of our several fellow-nations.

PART III

OLD AND NEW DIPLOMACY

I

THE PERMANENT FUNCTIONS OF DIPLOMACY

WHEN the statesman and the student have analyzed out the right principles of American foreign policy—principles which, we have found, may be summarized in the words peace and economic expansion by means of international co-operation; when the public sentiment has been educated to understand and to accept these principles, there still remain to be determined their application to specific cases; the means and circumstances by and in which they may best be furthered; in brief, their manner of execution. This is the task of organized diplomacy, through which, and through which alone, a people's aspirations in foreign affairs, the ambitions of its bankers and merchants, the ideals of its philanthropists, the wisdom of its statesmen, at last take contact with reality.

Not merely our own, but practically all the other modern democracies have exhibited suspicion of diplomacy and diplomatists—terms which to them have seemed to smack unpleasantly of spendthrift aristocracy and of imperial intrigues. The defects of a tradition have obscured the permanent necessity of the function. Intent upon interior reforms, the more liberal elements of the population have heretofore lent scant attention to foreign problems, and the public has been allowed to sink into a curious condition of

ignorance with respect to the aims and needs of its ambassadors and ministers; so much so, even, that honest voices have arisen to proclaim them an anachronism, and to demand their abolition altogether. Diplomacy, as now practised, does obviously need re-adaptation to the changing life of the times, but as for doing away with it, never, one may safely venture, has it been so essential to the national life and well-being as to-day.

For to-day, as yesterday, as in the beginning of record, diplomacy is the art and science of conducting a nation's foreign relations, not only in peace, as has sometimes been intimated, but also in war, when it strikes out side by side with the other factors of defense and attack. It may be bad or good, vicious or beneficent, clumsy or skilful, active or passive, hide-bound or supple, but so long as men buy, sell, travel, or fight abroad, it must and will exist. On the reports and judgments of diplomatic agents, whole policies are often formed—the course of history is perhaps turned. Diplomacy makes friends. It discovers and seeks to thwart inimical aims. It reveals conflicting interests, and searches out those interests which nations have in common. It makes political and commercial treaties, protects its nationals who are far from home, watches over the carrying out of international contracts and the observance of that body of international law which it is itself continually helping to form. It strives to enhance the national prestige. By means of studied psychology, by persuasion or by threats, by granting or withholding favors, by bargains and trades, by the demonstration of common purposes, it seeks to bring about those ends which the nation desires. In race and

religion, in custom and tongue, in political and commercial aim, men differ, and these differences produce misunderstandings and frictions which, unless smoothed out and oiled away, threaten peace. Diplomacy, when peace is the national desire, is the agent of this good smoothing and oiling. When, on the contrary, war is sought, or is believed to be inevitable, then diplomacy, by systems of alliances and neutralities, helps to prepare it; and for the final victory or defeat, is sometimes more responsible than the army itself.

The point is worth dwelling upon. If France, on the eve of 1870, had possessed diplomats of a caliber less mediocre, the war, Dr. Gustave le Bon assures us, instead of being fought at the moment chosen by Bismarck, might have been postponed to a time when France had prepared alliances. In the American War for Independence Franklin's mission to Paris won us the determining French alliance. In the Civil War Adams' action at London contributed to keep Britain neutral. If Germany had been better advised by its ambassador at London as to Britain's mood and intentions, Germany might never have risked the Great War, in which, later, the clumsiness of German diplomacy helped to end American neutrality. Germany, by favoring Bolshevism, certainly hastened the collapse of Russia; and America, by the "new diplomacy" of its Committee on Public Information, as certainly contributed to the speedy moral disruption of the Central Empires. Even the actual conduct of military campaigns cannot be dissociated from diplomatic purposes; and when the war is over, it is the skill or awkwardness of diplomats, as more than one

country has found to its sorrow, which determines to what extent the victor shall enjoy the fruits of his victorious sacrifices, or how far the vanquished may be able to escape from the consequences of defeat.

First, the adjustment of international disputes and the furtherance of national aims without recourse to war; second, the political preparation of war, when war is thought to be necessary, so that it shall be fought in the most favorable circumstances; third, after the war has started, the formation of a system of alliances and friendly neutralities, the disruption of enemy coalitions and the harmonizing of merely military, with these political, ends; finally, the negotiation of peace and the establishment of the new international order; such have been, are still, and must continue to be the functions of diplomacy.

There has always been diplomacy, and its activities have extended or contracted in proportion to the extent of the international intercourse of the day. The ancients did not maintain permanent representatives abroad, but were continually interchanging special embassies for special purposes. The Greek republics, governed by popular assemblies, sent orators to one another as emissaries who would sue to be heard in their city's cause before the assembly itself. In the same sitting, Corinth and Corfu, enemies, pleaded in turn before the Athenian citizens for Athens' alliance, and when both sides had been heard, the fateful vote was taken which led soon after to the Peloponnesian War. Rome had an effective diplomacy for dealing with the Empire's barbarian neighbors; but the best "state department" of earlier times is generally considered to have been that of Byzantium, which took over the

Roman method, and developed and perfected it into "a prodigy of tenacious and scientific skill."

"It was by the marvelous skill of its diplomats, by the tireless activity of its missionaries," writes Prof. Charles Diehl, "that Byzance maintained itself, during so many centuries, against the invaders; and it was by these also that its civilization was spread throughout the Near East, leaving upon the world an ineradicable trace."

Byzantium was a rich, but not a military state. The barbarians were warlike and many: Vandals, Visigoths, Ostrogoths, Lombards, Franks, Croates, Serbs, Bulgars, Huns, Avars, Khazars, Petchenegs, Russians—not to mention the more civilized Arabs and Persians. But what could not be attempted by force alone was done by money and by brains. The "governing of the barbarians" was reduced to a science. In the Byzantine "State Department" there was constituted a "Barbarian Division," whose sole office was the elaborate and detailed study of these half-wild peoples. "The strength and the weakness of each was known, how they could be acted upon, used or neutralized, which were their most influential families, what gifts would most please them, what sentiments and interests could be most profitably cultivated, what political and economic relations might be established with them." The reports of Byzantine merchants, missionaries, and embassies, supplemented by such information of all sorts as could be extracted from distinguished visitors in Byzantium, were classified and collated, and when finally the empire was ready to act, it could do so with full grasp upon the facts, both ponderable and imponderable.

The means of action adopted by that early diplomacy were not such as to appeal to our modern needs or sympathies, but they were apparently not ill-suited to the place and time. Marred by the defects of their qualities, they nevertheless were employed successfully, not merely for a few years, but for centuries. Following the merchant who then, as now, was always the pioneer, Christian missionaries were sent out to the barbarian lands. They taught the Greek language, they spread Greek ideas, they instilled the rudiments of education. Appealing first to the quicker sensibilities of the barbarian women, through these they soon obtained the ear of the men; and what with the splendor of the Greek Church ritual, and the descriptions they gave of the power and wonder of the seat of empire, they made many converts, in whom was awakened the desire to visit the great imperial city of the Bosphorus. In particular, an effort was made to stimulate kings and nobles to go up to Byzantium. Here the State Department, duly forewarned, was waiting in readiness to dazzle and impress the foreigners by rich and mysterious ceremonial and by paraded magnificence. There were dinners of state, concerts, dances, giving of gifts, and sometimes gorgeous baptisms of heathen nobles into the Christian church. If policy so demanded, an appeal would be made to the visitor's vanity. Honors and high-sounding titles, entailing the right to wear certain gold-embroidered robes, would be bestowed upon him—titles, empty perhaps, yet coveted, for even the Doges of Venice, at a later date, were not too proud to accept them. Finally, in special cases, a girl of the Greek aristocracy might be found for the barbarian poten-

tate to marry, and he would be made to feel that he himself was now almost a Greek; almost, but never—and here was the cunning of the system—never quite! All men, this unscrupulous State Department thought, have their price. Large sums were regularly distributed as gifts and subsidies. Important foreign political refugees were hospitably received and were accorded a certain encouragement in case it should ultimately be found expedient to send them home again as the heads of a revolutionary party. Possible enemies were divided, neutralized, played one against the other by the subtle excitation of jealousies and suspicions; at first, barbarian against barbarian; later, France against Germany, Sicily against the Central Italian States, Venice against the Normans, the Papacy against Frederick Barbarossa. The alliance or favor of trading states, such as Venice, Pisa, and Genoa, was gained by the granting of economic privileges, and the making of liberal commercial treaties. In short, there was scarcely a time when this physically decaying but mentally alert empire was not able, by one expedient or another, to get other and more primitive peoples to help fight its battles and so contribute to the prolongation of its remarkable longevity.

As late as the XII Century, Constantinople was still the world's most active political center; but the flame of civilization was now shifting westward, and the next great school of diplomacy flowered from the merchant republic of Venice. As Byzantium had first drawn upon, then improved upon, the methods of Rome, so Venice drew upon and improved upon the methods of Byzantium. Beginning, one may say, in the XII Century, with the series of classic "instructions

to ambassadors," issued by the Venetian senate, Venetian diplomacy developed steadily in science and organization, to its climax, in the XVI Century. At this time Venice had permanent representatives at all the great courts of Europe. Each diplomat, however, was transferred or replaced every three years, for beyond this period it was feared that neither his objectivity nor his loyalty to the republic could be entirely trusted. "Each ambassador," the senate kept repeating, "should ceaselessly have in mind the honor and advantage of the Republic." Technically, however, the Venetian diplomatist's first duty was "to see well and to say well." Every eight days he was required to transmit a dispatch giving all the latest information concerning the aims and movements of the principal personages in the country to which he was assigned. These dispatches were read aloud before closed sessions of the senate, which thus received continually a full and confidential account of everything of political and economic significance that was going on in the world. Moreover, at the end of three years, within fifteen days after his return from his post, the ambassador was required to appear personally before the senate, the Doge, and the Council of Ten and read a full report enlarging upon the following items: the geographical situation of the country described; its boundaries; its administrative divisions; its principal cities, ports, and fortifications; its population, customs, religion; the condition of its army and navy; its import and export trade; its manner of government, the personal fortune, the relationships, the entourage, the character of its ministers; the character and way of life of the sovereign; the manners of the court; the

condition of the country's finances; its interior political situation; its foreign relationships and policies. There was a saying in that day, that the ambassadors of Venice soon came to know a country better than its own inhabitants knew it, so thorough was their training and so shrewd their method. The fifteen volumes of the "*Relazioni Venete*," in which these reports and dispatches are contained, are not only the best historical documents of the period—a veritable mine of information,—but so happy is their expression, so graceful their wit, so vivid their detail, interspersed with sprinkled anecdotes and bits of dialogue, that even at this distance of centuries, the reader cannot remain insensible to their charm of style.

In relations between the Italian city-states, where feudalism had never really taken root, diplomacy was very influential. The first permanent embassies date from the XV Century, and were established by Venice, Milan, and Savoy, whose example was soon followed by the Papacy, with its system of legates and nuncios, and in 1487, by Spain; until, in the XVI Century, such embassies were no longer the exception, but the rule, in all of Europe. France, under François I, was the first country to give extension throughout the continent to its diplomatic organization. The collection of French "instructions" in this and the two succeeding centuries is replete with noteworthy documents. An instruction of 1756, in the series entitled "*Austria*," reveals that full information was demanded from French agents as to "the condition of the courts and countries in which they have been employed, the quality and quantity of troops maintained, the good or bad state of their finances, the extent and kind of their

commerce, the abilities and inclinations of their princes and ministers, not only those who in all courts play a principal part in the administration of general affairs, but also those who, under whatever denominations, have any influence in deliberations and resolutions relative to public interests, finally, on all subjects, either merely curious or of real interest for the King's service."

In the Middle Ages, members of the clergy had almost a monopoly of diplomatic activities, for they alone possessed the necessary languages and education; but by the XVI Century, lawyers, soldiers, and great merchants began also to be employed. In the list of Florentine envoys, one finds the names of Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio, and later, Guicciardini and Machiavelli. Since the XVIII Century, the tradition has been to make use almost exclusively of aristocrats, first, because of their social prestige, enabling them more readily to gain the confidence of eminent personages, and second, because of their private fortunes, enabling them to make a display suitable to their rank without drawing therefor upon the state treasury. At present, most countries have placed their diplomacy upon a civil service basis, although appointments to the highest embassies are frequently made, for one reason or another, outside "the career," among citizens distinguished by high political service to the party in power. Yet even in these democratic days, the aristocratic tradition is by no means extinct. Most young men who enter "the career" belong to the "best families," and have private incomes. Their social connections enable them to obtain desirable appointments, and their private incomes enable them to live

suitably, which they could not do otherwise; for with the possible exception of Britain and of pre-war Germany, no country has yet seen fit sufficiently to remunerate its diplomats.

The first permanent ambassadors were looked upon everywhere as objects of profound suspicion—"professional liars" and "resident spies," by whom the ordinary moralities would not be applied, and who would consider the greatness of their national ends to be justification for even the ignoblest means. François I, whenever he had really important business of state to transact, used to go a-hunting in order to escape the prying observation of the corps of foreign diplomats. The latter were none the less tolerated, for the advantages of the system outweighed the disadvantages, and in the close game of wits, each monarch doubtless thought to come off victor. It was not, however, until the French Revolution and the Napoleonic cataclysm had shaken Europe into a new sense of solidarity that the diplomatic status was given a really official international recognition. At the Congresses of Vienna (1815) and of Aix-la-Chapelle (1818), the first classification of diplomatic agents was made and ratified—a classification which still holds to-day: (a) ambassadors, legates, nuncios, (b) envoys-extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary, (c) ministers resident, (d) *chargés d'affaires*. By custom and by international law, accredited diplomats and their suites have been accorded the right of inviolability, even after the outbreak of hostilities. A convenient fiction places their resident embassy under a régime of extra-territoriality, and although they may be expelled from a country, they are immune from its jurisdiction, whether civil or criminal.

The nature of the diplomatic system, it will be found, has changed and developed in close accordance with the change and development of international relations. The improvement of communications, inventions for rapid transit, the extension of foreign trade, have bound the nations into a single great community. Even farthest Asia has been opened up and taken into the system. The universal character of present-day consular and diplomatic representation is a striking testimonial to the universality of the interests of all modern nations. From a suspected "official spy," and the personal representative of a foreign king, the ambassador or minister has come to be looked upon as the honored representative of a sovereign people; who will speak and act for that people in the common interest of the country from which he comes, and the country to which he is assigned, and who is responsible, in a sense, not merely to the two countries immediately concerned, but to international comity as well. There is no nation so modest that it has not now its "State Department," or ministry of foreign affairs, where the records are kept, where the information sent in by its agents abroad is classified and digested, and through which these agents in turn are informed and instructed. A nation expects its diplomats to be suitably housed, and so to conduct themselves that they advance discreetly the national prestige and the national interests. It expects them to entertain sufficiently, so that they may honorably return the hospitality they receive, and may come to know the most influential people in the best way. It expects them to further, in proper circumstances, the expansion of the national trade and the national cul-

ture; to protect its nationals abroad in the pursuit of their legitimate business or pleasure; to watch and guard against violations of international law, or of contracts affecting the national interests; to prepare, and sometimes to negotiate, political or commercial treaties and agreements; to smoothe away misunderstandings and to create good-will; in a word, to perform all the immemorial functions of an emissary, but with a tact, judgment and skill greater than ever before, and in due respect for the observation and advancement of recognized international law and custom, and of the new international morality, as founded upon the common rights and interests of the entire community of nations. Never, let me repeat, has the function of the diplomatist, whether European, American, or Asiatic, been so complex or so important as it is to-day.

EFFECTS OF RAPID COMMUNICATIONS

FUNDAMENTALLY, the purpose of diplomacy is unchanging. In the future, as in the present and the past, it will aim, first, to inform itself as to the tendencies of the sources of power in foreign countries, and second, to influence these sources of power in accordance with directions received from its own government. Its means, however, do, or should—to be effective—change with changing circumstances. The methods which Rome and Byzantium employed so successfully in dealing with the barbarians, were of no use to Venice, in dealing with the equal and civilized states of the Renaissance. In the same way, the methods appropriate to the days of the post-chaise, the sailing-ship, and the monarch by divine right are wide of the mark in the days of the telegraph, the steamship, the railway train, and the “divine right” of democratic majorities.

Two factors have tended to transform diplomatic practice in our time; rapid communications and the rise of democracy. Both have been recognized, and both have given occasion to many erroneous suppositions. On the whole, probably too much significance has been read into the former, which dates from the middle of the last century, and not enough into the latter, the implications of which are only now beginning to be fully understood.

In the Europe of George III, and of Louis XV,

relations between the ministry of foreign affairs and the diplomats in the field were maintained by means of long, carefully considered dispatches, the transmission of which was at best a matter of some days or even of weeks. When instructions were received in time they were generally so detailed as to leave little or nothing to the resources of the ambassador, who was often furnished with even the precise words he was to employ in speaking to the foreign government. But frequently, instructions did not arrive in time; or else, in the interval between the sending of information and suggestions, and the receiving of a reply, the situation would have changed so considerably as to render the reply practically useless. It would then often be incumbent upon the diplomat to exercise his judgment and discretion, and to act upon his own responsibility; like the American peace commissioners who, arriving in Paris in 1782, and finding the political complex to be other than they had foreseen, did not sit down idly to wait while a ship could sail to America and back, but deliberately broke the specific orders of Congress, and made a secret separate peace with England. To risk such action, engaging his country solely upon his own prescience and decision, the old-time diplomat had need to be a man, not only of high ability, but of high standing and authority in the councils of his own government. Moreover, the absence of well-informed periodicals obliged governments, in the formulation of policies, to rely almost exclusively on the news and interpretations sent them by their agents abroad, the careful choice of whom was therefore, on still another score, a matter of the first importance.

But the telegraph and the submarine cable have wrought widespread transformations. The foreign minister of to-day is, or can be, in almost constant touch with all his agents, even those most remote. A diplomat can ask and receive instructions in the space of a few hours. When he has urgent information to transmit, he can wire it, secrecy being insured by a code. Even his dispatches, instead of moving by coach and by sail, are carried by rail and steamer in a fraction of the former time; and his news and views are supplemented, at home, by a ceaseless current of newspaper articles and telegrams from all the centers and ends of the earth.

All this is obviously a great convenience. To conclude, however, as some stout democratic spirits have been tempted to do, that the rôle of the diplomatic agent is therefore henceforth superfluous, or that it can at least be reduced to a kind of gentlemanly messenger-service between the embassy building and the foreign government's foreign ministry building, is to commit the grossest of errors.

The British government, as long ago as 1861, had to meet a popular misconception of this character. A commission of inquiry regarding the effect of the telegraph on the responsibility of diplomatic missions was accordingly instituted, and much of the testimony elicited from British diplomats, familiar with both the old manner of communication and the new, remains of interest. Sir A. Buchanan, for example, gave his opinion that telegrams were a useful improvement "unless too concise" and therefore difficult of interpretation. He pointed out that, even now, replies are sometimes not received in time, and that the agent

is still obliged occasionally to act upon his own responsibility. Finally, he insisted upon the necessity of keeping up the diplomatic establishment, if only for the purpose of communicating verbally with the foreign government, verbal communications being often preferable to written. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe demonstrated that the telegram should never be allowed entirely to supersede the full, written dispatch. Lord John Russell, a former foreign minister, stated the belief, based on his experience, that the modern diplomat is burdened not with less, but with more, responsibility than his predecessors, for the reason that, his instructions being briefer, he is obliged to supply most of the detail from his own store of tact and intelligence.

More than half a century has elapsed since this British inquiry. Communications have been still further speeded up. Longer telegrams are possible. Yet the case for the responsibility of the diplomatic agent remains, if anything, stronger than before. The information supplied by newspapers is voluminous, but it is not complete. The popular taste for sensational or highly-colored news tends to make it fragmentary and unreliable. Too many of the men who write for the press are ill-paid, inexperienced, and incapable of rendering mature judgments. The ordinary newspaper-reader is apt to be more interested in picturesque but insignificant details than in the fundamental analyses which interest the statesman. Governments certainly scrutinize the periodical press, but for all the foregoing reasons, the information to which they will naturally give most heed is that which they demand and receive, in confidential dispatches, from their trained diplomatic agents; and the first function of

these agents remains the furnishing of informatory analyses, accompanied by an interpretative opinion and by specific recommendations fitted to the circumstances.

The argument goes farther. Supposing—which is far from the fact—that the diplomat had no longer an informative and advisory function to perform; supposing even—which is also far from the fact—that his instructions always come in time and that they leave him not the slightest initiative: the presence of a distinguished, capable diplomatic representative in every foreign capital would nevertheless be essential, for the primordial reason that the element of human contact can never with impunity be eliminated from human affairs, whether of individuals or of the state. If writing letters or telegrams to customers would suffice, why do commercial houses go to the great expense of sending out salesmen? A good salesman is the pride of his firm, and a good ambassador is a source both of honor and of profit to his country. The exchange of written communications between governments is often necessary. In moments of misunderstanding, however, note-writing is apt to lead only from one misunderstanding to another; for nations are even more sensitive than individuals to real or fancied slights, and there are moods in which whatever is written is subject to misinterpretation. The manner and bearing of diplomats, even when they present written communications, is often an aid to the correct interpretation of these communications; much more so when their communications are verbal. Two diplomats can often do more toward the settling of a disagreeable international problem in half an hour's friendly conversation, than could be accomplished by half a year

of epistles. And to whom would the traveler appeal for the protection of his rights and interests in a foreign land, if not to his resident ambassador?

Regarding this whole matter, I am glad of the opportunity to quote the following incisive passage from a recent speech of Mr. Charles Evans Hughes:

"There is still a lingering notion that in view of the fact that the representatives of our government act under instructions from the Department of State, and because of the improved facilities of communication, these representatives continue what is mainly a social tradition and are of slight practical value. Some may think that communications cabled directly to foreign powers would be sufficient. It is a very crude and limited view which would deny the importance of even social contact. But the inadequacy of mere written communications, however important these may be, and of the necessity of direct personal approach should be apparent to everyone whose horizon is broad enough to enable him to consider foreign affairs to any advantage. The facilities of communication increase the opportunities for business and the multiplicity of business interests and intimacies of business relations serve not to lessen but greatly to increase the necessity for the factor of personality in contacts with foreign governments. . . . Everyone familiar with foreign affairs knows that while the statement of foreign policies in formal writings is absolutely necessary, still, in order to accomplish results in negotiations, there should be, so far as practicable, the personal contacts of diplomatic representatives. Every important business concern that can send an agent personally to conduct delicate negotiations does so.

Every responsible foreign minister longs to get away from interminable note-writing through which controversies tend to approach an impasse. . . . The present effort of diplomacy is not to rely on mechanical facilities of communication, but to get to the maximum the advantage of personality in negotiations."

Rapid communications, I would point out in conclusion, have done an immensely beneficent work in making the world smaller, and in linking it more closely together; but there is one unpleasant compensation: they have tended to make men act and think in a nervous agitation which is often ineffective, and with a rapidity detrimental to sound and thorough reflection. "There are two things," Diodorus told the Athenians, "which I believe to be contrary to a wise deliberation—precipitation, and anger, the latter commonly accompanied by insanity, and the former, by carelessness and ignorance." There is no field in which this sudden anger or this over-precipitation is so much to be dreaded as in that of foreign affairs. Diplomacy must take full advantage of the facilities offered it by modern science, but it must never allow itself to be stampeded by the speed-mania. Moments there are, certainly, when the greatest issues, as of peace or war, depend upon instant decisions; but these decisions will be facilitated if the various contingencies have been duly foreseen and balanced beforehand by a diplomacy which, despite the telegraph and the wireless, remains reflective, cautious, tactful, even-tempered, analytical and synthetic.

EFFECTS OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL

OF later date than rapid communications, but more influential in every way upon the processes of diplomacy, is the increasing popular control over the internal and external policies of governments. Although this control has been developing gradually through a couple of generations, it is only now beginning to be really effective, and there are very few diplomatic services which have as yet seriously undertaken to adapt themselves to it. The British have perhaps gone farther than other people in this respect, and after them, the Americans, but haltingly, and with the scruples of the amateur. It is of course by no means certain that democratic peoples are going to be able, in practice, to live up to their supervisory ambitions; for those who are public-spirited enough to be willing to devote a part of their leisure to the understanding of the problems of state-craft are still few; and the bulk of the people notoriously shun responsibility. Nevertheless, the experiment is begun, and must be seen through; and all diplomacy must presently readjust itself accordingly, on pain of becoming futile, as a man who should persist, however skilfully, with bow-and-arrow, after the practical innovation of gunpowder.

The desire of public opinion, in the more advanced

democracies, for something like a direct control of policies, originated, no doubt, in universal suffrage, in compulsory education, and in the discovery of the influence which mere numbers are able to exert by means of organization. The decisive impulse, however, springs not from these factors, but from the principle of "integral war," as applied in the recent world-hostilities. The ancient Greeks and Romans levied armies by conscription; the French Revolution and Napoleon renewed the system, Germany perfected it, and the Great War made it general. Since, therefore, the demonstration has so recently been made to every man that war is no longer a matter of professional soldiers, of voluntary enlistment, and of short, sportmanlike campaigns, as in the XVII and XVIII Centuries, but is now a deadly conflict of whole peoples against whole peoples, involving not merely the men, but even the women and children, and threatening the lives and fortunes of high and low alike; since war, in short, has now become truly "integral," no people desires to be drawn into such a combat save with eyes wide open and with its own free and forward-looking consent. No educated people, consequently, is willing longer wholly to delegate the conduct of its foreign affairs, lest it awake some morning to find itself involved in a situation wherein the national honor or interest is already at stake, and mobilization inevitable. Mr. Elihu Root believes that democratic peoples henceforth will tend increasingly to take active part, not merely in the formulation of policies, but in the actual oncarrying of negotiations, as did the American people, for example, during the Washington Arms Limitation Conference. If the prospect contains new ele-

ments of danger, there is the more reason for critically contemplating it.

The diplomatic agent, broadly speaking, has, as I have said, two duties, first, to study and report upon the sources of power in foreign countries, and second, to try discreetly to influence these sources of power in a sense favorable to his own country's aims and interests. The triumph of democracy marks the definite shifting of these sources of power from the aristocratic individuals of a ruling family and class, to the mass organizations, and their leaders, which, taken together, form the country's sovereign public opinion. Most diplomats are aware, in the abstract, of this fundamental transference of power, but too many have been tardy in deducing all the consequences, especially as affecting their own ways and methods.

From among numerous possible instances, the origins of the Franco-Spanish War of 1556 may perhaps be taken as a type of pre-democratic foreign relations. This war arose, not because of any quarrel between the peoples of France and Spain, but out of the personal jealousies, ambitions, and intrigues of certain eminent and unscrupulous individuals, chief among whom may be mentioned Pope Paul IV, of the house of Caraffa, his adventurous nephew, Cardinal Caraffa, the French king's mistress, Diana of Poitiers, and the French queen, Catherine de Medici. The pretext of the war was the violence inflicted upon the Roman gate-keepers by the Spanish ambassador, because they had refused to open the gate before hours, early in the morning, to permit this dignitary to ride out a-hunting in the Campagna. Says Motley: "The wiles of a cardinal,—the arts of a concubine—the snipe-

shooting of an ambassador—the speculations of a soldier of fortune—the ill-temper of a monk—the mutual venom of Italian houses—above all, the perpetual rivalry of the two great historical families who owned the greater part of Europe between them as their private property, such were the wheels on which rolled the destiny of Christendom.” Obviously, then, since here was the power, the things which a foreign agent, desiring to keep ahead or abreast of events, required to know, were not the sentiments and economic and political interests of the French and Spanish peoples, but the characters, connections, idiosyncracies and aims, open or secret, of Hapsburgs and Bourbons, queen and concubine, captain, cardinal, and pope, for out of these personal complexes, history would weave its pattern; and the ambassador who wished to try his hand at modifying the course of events, might ask no better opportunity than to sit beside Diana of Poitiers at a dinner-party.

There are still countries, in Asia, in the remoter parts of Europe, and perhaps in Latin America, where personal rule remains practically supreme. But in the great democratic nations of the west, the problem is now far more complicated. It is no longer sufficient for the skilful diplomatist to keep in touch with individuals; he must also keep in touch with the masses themselves—that is, not only with the people’s leaders, but with those deeper, mysterious currents of opinion which sometimes overwhelm leaders, and which, in any case, are the true weather-signals of a political trend. I realize that I am here treading on doubtful ground. There have always been, there will be perhaps always, men who, like Herodotus, tend to

over-emphasize the individual factor in history, and men who, like Thucydides, tend to exaggerate the factor of the anonymous mass. Obviously, a subtle interplay of forces is here involved, which cannot readily be unraveled. Professor Robert Michels, of the University of Turin, in his admirable study of contemporary socialist parties, has shown that no enduring political movement, however popular, is conceivable without professional leaders. We know that in even the most advanced democracies there arise now and then men whose powers are nothing short of dictatorial—a Pericles in Athens, a Lincoln in the United States. A French diplomat has wittily maintained that “there is never but one question at a time in Europe, and that question is a man.” Napoleon, Alexander, Metternich, Bismarck, William II, Wilson, Lloyd George, Poincaré—there is certainly more than a shade of truth in the witticism, and he would be a rash critic who would deny to modern diplomacy a close preoccupation with the strengths and weaknesses of individuals. Two points, however, are to be insisted upon. The leaders whom it is henceforth necessary for a diplomat to know are far more heterogeneous than formerly. Aristocrats, ministers, “high society,”—these are not enough. He should have at least a speaking acquaintance also with party chieftains, influential legislators, financiers, big merchants, important journalists, the heads of institutions and of general professional organizations—even, on occasion, labor-leaders. Yet even to know these potent moulders of opinion is not enough. He must also—and this is the second point—keep vigilant watch, as I have said, upon the vague movements of mass-psy-

chology, whether regional, national or appertaining to some influential class; for in our modern democracies, as often as not, it is the masses who lead the so-called leaders, and through whom, therefore, a government is to be most readily influenced.

The appeal of a foreign agent, direct to a people, may occasionally be successful. The British made such an appeal successfully in the matter of submarines, at the Washington Conference. But it is nearly always dangerous and is not to be recommended, as witness the Genet episode, in our early history; Wilson's note on Fiume, which so angered the Italian people, and the case of the Italian ambassador, Ricci, only the other day, whose recall was threatened because he spoke publicly against the Fordney tariff bill. It is of course a principle of international law, though the principle is observed at present more generally in the letter than in the spirit, that no nation must attempt to interfere in another nation's domestic affairs. A question arises as to just which affairs are "domestic." Perhaps very few nowadays are wholly so. Nevertheless, a people's susceptibilities are easily wounded in this respect, and the appeal direct to opinion, if it has to be attempted at all, is far more safely accomplished, as certain other British experiments have shown, by means of influential private writers and speakers, who have of course no official connection with their own government, but whose views may nevertheless be relied upon for orthodoxy. I see nothing particularly sinister in all this. The old Greek republics were never afraid to accord to foreign envoys the privilege of a public hearing; what are our contemporary republics afraid of? The evidence remains,

that the direct appeal to opinion, by a foreign agent, unless delivered with the greatest circumspection, is perilous; for if it only overshoot the mark by ever so little, resentment is aroused, and the harm accomplished outweighs the good.

If it were possible to imagine a trained Venetian diplomat of the XVI Century assigned to the Washington of to-day, he would, of course, in making his professional inventory of the country, omit the item "manners of the court." The rest of his old formula, however, would hold good. The country's geographical situation, boundaries, administrative divisions, its principal cities and ports, are still significant. For the item "fortifications," he might substitute "naval bases." Population, customs, religion; condition of the army and navy; import and export trade; manner of government; character and circumstances of cabinet members; character and way of life of the president, condition of public finances; interior political situation; foreign relations and policies—in all these items, after replacing the word "sovereign" by the word "president," there would be no change. He would, however, be obliged to make two vital additions: national interests, as indicated by the general economic situation; and public opinion, as indicated by the press, and by the nation's great professional and institutional organizations. By reason of these two additions, his whole circle of acquaintances would have to be broadened. Receptions of local society leaders and dinners to cabinet members would not suffice his purposes. He would want to know leading senators, and party-leaders of the House. He would have an eye alert for bankers, industrial magnates, railway

presidents. He would be glad to meet leading educators, heads of national religious organizations. He would watch opinion in the wheat-belt and the cotton-belt, and on the Pacific Coast. He would desire an acquaintance with labor chieftains and with the moving spirits of the chambers of commerce. In short, wherever a great national interest or a powerful reservoir of sentiment was represented in individuals or groups of men, he would desire to know and to be known—discreetly, of course, and in all dignity, yet certainly. And this, in my opinion, is the most important fact about the new diplomacy, regarded from the diplomatic point of view.

Strictly speaking, it appears, then, that the rise of public opinion to sovereign power in the western democracies, far from striking at the existence of the diplomatic career, is merely one more factor with which the diplomatist has to deal. The qualities of intrigue, eloquence, and personal fascination which marked the old diplomacy, are certainly lessened, but by no means eliminated, in and from the new. What with ignorance, prejudice, pride, and naïve, innate combativeness, opinion itself, as one commentator points out, is "subject to the wiles of the skilful diplomatist no less than were the princes and statesmen with whom the old diplomacy was solely concerned." "When foreign affairs were ruled by autocracies," writes Mr. Elihu Root, "the danger of war was in sinister purpose. When foreign affairs are ruled by democracies, the danger of war will be in mistaken beliefs." Even, on occasion, he might have added, it may be the "sinister purpose" of the cunning foreign agent to create these "mistaken beliefs." But although

the rise of opinion is obviously attended with evils and dangers, these evils and dangers are perhaps less great than in the days of autocracy. At least, if the people suffer henceforth from the pursuance of mistaken policies, they themselves must accept the bulk of the responsibility. Democratic opinion, though only one factor in diplomacy, is a factor of primordial import, and from now on, must be reckoned as such.

PUBLICITY AND SECRECY

I COME now to the burning controversy of "secret diplomacy."

In the eyes of an irritated public no rag is redder at present than this hated phrase. In consequence, demagogues have seized upon it and agitate it on every occasion. Reformers have found it to be the root of all international evil. No crime is too extravagant or too humble to be imputed to the machinations of intriguing diplomats, and the quantity of careless and erroneous comment which passes current upon the subject is every day more considerable.

If suspicion, rivalry, and lack of confidence still persist between the nations, what is the cause? Secret diplomacy! If the world is to-day threatened with new wars, what is the reason? Secret diplomacy! It is this, and this alone, we are told, which obscures "the truth" from well-meaning peoples, and so prevents them from putting immediately into effect that utopia of peace and good-will which is supposed to be their urgent preoccupation. Not German ambition but secret diplomacy started the Great War—the secret diplomacy of the allies, said Bethmann-Hollweg in 1914, and he could not have hit upon a happier disculpation. Secret diplomacy causes suspicion, suspicion causes armaments, armaments cause war; ergo, if you want to be rid of war, get rid of secret diplomacy.

Its consequences, the assertion is gravely made, have never been other than disastrous. Its "manipulations" are "selfish and short-sighted." Its "evil bargainings" stand in the way of "the broad and permanent view," "the true underlying forces." Destroy it, and all at last will be well.

The case, however, is perhaps not quite so simple as the demagogues and reformers would have it appear. Suspicion, rivalries, and distrust may thrive in the dark, but so long as men are men and have reason to fear one another, these unpleasant moods will hardly vanish, even in the light. Nothing, for example, could be more "open" and above-board to-day than the "new wars" with which France and Germany threaten one another, with which Hungary threatens Czecho-Slovakia and Roumania, with which Germany threatens Poland and with which Russia threatens almost everybody. All peoples, it is certain, want peace, but they want it on their own terms, and what obscures "the truth" from them is not so much "secrecy" as their wilful blindness to every viewpoint save their own. To say that "secret diplomacy," which all Europe practiced more or less, caused the war, is to say that it simply caused itself; but unfortunately for Germany, the theory of spontaneous generation is no longer in favor among thinking individuals. A circle—even a "vicious circle,"—may be described either clock-wise or counter-clock-wise. Why say "secret diplomacy, suspicion, armaments, war?" It would be at least as accurate, in my opinion, to say "war, armaments, suspicion, secret diplomacy." In other words, if you want to do away with secret diplomacy, begin by doing away with war. And have

the consequences of secret diplomacy always been disastrous? Surely this is a sweeping statement, for from the Middle Ages until quite recently, all diplomacy whatsoever, that is, the conduct of all international relations, was secret. The rebellious American Colonies negotiated in secret an alliance with France, in 1777, and a separate peace with Britain, in 1782, and were certainly none the worse for either. If some of the "manipulations" of secret diplomacy have been "selfish and short-sighted," are we to conclude that the "manipulations" of open diplomacy will necessarily be generous and far-sighted? Is "bargaining" necessarily "evil"? And what are these mysterious "underlying forces" this "broad and permanent view," whose action secret diplomacy is supposed to be so potent as to obstruct? On this point I find the reformers to be somewhat chary of revelations.

"The dream of political ideologists," remarks an eminent French jurist, "has always been to find the magic formula of a constitutional or legislative mechanism which does away with conscious and voluntary effort . . . How much more attractive does this dream become when transported into the international field?" Of the prevalent rage against secret diplomacy, much, I fear, is simply a new turn in the ancient search for a "magic formula." There is, however, a real charge to be brought against the aged and venerable accused, and it may be stated as follows:

Secret diplomacy, natural and proper in an autocracy, when diplomats represented, and were responsible to, rulers only, is incompatible with the democracies of to-day, when diplomats represent, not rulers, but peoples. Public opinion, in a democracy, is sovereign.

But in order to exercise its due function of control over its chosen ministers and agents, it must be fully informed as to their aims and actions. Modern peoples, in short, refuse to be bound save of their own will and consent, and secret diplomacy has become, in consequence, not only an anachronism but a futility, since the makers of secret agreements risk repudiation in the hour of crisis, at the hands of the public.

So obviously is this strong charge justified by all the evidence that there are to-day few statesmen who dare still to defend secret diplomacy as a principle. In the abstract, it is now generally admitted, all diplomacy should be open. This is the ideal. But in reality, in practice, a measure of secrecy is argued for, and is maintained. Although this measure varies, it is present, to some extent, everywhere, and there is no government which conducts its foreign relations with complete publicity. It is governmental oppositions, in the main, which lead the outcry against secrecy. But responsibility is a masterful teacher; and just as it is said that potential criminals make the best detectives, just as it was found, during the war, that former newspaper reporters make the best censors, so perhaps those same politicians who, when out of power, are hottest against secrecy, are apt, upon assuming the burden of government, to become its coolest defenders.

"If you want to buy a certain horse," said Bismarck, "you do not go shouting everywhere the highest price you will consent to give; and if you want to sell one, you do not publish the lowest price you will agree to let it go for. Diplomacy," he added, "should act with the same elementary good sense." This is

frank, but it is also rather crude. Most of the defenses offered for limited secrecy are more subtle. If certain communications to the Foreign Office from its agents were to be published, Lord Wodehouse explained to a British committee in 1861, the sources of information would be suddenly dried up, and foreign diplomats would cease to be confidential with their British colleagues. "A plain exposition of policy," writes Walter Alison Phillips in the "Encyclopedia Britannica," "would often give an undue advantage to the other party in a negotiation." If publication of the terms of conversations were to take place during negotiations, too many outside factions and persons would interfere, and an end could never be come to, the Earl of Clarendon feared. Legislatures, to say nothing of public opinion, are declared to be too ignorant of foreign affairs to be entrusted with their control and direction. The executive, not the legislature, we are told, is the organ of democracy best fitted to conduct foreign policy, and as the executive is no less representative of the people than is the legislative, there is no reason not to trust it. "Governments," testified Lord Lytton, "are generally for diplomacy, the people for war." Public opinion, remarks Lord Arthur Balfour, is explosive in time of controversy; the cross-examination of diplomatic agents by legislators would be demoralizing and intolerable, and as for secret treaties, they are an evil, but a necessary evil. "It should be understood," Mr. Charles E. Hughes set forth in a recent speech, "that there are certain inescapable limitations in the most straightforward diplomacy." Governments, he continued, must be free to make tentative proposals and withdraw them with-

out hurt to the national prestige. "It does not facilitate the reasonable adjustments which must be made, if there is to be resort to practical wisdom and not to force, to create situations in which nothing can be accomplished without an unnecessary wounding of national pride." Finally, one party to a negotiation cannot, in honor and in courtesy, publish the negotiation without the consent of the other part, on pain of forfeiting that good-will upon which, Mr. Hughes thinks, "the peace of the world ultimately depends."

The controversy which thus rages around the issue of secret diplomacy is not uninteresting, but like so many other famous controversies, it is perhaps a little way beside the point. Secret diplomacy was not a device of wicked aristocrats for the undoing of the masses; it was a natural function of an accepted international system. Why fulminate against the intrigues of dead kings and princes? Their own subjects accepted the system complacently enough, else it would have broken down much sooner. The democratic impulse, when it came, from the people, who are to-day, in the western democracies, sovereign. The outcry against secret diplomacy has had a wide popular reverberation, and if a measure of secrecy still persists, it is certainly for no other reason than that the people are indifferent, tolerant, or convinced of its utility. Even Dr. Paul S. Reinsch, one of the most ardent of our American lances against diplomatic secrecy, admits this popular responsibility. "The abolition of secret diplomacy," he concludes, "is not a matter of agreeing to have no more secrets. It is a matter of arousing among the public so powerful a determination to know, so strong a sentiment of the

value of truth, such a penetrating spirit of inquiry, that the secrets will fade away, as they always do when the importance of a situation is really understood by a large number of people."

The fact is that the term itself, as now used, is vague—a sort of bugaboo agitated in the dark, of which some persons take fright without knowing too well whether it is really a dangerous spirit or only a rag on a stick in the hands of interested manipulators. To charge an adversary with indulgence in "secret treaties" has become an excellent form of propaganda; as the Russo-German treaty of Rapallo was immediately said to have secret military clauses, or as the Bolsheviks of Siberia took the occasion of the Washington Conference to give to the press the "texts" of alleged secret Franco-Japanese agreements which were almost certainly forgeries.

In time of war, the secrecy of diplomatic strategy is generally admitted to be no less needful than the secrecy of military strategy, for both are essential factors of defense and attack. In time of peace, however, secret diplomacy, in the old absolute sense of the term, no longer exists. The public, if not fully aroused to its new responsibilities, is partially so, and legislators everywhere are being forced to give more serious attention to matters of foreign policy. This awakening of public interest enables the press to employ more and abler men in the international field, and their surveillance, though still leaving much to be desired, is already so shrewd that more than one statesman has come to see that his best plan is to take them into his confidence, pledging them, on occasion, to silence—to which the newspapermen retort, as often

as not, by refusing to accept confidential communications. The keeping of a really important secret between more than two or three people, when a lot of other able people are trying to find it out, is next to impossible. It is taken for granted among newspapermen that "somebody always tells." The main circumstances of nearly all international situations are therefore to-day pretty well known by diplomats and expert observers, and could be equally well known, at cost of a little effort, by almost anybody. The texts of the treaties binding together the Triple Alliance, on the one hand, and the Entente, on the other, in the period prior to the war, were secret, but the resultant situation was by no means obscure. Most of the secret agreements made during the war leaked out, in one way or another, before the war was over. The main outlines of the Paris peace negotiations were perfectly well known to the leading newspaper correspondents, and were published contemporaneously, and the same is true of all subsequent important conferences or negotiations. Most existent European treaties have been duly filed, according to covenant, with the League of Nations, and can be perused by any inquirer. The principal exceptions are technical military conventions which, by their very nature, cannot be rendered public, lest they thus defeat their own end. From the public viewpoint, after all, the important thing is not to know just what troop movements the French and Belgian governments intend to concert, in case of war with Germany, but to know that the Franco-Belgian military alliance does actually exist. In the case of Russia and Germany, their identity of interest, in certain circumstances, is so patent, that it

does not particularly matter whether the Rapallo treaty entails secret military clauses. The Europe of to-day is a Europe, not of monarchs, but of peoples. Its politics are confused and complicated, but they are not, broadly speaking, secret. On the contrary, they can be read by the trained observer like print.

But because the element of secrecy, in modern diplomacy, is greatly diminishing, to conclude that it must therefore soon disappear altogether is certainly oversanguine. Why do nations make secret compacts and alliances? Sometimes, no doubt, for purposes of aggression, but usually for purposes of defense against what are believed to be real dangers. Why do some otherwise democratic peoples, as those of France and England, permit their governments to enter into secret compacts? Because they are conscious of certain dangers, and because they have confidence in their chosen statesmen, who very well know that unless their secret treaties are harmonious with the trend of opinion, these treaties, in time of crisis, will not stand. As long as there are dangers which cannot be openly avowed on pain of seeming provocation, so long will governments be tempted to combine, against these dangers, measures which in turn cannot be openly avowed. The suggestion has been made that all treaties not publicly ratified should be outlawed; but if the parties themselves do not object to secrecy, who is to force publicity upon them? No more in international than in national affairs can mere legislation change or abolish what is essentially a state of mind. The only plausible remedy for secret diplomacy, as still practised by democracies, is to do away with the fear of aggression by making general compacts of

guarantee against any and all aggressors. Even then there would remain the entire field of economic competition in which nations desiring to conspire or bargain for advantage could scarcely be prevented from so doing. Complete publicity remains the ideal, but its realization is not yet in sight.

Meanwhile, in order to pick one's way with reasonable success through this tangle of controversy, suspicion, dangers, outworn methods and popular impulses, it is necessary to subdivide the broad term "diplomacy" into its several processes, asking then of each process in turn, how far the maintenance of secrecy seems justifiable in the people's own interest, under contemporary conditions.

The first distinction to be made is between peace-diplomacy and war-diplomacy. As there was not one of the western democracies which hesitated in the late war to bestow upon its government the most autocratic dictatorial powers, I suppose there is no one in these democracies who would controvert the assertion that war-diplomacy, in so far as it is a weapon of attack or defense, must be veiled from the enemy whenever secrecy seems an advantage. Against secret diplomacy in war-time, it is difficult to make out a plausible indictment. The one rule is that statesmen, even in the stress of life-and-death struggle, should beware of entering into engagements which they have reason to fear may later be repudiated by the people in whose name they are supposed to be acting. Sooner or later a betrayed people takes its revenge. It is therefore with the subject of peace-diplomacy that we are here chiefly concerned. The subject may perhaps

best be considered under a number of heads, as follows:

a. Correspondence between a government and its agents. This comprises written or telegraphic instructions to diplomats, and messages of information, interpretation, and suggestion from diplomats to their governments, including often informal and unofficial, but important, personal correspondence. Nearly all official dispatches are transmitted in code by wire, or in sealed mail-pouches which, by common international consent, are not subject to interference. They are placed on file, and are a matter of record. For a time, at least, they are kept secret. Their premature publication would perhaps cut off useful sources of information, and compromise the persons concerned. Most governments, however, after a number of years, publish selections of dispatches; and information obtained from agents abroad is often communicated immediately to the public through the press, or through the speeches of some member of the government. The public, in my opinion, has no interest to try to force premature publicity of dispatches. A certain amount of confidential correspondence is necessary between a government and its agents. Experience has shown that the threat of premature publicity simply serves to increase the quantity of private letter-writing between diplomats and members of government. These private letters are not a matter of record and may be removed or destroyed. The interest of the public is that they should be resorted to as little as possible.

b. Communications from one government to another, not taking the form of negotiations. When such communications have to be confidential, they should be

made verbally. They then enter into the preceding category as correspondence between a diplomat and his government. When they are written, they should be published by the author-government. The public should demand such publication.

c. Progress of negotiations. This includes all conversations between governments looking toward possible settlements or agreements. Mere *démarches* for the purpose of sounding out another government as to its willingness to negotiate, need not be published, but once a negotiation has really begun, the public should be apprised of the fact. Complete publicity of negotiation, however, is not practicable, and is not the public's interest. Experience shows that men who wish to profit by confidential exchanges of views will always manage to do so—if not around a council-table, then around a dinner-table, or on a golf-links; and every door that the press, backed by public clamor, forces open, discloses another door behind. It is the interest of the public that written records should be kept of all negotiations; but if the pressure for full publicity is too great, statesmen will fear to keep such records and will discuss verbally—a method which leads not only to frequent misunderstandings, but to excessive secrecy—historic as well as contemporary. Diplomats, however, should publish as much of the trend of negotiations as is possible without compromising success; and whenever something is agreed upon, its chief features, if not the detailed text, should be published, though of course this cannot be done save with the consent of all the parties concerned. Broadly speaking, the practicability of public participation in important negotiations depends upon the degree of self-control,

reasonableness and sympathetic understanding which the public learns to exercise. Especially, the public must begin to comprehend that there may be two sides to a question, that international bargaining is no more reprehensible than individual bargaining, and that if two or more peoples are to settle their differences amicably, it can only be on a basis of mutual concessions, the acceptance of which is not at all, as the public tends to believe, a blot upon the national honor, but a proof of the national good-will and common-sense.

d. Conclusion of negotiations. When negotiations fail, the public has a right to know why, and full explanations should be offered it by the government. When there is success, the results are usually embodied in a text of some kind — protocol, exchange of letters, conversation, entente, agreement, treaty. These texts, in my opinion, should be immediately published, in the public interest, except perhaps in the case of military conventions, when the mere fact that one has been concluded is sufficient to be announced. Secret understandings, secret clauses, secret letters of interpretation, except, as I have said, in war-time, are contrary, in my opinion, to the public interest, and should not be tolerated by opinion. Their existence is generally soon known, anyway, and if governments or peoples harbor designs which they are unwilling to avow, they had better not entrust them to writing at all.

e. Irregular, unauthorized, occult or personal agreements. Such understandings seem not infrequently to occur between highly placed individuals of two or more different governments, whether for reasons of sim-

pathy, prejudice, material gain, or personal ambition. By their very nature, they are secret, and about the only way by which their existence may even be surmised is the careful scrutiny of events. They bind, of course, merely the individuals concerned, but their influence, whether for good or bad, may be far-reaching, so long, at least, as these individuals remain in positions of power. I see no way to prevent such personal agreements, which are made because men are human and will pursue their ends by human means. The public interest is probably to ignore them, supporting both men and issues solely on their apparent merits, without regard to known or supposed personal affiliations of diplomats and statesmen. As for unauthorized intrigues of minor agents, these, when discovered, can always be disavowed by governments, and their harm diminished by disciplinary measures.

f. Archives. "History," says Prof. Joseph Barthélémy, "is the tribunal of the national conscience, before which governments are summoned to appear; it is also a guide in political reasoning; it teaches, by the example of the past, how to organize the present and to prepare the future." After a suitable lapse of time—at most, say, thirty years,—when the repercussion of events has passed far on, and the persons concerned are no longer active, the public interest is therefore that government archives, including all correspondence exchanged with foreign governments and diplomatic agents, should be entirely open to the authorized historian.

It is clear, I think, from this brief survey of various aspects of diplomacy, that the question of publicity is not nearly as simple as the enthusiast would have us

believe. Principles, to statesmen, like stars to navigators, are useful rather as guides than destinations. Between complete secrecy and complete openness, as between most abstract extremes, the just mean is still golden. For the people, the best course is neither to deify public servants by a blind trust, nor to hobble them by a blind suspicion. Give them general principles as guides, but leave to them the conception and execution of the details, the specific policies, until such time, at least, as their actions, duly observed, begin to seem inharmonious with the directive principles enunciated. For the diplomat, the best course is to make public everything the publication of which is not distinctly injurious to his work, that is, to the national interest. He has much to gain by taking reliable newspapermen into his confidence, and by winning, if possible, through them, the public confidence, as without this public support, he is likely to find himself handicapped at every turn.

I wish that, in conclusion, I might express my hearty adherence to the popular faith that the substitution of publicity for secrecy in international relations is going to usher in the millennium. But, diplomacy, whether open or secret, is not an end, but a means. As a means, open or secret, it may be either good or bad, according to the tact and skill of the statesman, and the coolness and wisdom of his public. What principally matters are the ends to which it is directed, and these too, whether open or secret, may be good or bad. To be able to feel securely that no nation is plotting in secret, is certainly an advantage; but it is a slight one if, at the same time, demagogic politicians and editors persist in the indiscriminate endeavor to

arouse international hatreds and suspicions, however openly. At all events the question of whether open diplomacy is good or bad is purely academic. The new diplomacy, with its enlarged publicity, is an integral part of the democratic scheme of government, and whether for better or for worse, it is here to stay. The aim of both public and diplomats should be to make it, and keep it, as courteous, tactful, effective, and beneficent as our national and international welfare seems now to demand.

FACTORS OF DIPLOMATIC STRENGTH

IN the chapters immediately preceding, the permanent elements of diplomacy have been indicated, as well as the modifications of diplomatic method induced by rapid communication and the rise of democracy. Diplomacy is itself the conduct of international relations; and as the net of common interests between nations, has now, for the first time, become world-wide, so there has never been an era when the need of the science and art of the trained diplomatist was so generally evident.

However, the Jews in Egypt could as well have been expected to make bricks without straw as diplomatists can be expected to make satisfactory agreements without the implication of force. Behind all their negotiations, mixed through and through their official acts, rarely mentioned, but always felt, there should be manifest the centrifugal powers, active or potential, of the people they represent. Professional skill is important. A poor ambassador, bungling, may nullify the most excellent possibilities. A skilful and experienced ambassador, on the contrary, not only can extract the utmost profit from a favorable situation, he can improve a situation which is actually bad. But the very best ambassador can hope to accomplish little or nothing in his country's interest, if he have not

behind him, conscious and consented, the elements of national force.

These elements, although interdependent, may be considered separately as military, moral, economic, and cultural. Military force, while it represents, in the larger sense intended by Admiral Mahan, "the aggregation of the national forces inherent in any community," is comprised specifically in the army and navy.

Moral force has both an interior and an exterior aspect. In the former, it depends primarily on a sound, efficient government, supported by a united and energetic public opinion. "Our influence, if it is to be maintained abroad," said George Canning, "must be secure in its sources of strength at home; and the sources of that strength are in the sympathy between the people and the government; in the union of the public sentiment with the public counsels; in the reciprocal confidence of the House of Commons and the Crown." In its exterior aspect, moral force accrues from a just cause, fairly and ably presented to the world, and from a national reputation for fair play, fidelity, determination, and peaceful intent.

Economic force is based on natural resources, the thrift and industry of an adequate population; agriculture, manufactures, foreign trade; buying power, lending power, branch banks abroad; adequate railways, waterways, and roads; an adequate merchant-marine, good foreign cable and wireless facilities; relative economic self-sufficiency.

As for cultural force, it arises from a strongly characterized stable, but lively, civilization, of proved duration, which has demonstrated its notability in one or

more of the higher human pursuits—science, art, business, philosophy, politics. Perhaps the word “prestige” could here have been properly substituted for the word “force.” Its means of action abroad are numerous; but among those chiefly employed, consciously or unconsciously, may be remarked; educational attraction to foreigners, who return afterward to their own countries; spread of language and viewpoint through religious schools and missions, through nationals of good character representing all manner of national interests abroad, through the organization and the at least partial control of emigrant nationals; export of art products and the finer grades of manufactures; export of books, periodicals, newspapers—especially those of the better class; encouragement of literary, artistic, scientific, sanitary, and relief missions to foreign countries; export of news reports through private national agencies.

These military, moral, economic, and cultural factors are, let me repeat, interdependent, and they reinforce one another. Economic expansion and a good moral reputation aid cultural expansion; while the most potent prestige of all, other things being equal, is that which springs from hard-won military victory in a cause appearing just. In the same way, cultural expansion aids economic expansion, and assists, or should assist, in the upbuilding of a good reputation. The army and navy may be materially excellent; but if they are not supported by economic strength, they tend soon to give out, and if they are not supported by the moral strength of a united opinion, the arm that holds the sword is palsied before it can strike. In passing, the remark may be made that the only

countries in the world to-day which seem industrially capable of waging a prolonged war on their own resources are the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and perhaps Japan. Finally, a good moral reputation and a just cause may prove decisive considerations in the cementing of victorious alliances.

All the four factors are important to diplomacy, but not in the same degree. Cultural strength is worth less, in negotiation, than economic strength, and both these are secondary to military, reinforced by moral, strength. In the last analysis, it is the army and navy, the power to attack and defend, to parry or to inflict physical harm, which are, and must remain, under whatever system of international organization, the ultimate argument. Armaments may perhaps safely be reduced, but they cannot safely be abolished, any more than the domestic police can safely be abolished; for force, armed force, "the organized force of the community as the means of assuring its will, is and must remain"—Admiral Mahan is right in insisting—"the basis of social order so long as evil exists to be repressed."

I do not know why so many illusions persist upon this score, when all history, past and present, is but a continual testimony to the primordial import of armament in international relations. To have a just and noble cause is good, but it boots little unless a sufficiency of physical force can be brought to the service of this cause. To have great riches, a great trade, is good, but in time of danger, it avails nothing, if these riches, this trade, cannot be protected; and for the reason that all peoples tend to value their pride, and what they call their "honor," above their mere

material interests, even the "economic sanctions" of which we have lately heard so much are potent only as they are clearly understood to be merely the prelude to possible military sanctions. Finally, to have a great and expanding culture is also good; but it is difficult of maintenance, it persists by tradition only, it tends to wither away, if the national independence be not at the same time vigorously maintained. Starting, as it were, from absolute zero, what has been the first care of the Russian bolshevists? Has it not been the reconstitution of their army and navy? And has not their cultural and economic collapse been largely compensated, even now, by this increasing power of theirs to inflict harm upon their neighbors? Aided by the consolidation of their interior situation, is it not already winning for them the international recognition which they tried in vain to entreat by other means? Again, if the Turks have re-established their position in the Near East, was it not solely by military prowess? The hard fact stands, to-day no less than yesterday, that the nation which wishes to be successful in diplomacy,—that is, in furthering what it conceives to be its people's interest abroad,—must begin by building up a military and naval establishment commensurate to its resources, and to the international rôle it assigns itself.

In diplomacy, as in other human endeavors, the secret of success reposes in one simple rule: the nice adjustment of the means to the end, and of the end to the means. History is strewn with the wrecks resulting from neglect of this elementary wisdom. Justinian, that "most happy, most illustrious emperor, victorious and triumphant," set out to reconquer, by

persuasion or force, the Roman Empire. He had great economic and cultural strength, but the moral factor was deficient, and especially, the army was inadequate, so that for every gain he made in the west, he suffered a loss in the east. But there is no need to look so far backward for examples. The contemporary chronicle teems with them. Why does China, with able diplomats, with great economic and cultural strength, with a just cause, fail in every negotiation? Because it has no government worth mentioning; because its opinion is divided; because it has no serious military establishment. Why has Europe, in the last four years, tended more and more to slip from the control of the victorious allies, who, in 1919, had all of the military, moral, economic, and even cultural forces on their side? Because their quarrels have little by little nullified the effect of every one of these factors, and especially because, from the first, they have so obviously hesitated to make use of that physical force which is the only means of maintaining a dictatorship. Why did Italian diplomacy prior to Mussolini, fail so conspicuously in recent years? Because, although Italy had military and cultural powers, the economic factor was weak, and the moral factor had failed; its opinion and government were anarchic, and it had wavered in its alliances. Why was the Germany of 1922 a diplomatic cipher? Because, while still unable to re-establish the military, moral, and cultural factors shattered in the war, it finally shattered even its strong economic factor by practicing inordinate inflation and by failing to arrest the flight of its liquid capital. Why has British diplomacy in the Near East passed from one disaster to an-

other? Because, to enforce its aggressive and energetic policy of expansion, Britain tried to rely not upon its own resources, but upon the resources of other feeblers—Greeks, Arabs. Why has the diplomacy of the United States, potentially the world's greatest power, been largely ineffective since the war? Because the hesitancy of the government, the wavering of opinion, and especially the supposed popular sentiment in favor of isolation, have so weakened our moral influence, that the force of our formidable military and economic position is as if paralyzed.

Words alone, the issuance of high pronouncements, are not a sufficient diplomatic equipment. In discussing recently Article XIX of the Washington Naval Treaty, the article which forbids the United States to fortify effectively its naval bases in Guam and the Philippines, Admiral Knapp stated plainly a vital aspect of the force factor requisite in diplomacy. "Our military prestige," he said, "has received a blow, and with the waning of military prestige, political prestige wanes also. The treaty may very well mark the beginning of a decreased influence in the Far East, with attendant loss to our proper, if selfish, trade interests and to our altruistic purpose for China." In other words, the task of American diplomats in the Far East, whatever their skill, has been by this treaty rendered more difficult, for the means it allows us are no longer sufficient to the rather vigorous Far Eastern policy we have until lately been pursuing.

Failing the command of those military, moral, economic and cultural factors which are the mark of a great world-power, a nation may of course nevertheless carry on an active diplomacy by seeking to utilize,

for its own ends, the external force of others; but its policies in this case will be characterized almost inevitably, not by the straightforward firmness and honest compromise which are the privilege of real power, but by trouble-making, by the excitation of rivalries, by secret compacts, petty intrigues of every description—in short, by methods which, at best, are rather clever than wise, and which combine moral ugliness with the liveliest uncertainty of success.

THE BALANCE OF POWER

PERHAPS the chief characteristic of our era, in a diplomatic sense, is the increasing and inescapable political, economic, and moral interdependence of the nations, which has been developing steadily and rapidly since the Renaissance, and which is now practically universal. "No nation whose citizens trade and travel," remarks Mr. Elihu Root; "that is to say, no nation which lives in neighborhood with other nations, need consider whether or not it will be a member of the community of nations. It cannot help itself. It may be a good member or a bad member, but it is a member by reason of the simple fact of neighborhood life and intercourse."

In order both of time and of importance, political interdependence takes precedence. It arises, now as in the XV Century, from the instinct of the weaker to combine against the stronger and so preserve peace, or at least freedom. Originally, this interdependence was limited to Europe. "Europe forms a political system," wrote Vattel, "an integral body, closely connected by the relations and different interests of the nations inhabiting this part of the world. The members . . . unite for the maintenance of order and liberty." Now, however, it extends also, not merely to the continents inhabited and colonized by Euro-

peans, but to the whole world; as evidence whereof, the World War itself is ample witness.

With discovery, exploration, and colonization; with the opening of the tropics and the orient to occidental trade, with the growth of modern industry and with swift rail and water communications, there has further been created, in the last two or three hundred years, a general economic interdependence which parallels and reinforces political interdependence.

Finally, the extent and complexity of political and economic interdependence have served to extend and interweave cultural and moral interdependence as well.

Of moral and cultural interdependence, the expressions are the many international humanitarian enterprises now actually functioning, the many scientific and learned congresses held, and especially, the growing prestige of international law. Of economic interdependence, the expressions are the interchange of consular representatives, and all the varied phenomena of foreign trade and finance. Of political interdependence, the expressions are the universal interchange of diplomatic representatives, the increasing number of international political congresses and conferences, and the system known as the balance of power.

It is natural for men always to endeavor to justify their actions to themselves and to one another by some accepted body of principles; and to this rule states, in the conduct of their foreign affairs, are no exception. A large number of the frictions commonly arising between nations are now recognized to be of a justiciable nature, and as such, subject to the influence and authority of international law. Other disputes, the gravest of all, those, namely, which are con-

sidered to involve the national prestige or honor, or to affect fundamental policy, are held to be non-justifiable, that is, to be outside the scope of mere law, above it, or beneath it, as you choose. In this extralegal realm of politics, whose frontiers with the realm of international law are shadowy and confused, the sovereignty of certain principles is nevertheless acknowledged; but the principles are political, psychological,—one may almost say, instinctive. The twin instincts of self-preservation and expansion here hold their iron sceptres, and the sources of their power lie deep in the wellsprings of popular or national passion.

I suppose that the oldest principle of foreign policy known to the world is the principle that might makes right.

“ the good old rule,
 the simple plan,
That they should take who have the power,
And they should keep who can.”

The sentiment of our barbarian forefathers seems definitely to have been that God was always on the stronger side; or rather, that success in contest was evidence of divine approval; and they expressed this sentiment in the phrase, “the judgment of God,” which was given as the explanation of all defeat, whether in single combat or in battle. We have to face the truth that this old jungle law is still active in the world. Ideally deplorable as it may be, no sure means of undermining it has yet been found, and perhaps none ever will be found. “A state conscious of its strength,” a French writer remarks, “tends to impose its will by force”; and the accomplished fact is still an argument most difficult of refutation.

As examples of practical and long-standing policies based chiefly upon the right of might, there will at once occur to the reader our American Monroe Doctrine, and the British doctrine of sea-power—"Britannia rules the waves." The right of the victor in war to impose his terms upon the vanquished goes unchallenged even by international law; and fortunately so, else this body of law would soon become but an empty abstraction. Revolutionary governments, which wade to power through blood and ruins, are at first regarded as criminal by older, settled governments, but if they succeed in maintaining themselves, recognition is only a question of time. The indignation which arises against a successful aggressor presently dies out, other things being equal, and sooner or later, honors and homage begin to be accorded him. Alexander, Cæsar, Napoleon, Bismark, are today regarded, in some respects rightly, as great men. Peter Karageorgevitch of Serbia, abhorred by western peoples in 1903 as a peculiarly atrocious murderer, was hailed by these same peoples as a hero in 1914. Failing, William II is an arch-criminal, but if he had won the late war instead of losing it, his good fame would almost certainly now be echoing around the world. What restrains common evil-doers is not the enunciation of noble ideals, but the force of the organized community, as represented in the police or the vigilance committee; and what restrains states tempted to infringe upon others' rights, is not so much respect for international law as fear of defeat at the hands of an outraged coalition. In short, the only known way by which the strength of evil may be overcome is by opposing to it the strength of good; which-

ever prevails, it is force which has been the arbiter. Might, in the long run, always makes right. The conclusion may be unpleasant; it seems to be incontrovertible.

But although philosophically, theoretically, might stands at last unchallenged, practically, its domination is continually modified by the operation of another great political principle—the principle known as the balance of power. This principle may be described as the right and duty of all interested states to combine against any state or group of states whose strength is so preponderant as to seem to threaten, either immediately or ultimately, the liberties of the others. In short, to the aggressive force of the strong individual or oligarchy, it opposes the united defensive force of an entire international community.

Its origin is very early—as early, almost, as the jungle law itself. Certainly, organized political groups have tended always to be actuated by it, as if instinctively. “The balance of power between contiguous nations constitutes freedom,” said Pagondas the Boeotian, some five hundred years before Christ. The Corfou affair, according to Thucydides, was merely the pretext of the Peloponnesian war, its profound cause being the rapidly rising aggressive power of Athens. Polybius declares: “Nor should so great a power be allowed to anyone as to make it impossible for you afterward to dispute with him on equal terms concerning your manifest rights.” The definite recognition of the principle in modern Europe dates from about 1500, thus corresponding roughly to the young maturity of the new system of national states. The treaties of Utrecht, 1713, aimed textually “*ad conser-*

vandum in Europa equilibrium." Vattel, in his celebrated *Droit des Gens*, described the balance of power in these words: "Such a disposition of things as that no one potentate be able absolutely to predominate, and prescribe laws to the others. . . . The method . . . of forming confederacies in order to oppose the more powerful potentate, and prevent him from giving law to his neighbors." The nations, he wrote, "consider the two principal powers, which on that very account are naturally rivals, as destined to be checks on each other; and they unite with the weaker, like so many weights thrown into the lighter scale, in order to keep it in equilibrium with the other." Clausewitz found the principle to be evidence of a "tendency to stability;" and from the military viewpoint, he remarked that "the defensive, in general, may count more on foreign aid than the offensive." However, the balance of power, Sir James Mackintosh has pointed out, is only the means—the end is the independence of nations. And Prof. L. Oppenheim shows that, without this principle, there could be no international law, for unless states held one another in check, any state could proceed upon force alone. At first a solely European doctrine, the balance of power, in the course of the last century, has become of worldwide operation. Africa, Asia, America—all are involved, for the world, henceforward, politically as well as economically is one.

Idealists have never been wholly satisfied with the principle of the balance of power, for the reason that it does not prevent war. J. J. Rousseau remarked perspicaciously that because of continually changing conditions, the endeavor to preserve it occasioned a

"continual agitation," to overcome which he urged the establishment of a confederation of all European states. Just at present, large numbers of people believe not only that it does not prevent war, but that it actually causes war, and they profess to hope that political equilibrium will never again be recovered. Obviously, a profound misconception is here involved. The knowledge that there will surely arise a coalition against him may deter an aggressor, but it does not necessarily stop him from gambling upon the chances of success. The balance of power, consequently, cannot prevent war, and nothing can prevent war, so long as there are communities which are willing to undertake aggression. The balance of power, however, as history shows and as Clausewitz noted, does almost invariably operate against the aggressor. In Europe, it has in turn saved the liberties of the lesser states from the imperialisms of Charles V, Louis XIV, Napoleon I, and William II. It has guaranteed successfully the independence of the small neutral states, and has made the partition of Africa and of parts of Asia more equitable and hence perhaps less oppressive. It is therefore even to-day most certainly what it has authoritatively been asserted to be—a safeguard of the liberties of the community of nations.

Properly understood, the balance of power is not at all, as has been lightly assumed, a division of states into two armed camps for the purpose of fighting each other; it is simply the natural tendency of states to combine, even in advance, against the probable aggressor, in the hope, first, of warning off the aggression, or if mere warning fail, then, second, of successfully resisting the aggression, once it has been

launched. The assertion that it has caused war is, therefore, in my opinion, unsustainable. What causes war is aggression, and it is precisely against aggression, as we have seen, that the balance of power is designed to operate. Even in those cases where the interest of humanity seems to demand a form of aggression or intervention, as against the Boxers in 1900, the principle, by associating all the greater powers in a common enterprise, as a guarantee against one another, makes this intervention both more effective, and less likely to lead to annexations and conquests. Not the balance of power caused the great war, but Germany's effort to overthrow it. The balance of power, by bringing in first Britain, then Italy, then the United States, to say nothing of a number of lesser nations, on the side of the allies, was the real instrument of Germany's defeat, and half the trouble with the world to-day, in my opinion, is that since the war, what with American isolation, and the enigmatic aspects of Germany and Russia, no new balance has as yet arisen to insure stability to the passion-blown and partially-ruined international community.

In any case, whether it be considered beneficent or nefarious, the principle, I think, cannot be abolished off-hand, for it is instinctive. The basis of rule in the monarchies of Europe lay in the balance of classes, as nobles and commons, or nobles and burghers; in democracies, the basis is the equilibrium of parties; and in international life, whether within or without some such organization as the League of Nations, it is the balance of power.

So sure and subtle is the operation of this instinct that it determines the conduct even of peoples who

are unconscious of it, and who think they are immune from its magnetism—for example, the American people. In 1744, when the French were rapidly occupying the Mississippi valley, the American colonists were pro-British. In 1776, the French having been driven even from Canada, the colonists fought Britain for their independence, and sought an alliance with France. In 1780, when the French had begun to overrun all Europe, we turned pro-British, and in 1812, when the British had driven the French navy from the seas, we once more fought Britain. Prior to the Russo-Japanese war, disquieted by Russian aggressions in Asia, we were pro-Japanese; but after Russia's defeat and Japan's unexpected show of strength, we became pro-Russian and anti-Japanese. The balance of naval power in Europe before and after 1900, as Admiral Mahan perfectly understood, was our best guarantee of safety, and Roosevelt acted discreetly at Algeciras, in 1906, to preserve it. I imagine I shall not be controverted if I asseverate that the crimes of German submarines were simply the pretext and occasion of our entry into the war in 1917, the deeper cause being our fear that Germany would win, and so set up a kind of universal domination. After the war, the German navy having ceased to exist, the nightmare of American statesmen was the Anglo-Japanese alliance; and whether the Washington conference has quieted out anxieties more than temporarily, it is still too soon to say. France, which won our affectionate admiration when fighting precariously for its life, excites our suspicions, and almost our dislike, when it arises victorious and practically supreme upon the continent of Europe. Indeed, we ourselves,

whether we like it or not, are from now on a factor, perhaps even the most important factor, in that new equilibrium toward which the nations are inevitably tending: for the United States, no less than the other nations, has a definite interest in the preservation of world-peace; and the balance of power, as I have already said, is still the only known means of exercising preventive restraint upon the possible aggressor.

The right of might and the balance of power are what may be termed the permanent principles of international politics. There are however, a number of temporary political principles which also lie beyond the boundaries of international law, and which also exercise, each in its day, an influence upon the conduct of affairs.

"All political theories," a French jurist sagely advises, "should be dominated by the sense of relativity." And he adds the observation that "peoples do not live by abstract principles, but they may die of them." Such salutary warnings, however, are too dispassionate to be popularly heeded, and in practice, peoples are continually pushing their principles, especially their new-found principles, to the extremes which end in war. The great principles of divine right, of militant Christianity, and of legitimacy, which bloodied Europe from the Middle Ages to the end of the XIX Century, have fallen now into desuetude. But with the decline of feudalism and of temporal Christianity, parallel to the development of the modern national state, there arose a new principle which was destined in the XIX and early in the XX Century, whether for better or for worse, to give scarcely less trouble. I refer to the principle of nationality, or

self-determination. Quickened by the French Revolution and the goings and comings of Napoleon; stimulated further, in the middle of the XIX Century, by the then new sciences of philology and folk-lore, and the consequent re-awakening of dormant racial consciousnesses; reinforced finally by the spread of popular rule under the aegis of democracy, this principle has been increasing with really prodigious force, and is now presumably somewhere near its zenith. It has two aspects, the first is irridentism—the alleged moral right of a nation to seek to annex, by persuasion or force, adjacent territories inhabited, in majority, by people of the same race. The second is the right, also alleged, of racial groups themselves to decide, by plebiscite or armed revolt, to which of two neighboring states they prefer to give their allegiance; the right, even, of racial groups to autonomy or independence. Self-determination has played a leading rôle in the last three or four generations of European history; and in the settlement after the Great War it was invoked as fundamental.

Somewhat in contradiction to this right of self-determination, there arose, in the later XIX Century, another influential principle, which may be called, perhaps, the right of tutelage. What it asserts is the right of strong, mature, highly civilized states, to lay hold of weaker, immature, less civilized states or peoples, especially brown and black, but to some extent also yellow and even white peoples, and to govern these states or peoples, more or less despotically, against their will, in the name of humanity, progress, civilization, order, and economic efficiency. It denies to any weaker people the right to persist in the per-

petration of revolting cruelties, or to hamper and retard unduly the exploitation of natural resources, or to maintain prolonged disorders. The principle has been invoked by the great European powers as the justification for their colonization of Africa and Asia, by Britain against the Boers, by the United States against Spain in the West Indies and the Philippines, and later against the natives in both these regions. It underlies also the mandate system established by the League of Nations, in which, however, new emphasis is laid on the moral duty of the greater power toward the peoples taken in tutelage.

A number of other principles of motivation have also been agitated in recent years. The victors in the World War, on the unproved theory that republics are inevitably less militaristic than monarchies, and despite the anomaly that several of the victorious nations were themselves constitutional monarchies, declared and exercised the right to enforce republicanism upon the vanquished even against the latter's will. Again, the right has been proclaimed of overcrowded peoples to occupy, and take sovereignty over, underpopulated territories elsewhere. This principle was invoked by German publicists against France in 1914, and has been invoked by Japanese publicists, with respect to the west coast of North America, to Manchuria, Siberia, and Australia. Mention may be made also of the asserted right of all peoples to have an outlet to the sea; and the right, quite recently brought forward, to make economic rather than racial unity the basis of political unity. The most influential principles, however, are still those which have here been chiefly considered: first, the permanent principles, the

ancient right of might and the balance of power—
gage of the political interdependence of all the na-
tions; second, the transitory but contemporary prin-
ciples which underlie, in large part, the whole of the
present international political system—the rights of
self-determination and of tutelage.

FOREIGN TRADE

ONLY a couple of centuries ago, the more ordinary sorts of persons housed, clothed, nourished themselves and worked with, almost exclusively, the products of their own region. From this condition of local self-sufficiency, an astonishing revolution has nearly everywhere occurred, as anyone may verify who will pause to consider the origins of the articles which now form his immediate environment.

At the moment of writing these lines, I happen to be living in Paris, which is one, but only one, of the great modern centers of civilization. I am wearing a suit of clothes, made in France, from Australian or Canadian wool, spun in England. My shoes, also made in France, are of hides, probably from the Argentine, treated in England. My hat is of Italian felt. My handkerchief, of Dutch or Russian flax, spun in Dublin; my shirt of American cotton spun in France. The raw silk of my necktie came, doubtless, from Italy or Japan. I have a Swiss watch on my wrist, and the gold of the ring which is on my finger was mined, maybe, in Alaska or South Africa. I have just breakfasted on North African fruit, bread mixed perhaps of French and American wheat, and Brazilian coffee, sweetened with sugar which may be French, or may have been brought from Cuba, or from Czecho-Slovakia. The room in which I am sitting has a Turk-

ish carpet, and is heated by English coal in a French stove. My typewriter is American, my desk-pad Italian, my scissors German, my pen-knife Swiss, my pencil Czecho-Slovak. My little whetstone, bought in France, was quarried in Arkansas. My paperknife, of African ebony, was inlaid with bits of silver by fuzzy-haired, black artisans of Mauretania. I am writing with a German pen, upon coarse paper, made probably of Finnish or Norwegian wood-pulp, and I expect to use a telephone in a moment, the receiver of which is German-made and whose wires are of American copper, insulated with rubber from South America or the Straits Settlements.

How have these diverse articles, originating, one may say, in every quarter of the globe, come into common circulation at this one point? The answer, of course, is foreign trade.

The bases of our modern international commerce are specialization and exchange. Each community tends to produce exclusively those raw materials or manufactures for which it is best fitted by nature and training; and to make good the deficit in whatever else it may require or desire, it exchanges its surplus for parts of the various surpluses of other communities. Just as in a village, one man may be a carpenter, another a blacksmith, another a baker, so among the nations, one may supply the others with food-stuffs, and take in return construction materials and manufactured goods. Within their own frontiers, some nations find more, others less, of what they need. England exports machinery and textiles, but imports bread-stuffs. The United States, except for tropical products and a few minerals, is very nearly self-satis-

factory, but it has large surpluses of cotton, wheat, copper, and manufactures to get rid of, and hence is obliged to buy and invest abroad: for foreign trade, as has been said, means exchange, and he who would sell must be ready also to buy, else the international economic mechanism breaks down.

The dream of the economist is that the system of specialization and exchange should become absolute, no people attempting to produce what they cannot produce easily and naturally. Here enters, however, if only for reasons of national defense in time of war, the political factor—the desire for relative independence, for economic self-sufficiency; and tariff barriers, subsidies and privilege, abruptly check the interplay of purely natural tendencies. But despite these checks, there remains sufficient specialization, sufficient inevitable exchange, to render world-solidarity, in the economic sense, an ever more obvious fact.

"There be but three things," the astute Francis Bacon remarked, "which one nation selleth to another: commodity as nature yieldeth it, the manufacture; and the vecture or carriage. So that if these three wheels go, wealth will flow as in a spring tide. And it cometh many times to pass that *materiam superabit opus*, that the work and carriage is worth more than the material, and enricheth a state more."

This "spring-tide" of wealth from foreign trade, just freshening in Queen Elizabeth's day, continued slowly to grow during the centuries, and suddenly, in the last generation, was swollen into a veritable flood. The total of world-trade in 1890 was \$17,500,000,000; in 1900, it was \$20,000,000,000; and in 1912, \$35,000,000,000—in other words, in the brief space

of twenty-five years, its value had doubled. In 1913, the total was \$40,000,000,000, and in 1920, \$90,000,000,000; but in 1921, it declined to \$70,000,000,000, and in 1922, owing to the persistence of the world's economic crisis, to \$60,000,000,000. And "forasmuch as the increase of any estate," again to quote Bacon, "must be upon the foreigner, for whatsoever is somewhere gotten is somewhere lost," the rivalry of peoples for an increasing share in this vast exchange has become every year more lively.

It will be instructive to glance for a moment at the principal categories of rawstuffs and manufactured goods, with a view to noting from what widely dispersed regions they chiefly are sent forth.

Rawstuffs are of two kinds, agricultural—including forests—and mineral. Let us consider first some popular foods. The principal exporting nations for wheat, at the present moment, are the United States, Canada, the Argentine, Australia, and India. Rice is exported by Burma, Siam, and Cochin-China; sugar, by Cuba, the Dutch East Indies, Czecho-Slovakia, and Germany; coffee, by Brazil, Java, Ceylon, Arabia; tea, by China, Ceylon, India, cacao, from which chocolate and cocoa are made, by Central and Equatorial America; canned fruit and vegetables, by the United States; dried fruit, by the United States and the states of Southern Europe; figs, by Turkey; dates by Arabia and North Africa; wines, by France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal; fish, dried or refrigerated, by Northeastern North America, Northwestern Europe, and Northeastern Asia; cattle, and prepared or refrigerated meat, by the United States, the Argentine, Uruguay, Canada, South Africa, Australia; dairy prod-

ucts, by Denmark, Holland, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Switzerland, France, Italy; eggs, by China, Denmark, France, and others. Further prolongation of the food-export list is easy, but needless for our point. Tobacco, now of almost universal employ, is exported by the United States, Cuba, the Philippines, Mexico, Turkey, Greece, the East Indies. Rubber is obtained from tropical forests, and from the plantations of the East Indies. The tropic forests yield an increasing export of wood, as do also the forests of Canada, Scandinavia, and Russia. Hides, for making leather, are exported by the cattle-raising countries. Hemp, used for sack-making, for oil, for oil-cake cattle-food, and for a popular oriental narcotic, grows in India, Russia, Italy, France, the United States, and Canada. The entire textile industry may be said to depend on exports of cotton from the United States, India, and Egypt; of wool from Canada and Australia; of silk from the orient, Italy, and France; of flax from Russia and Eastern Europe.

The essential minerals are also widely dispersed. Coal, used for domestic heating, for steam-engines, for generating electricity, for making gas, for making dyes, is exported by Britain, Germany, Belgium, and the United States. Oil, used for internal combustion engines, for steam-engines in place of coal, and for lubricating machinery of every sort, is exported by the United States, Mexico, Persia, Russia, Roumania, Poland, and the Dutch East Indies. Iron, the base of the metallurgical industry, is exported by France, Sweden, Norway, Spain; but wherever it is found in proximity to sufficient coal, tends rather to be worked on the spot. Manganese, necessary in making steel,

is found in India, Brazil, and the Caucasus. Copper, the base of the electrical industry, is exported chiefly by the United States. Lead is exported by Mexico, Canada, the United States, Spain, and other countries; zinc, by Germany, Belgium, and the United States. Nickel, used to harden steel, comes from Canada, and from the French island of New Caledonia. Tungsten, which is mixed in the best steel, is found chiefly in the United States, Burma, Indo-China, Bolivia, and Portugal. Tin comes principally from the Malay archipelago, but some from Australia, Nigeria, England, and South Africa. Platinum is a monopoly of Russia and Colombia. Aluminium is produced by the United States, England, France, Switzerland, Norway, and Austria, but its preparation is dependent on cryolite, found only in Greenland. Of the three fertilizers necessary to agriculture, potash is almost a monopoly of France and Germany; phosphates are exported from North Africa, France, and the United States; and azote, contained in animal manures and also produced now synthetically from the air by Germany, is exported in the famous nitrates of Chili.

If agriculture is dependent on mineral fertilizer; if agriculture and mining are dependent on industry for machinery and tools, industry in turn is wholly dependent on agriculture, forestry, and mining for its raw materials. The great industrial nations nearly all have iron and coal within their own frontiers, though water power is being used more and more as a substitute for coal. The chief exporters of manufactured products are England, the United States, Germany, France, Japan, Belgium, Czecho-Slovakia. Heavy engines and railway material, electric and internal-combustion

motors, heavy war materials, heavy and complicated industrial machinery, fine sewing-machines, typewriters, and even agricultural machinery; finally, automobiles and tractors, and modern steam-ships—the production of all these is very nearly a monopoly of Britain, Germany, and the United States, but with France developing, with Japan forging rapidly ahead, with Belgium and Czecho-Slovakia competing, and with Italy, despite its lack of indigenous coal and iron, making a brave front. The textile industry, for a time pretty well monopolized by Britain, France, and Germany, is becoming more and more general. The United States is weaving more and more goods, China and India have their cotton mills, there is a great textile center at Lodz, in Poland.

The marketing, financing, insurance, and transportation of all these goods from sea to sea, from continent to continent, have in themselves become enormous enterprises. Marketing, that is, the fixing of world-prices for certain essential commodities, is accomplished through bourses, or stock-exchanges, whose agents collect, each season, statistics of probable production and consumption, and on a basis of presumed supply and demand, decree a figure which is immediately wired around the world, and is accepted as the current rate of sale. The world-price of rubber, for example, is established in London; of copper, in Hamburg; and of cotton, in Liverpool, so that, as a friend remarked to me the other day, Egyptian cotton-growers, before they may know what price they are to receive for their crops, are obliged to wait in the cafés at Cairo until certain gentlemen in England, who perhaps have never even seen a cotton-field, have re-

ceived cablegrams from New Orleans and have cabled in turn to Egypt. Export and import business being organized largely on a credit basis, the great trading nations, competing tightly with one another, have found it to their advantage to establish their own branch banks in the principal centers of exchange. The German financial strategy of before the war, using the same capital over and over, now to build up German banks in Italy, now in the Argentine or Brazil, was a masterwork of aggressive commercial expansion. Maritime insurance is very nearly a monopoly of Britain. As for the carrying trade, the following table shows the distribution by nations of the world's merchant shipping tonnage on June 1, 1922, as compared with August 1, 1914:

	1922	1914
Britain	19,260,000	21,400,000
United States	16,800,000	7,900,000
France	3,600,000	2,500,000
Japan	3,400,000	1,700,000
Italy	2,700,000	1,700,000
Norway	2,520,000	2,600,000
Germany	1,800,000	5,100,000

It must be added, however, that two of these 1922 figures are probably very unstable, for the United States has not yet demonstrated its capacity successfully to operate its huge merchant fleet, while Germany, which lost practically all its ships to the allies after the war, has recently been launching new tonnage at an astonishing rate.

From this brief survey, it is evident, I think, that the economic solidarity of the world is a vital reality. "The States of the world of European civilization, in which America is included," wrote Admiral Mahan,

"in their organized national activities represent among themselves an international community of competing business organizations. They recognize that the general benefit depends ultimately upon the welfare of each and all, but nevertheless the aim of each is to compass for itself—that is, for its people—the utmost preponderance of advantage possible to be secured."

There is accordingly not the slightest doubt that diplomacy is obliged more and more to preoccupy itself with the problems of economic imperialism, and of trade strategy. "Our international problems," declares Mr. Charles E. Hughes, "tend to become mainly economic problems." Co-operation between a nation's business and financial organizations, and its department of foreign affairs, is ever more close; nearly everywhere, following the initiative of France, diplomatic and consular services are being merged into one single politico-economic organization; even national defense depends upon industrial development and the control of essential rawstuffs, and hardly a negotiation is begun, these days, in which economic advantages and disadvantages do not shake the scales. At the same time, it would be a mistake to accredit economic with preponderance over political motives, in the lives of modern states. "Our passionate and bloody history saturates us," cried the old Clemenceau to his American audience; "our fathers fought for liberties, for frontiers, which are dearer to us than life. When people come and tell us that because of the location of a coal miné or an iron deposit, one must change one's country our whole being revolts against this inhuman theory." The veteran French statesman cannot be gainsaid. Now, as always, the

first aim of a people is not trade, not money, but independence, security; and if the choice between the two has to be made, the political motive, in practically every case, prevails. Nevertheless, in actual negotiation, economics and politics may be regarded henceforth as interactive, and inseparable.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

"The more clearly the people of a country understand their own international rights, the less likely they are to take extreme and extravagant views of their rights and the less likely they are to be ready to fight for something to which they are not really entitled. The more clearly and universally the people of a country realize the international obligations and duties of their country, the less likely they will be to resent the just demands of other countries that those obligations and duties be observed. The more familiar the people of a country are with the rules and customs of self-restraint and courtesy between nations which long experience has shown to be indispensable for preserving the peace of the world, the greater will be the tendency to refrain from publicly discussing controversies with other countries in such a way as to hinder peaceful settlement by wounding sensibilities or arousing anger and prejudice on the other side."

—ELIHU ROOT.

IF the sign of political interdependence between the nations is the balance of power, and of economic interdependence is foreign trade, the sign of moral interdependence is international law. The term itself has been considered by certain jurists a misnomer; and in a sense, international law is perhaps not law at all, there being no international authority to vote or decree it, no officially accepted codification, no court with obligatory jurisdiction, and especially, no sanctions. Then what is it? For like poetry, though it may be difficult to define, everyone can see that it exists, its vast and growing literature occupying shelf after shelf in the world's great libraries.

"The law of nations," said Blackstone, "is a system of rules deducible by natural reason and established

by universal consent among the civilized inhabitants of the world, in order to decide all disputes, to regulate all ceremonies and civilities, and to ensure the observance of justice and good faith in that intercourse which must frequently occur between two or more independent states, and the individuals belonging to each." "International law, as understood among civilized nations, may be defined," wrote Wheaton, "as consisting of those rules of conduct which reason deduces as consonant to justice, from the nature of the society existing among independent nations, with such definitions or modifications as may be established by general consent." "It shows," explains D. P. Heatley, "a growth of principles and an accumulation of precedents that have resulted from the clash of interests, the sway of reason, and grinding necessity. Historically viewed, it resolves itself very largely into a study of compacts and of conventional morality." I myself like to think of it as being the outward expression of that common interest in orderliness and peace which most nations soon come to recognize, whenever they become sensible of a certain political and economic interdependence.

Its origins may be traced from ancient Greece and Rome, through temporal Christendom, the Feudal Age, the Age of Chivalry, the Crusades, to the beginning of the age of discovery and commerce which is still our own age. Roman law, canon law, common law, equity, medieval sea-law—these have influenced it. In that crude and tumultuous, but nevertheless glorious, miniature of modern Europe which was formed by the city states of the Italian Renaissance, it began to emerge more definitely: rules of politeness

between states were formulated, passports were invented, a distinction was made between military and civilian populations. In its modern meaning, however, it is generally considered to date from 1648, when the treaty of Westphalia put an end to the fierce and brutal Thirty Years War. The idea of enfolding all Europe within a single empire, whether temporal or spiritual, had now been fairly exploded. The modern nations began to be formed. A world sickened by the horrors of bloody intolerance was longing for order and for peace; and its best minds turned with interest to the curious work, *De Jure Belli et Pacis*, published in Paris in 1625, by the "father of international law," the immortal Dutchman, Hugo Grotius. Since then, although it has twice been shattered and torn in cataclysmic storms, notably in the Napoleonic Wars and in the late World War, international law has not ceased to grow, in authority no less than in science and completeness. Illustrious jurists succeed one another: Pufendorf (1632), Leibnitz (1646), Bynkershock (1672), Christian de Wolff (1679), Vattel (1714), and many others of later date, including our own great American, Henry Wheaton (1785). In the XIX Century, international law was introduced as a regular course in the universities of Europe and America. Professors of the subject are found everywhere, and textbooks have multiplied. The Declaration of Paris (1856) was the first attempt at partial codification. The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 drafted whole series of conventions, and established a permanent court of arbitration, and were followed, in 1909, by the Declaration of London. In the very midst of the World War, in 1917, the Ameri-

can Institute of International Law, meeting in Havana, attempted a codification of essential principles; and in 1922, under the auspices of the League of Nations, a Permanent Court of International Justice was inaugurated at The Hague.

Wheaton, in his *History of the Law of Nations* (Paris, 1842), summarized the advance in international law which gradually took place after the Treaty of Westphalia, as follows:

"The pacific relations among nations have been maintained by the general establishment of permanent (diplomatic and consular) missions and the general recognition of the immunities of public ministers.

"Although the right of intervention to preserve the 'balance of power' or to prevent the danger to which one country may be exposed by the domestic transactions of another, has been frequently assumed; yet no general rules have been discovered by which the occasions which may justify the exercise of this right, or the extent to which it may be carried, can be laid down; and it remains, therefore, an undefined and undefinable exception to the mutual independence of nations.

"The exclusive dominion claimed by certain powers over particular seas, has been abandoned as an obsolete pretension of barbarous times; and the general use of the high seas, without the limits of any particular state, for the purposes of navigation, commerce and fishing, has been conceded. . . .

"The colonial monopoly, that fruitful source of wars, has nearly ceased, and with it the question as to the right of neutrals to enjoy in war a commerce prohibited in time of peace.

"The African-slave trade has been condemned by the opinion of all Christian nations, and prohibited by their separate laws, or by mutual treaty stipulations between them.

"The practice of war between civilized nations has been sensibly mitigated, and a comparison of the present modes of warfare with the system of Grotius will show the immense improvement which has taken place in the laws of war.

"Although there is still some uncertainty as to the rights of neutral navigation in time of war, a conventional law has been created by treaty, which shows a manifest advance towards securing the commerce of nations which remain at peace, from interruption by those which are engaged in war.

"The sphere within which the European law of nations operates, has been widely extended by the unqualified accession of the American states; by the tendency of the Mahomedan powers to adopt the public law of Christendom; and by the general feeling, even among less civilized nations, that there are rights which they may exact from others, and, consequently, duties which they may be required to fulfill.

"The law of nations, as a science, has advanced with the improvements in the principles and language of philosophy; with our extended knowledge of the past and present condition of mankind, resulting from deeper researches into the obscurer periods of history, and the discovery of new regions of the globe; and with the greater variety and importance of the questions to which the practical application of the system has given rise.

"And lastly, the law of nations, as a system of posi-

tive rules regulating the mutual intercourse of sovereigns (states), has improved with the general improvement of civilization, of which it is one of the most valuable products."

I shall presently venture a word as to the immediate future of this "system of positive rules," consequent on its partial breakdown in the World War, endeavoring thereby to complete Wheaton's optimistic picture. Meanwhile, let us briefly survey the scope and detail of the subject itself.

"International law," as Wilson and Tucker point out in their admirably clear and succinct manual, "covers all the relations into which civilized states may come, both peaceful and hostile." Its sources are the prevalent practice and usage of nations as shown in historical precedents, treaties, and agreements, state and diplomatic papers, decisions of national and international courts, and the written opinions of eminent authorities, influenced by expediency, practical reality, and the general ethical conceptions of the times. In other words, jurists have ransacked the whole of history, but especially modern and contemporary history, to find how nations do really act in their innumerable relations one with another, have sifted out the precedents which seem commonest or most commendable, and have organized the results into bodies of text covering every conceivable relation, from the pettiest and most perfunctory, to the gravest and most profound. These texts are being continually expanded, reviewed, and refined to correspond with the changing moral standards and the increasing complexity of the human world; and what was at first mere usage, becomes in time, by general consent, a recognized right or duty.

The basic principles of international law declare the necessity of recognizing the existence, integrity, independence and equality of all sovereign states; the necessity of mutual respect for recognized rights, and for the sanctity of all engagements formally accepted, whether freely or under threat of force. "No power," asserts the Treaty of London, signed in 1871 by Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Russia, and Turkey, "no power can liberate itself from the engagements of a treaty, or modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the contracting powers by means of an amicable arrangement." The six "fundamental principles" agreed upon by the American Institute of International Law in 1917 are as follows:

"1. Every nation has the right to exist and to protect and to conserve its existence; but this right neither implies the right nor justifies the act of the state to protect itself or to conserve its existence by the commission of unlawful acts against innocent and unoffending states.

"2. Every nation has the right to independence in the sense that it has a right to the pursuit of happiness and is free to develop itself without interference or control from other states, provided that in so doing it does not interfere with or violate the rights of other states.

"3. Every nation is in law and before law the equal of every other nation belonging to the society of nations, and all nations have the right to claim and, according to the Declaration of Independence of the United States, 'to assume, among the Powers of the

Earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature's God entitle them.'

"4. Every nation has the right to territory within defined boundaries and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over its territory, and all persons, whether native or foreign, found therein.

"5. Every nation entitled to a right by the law of nations, is entitled to have that right respected and protected by all other nations, for right and duty are correlative, and the right of one is the duty of all to observe.

"6. International law is at one and the same time both national and international; national in the sense that it is the law of the land and applicable as such to the decision of all questions involving its principles; international in the sense that it is the law of the society of nations, and applicable as such to all questions between and among the members of the society of nations involving its principles."

A suggestion of the detailed extent of international law may be gained from glancing through the sub-headings of any good text: what constitutes a state; its rights and obligations; recognition of a new state; rights of intervention and non-intervention; jurisdiction over life and property, land and water; naturalization and extradition; status of diplomatic and consular agents; international official etiquette; negotiation of treaties, their validity, ratification, classification, interpretation, and termination; amicable settlement of disputes, whether by negotiation, "good offices," commissions of inquiry, conferences, congresses, or arbitration; rights of retorsion, reprisals, embargo, and pacific blockade; extraterritoriality; declarations of war, and

their juridical effect; status of enemy and neutral states and their nationals; of combatants and non-combatants; of real, personal and public enemy property; of enemy ships, goods, cables, and radios; belligerent occupation; forbidden arms and methods of warfare; status of auxiliary ships and privateers; capture and ransom; treatment of prisoners; methods of juridically terminating hostilities; rights and obligations of neutral states and nationals; contraband; right of visit, search, and seizure at sea; convoy; blockade; continuous voyage; prizes and prize courts; compensations and indemnities: these are some of the more striking headings, but the list is by no means complete.

In 1914, as everyone knows, the German nation, taking the leadership of the Central Powers, brought suddenly upon the world a war of unprecedented extent and destructiveness, in the course of which this same nation, on the theory that the more cruelly the war was conducted, the more quickly it would end, ignored or shattered many of the most important tenets of the law of nations, as painfully built up through centuries. Belgium, whose independence Germany itself had guaranteed by treaty, was invaded. The distinction between civilian and military enemy populations was practically ignored. Non-combatants were tortured and massacred. Great teeming cities were bombed and shelled. Civilian populations were interned, deported, made to do forced labor even under fire. Exorbitant requisitions and indemnities were levied upon occupied communities. Pillage, destruction, and devastation were systematically organized on a vast scale. Great industrial districts were carefully demolished, coal mines were broken in and flooded, without even a

show of military necessity. Explosive mines were set afloat in open seas. Submarines attacked indiscriminately passenger-ships, neutral merchant-vessels, and hospital ships, sinking them without warning. The allied nations, meanwhile, abusing their own sea power, extended the definition of contraband to unprecedented breadth, made every possible effort to restrict the legitimate trade of neutral with enemy states, and attempted to maintain a blockade which was to a large extent fictitious.

From the evidence of the war, the conclusion has been reached by many people, somewhat cynically, that international law has "failed," in that its observance obviously is not to be relied upon when nations are struggling for their lives. Especially, the hope of maintaining neutral rights seems small indeed, unless the neutral group is itself strong enough to enforce these rights against the belligerents. Of course, the ideal would be, as President Wilson saw at Paris, in connection with the question of the freedom of the seas, that there should henceforth be no neutrals, because when any state committed an unprovoked or illegal aggression, all the others would immediately combine against it; but this happy consummation is apparently again deferred indefinitely. I think myself that the effort to "humanize" war by limiting the use of the newer chemical and industrial weapons, is largely a waste of energies, which would better be devoted to the main problem, namely, the prevention of war itself. In any case, the so-called rules of warfare certainly require to be revised. Especially, the whole matter of the distinction hitherto made between combatant and non-combatant populations will have to be

reconsidered, as well as the whole matter of contraband; for obviously, it is to-day not with a small army and navy, but with its entire resources in treasure, material, and human beings, that a nation wages war.

To conclude, however, that international law has "failed" is to pass rash judgment. On the contrary. I believe that its future has never been more luminous. All peoples recognize it abstractly, and even in breaking its letter, they seek to justify themselves to its spirit. A large part of its rules are kept unconsciously and continuously, by common consent; others are partially kept, and still others want re-adaptation. The sense of national rights and duties, and of the sanctity of international contracts, seems rather to be increasing than declining. The very reaction of the civilized mentality against the breaches of international law committed in the World War augur most fortunately for its closer observance henceforward, especially when taken in connection with the growing sense of political and economic independence, and the growing desire for a more settled world-order.

It is true that there exists no world-legislature, where the nations, by unanimous consent, can formulate international laws. But the assembly of the League of Nations is an important step in this direction, and for the rest, there is nothing to prevent nations so disposed from banding together repeatedly, continually, to draft such rules as seem to them advantageous, and adopt and ratify these rules as between themselves. Universality is highly desirable, but it is not strictly essential. Every great treaty, every international convention, ratified in a common interest by a number of nations, every custom adopted by the

greater powers, contributes to the making of the laws of nations. The Versailles Treaty itself must emerge as a landmark in the history of international law, for not only does it embody the covenant of the League of Nations, but its very basis is the moral condemnation of aggression as such, and the strict and heavy penalization, after defeat, of the aggressor people. It provides, moreover, for the legal trial, that is, it edicts the personal responsibility, of vanquished war-criminals.

International law, the objection has been raised, has never even been codified. This is true rather as regards peace-law than as regards war-law; yet international law exists, and is acknowledged to exist. Jurists of all nations tend more and more to agree as to the fundamental principles, and moot-points are debated between them more and more scientifically. While the bulk of specific treaties and conventions is constantly increasing, the popular demand for at least an attempt at general codification is heard on every side, and there is reason to assume that, before many more years have elapsed, the tentative will be made.

In the spring of 1922, the first Permanent Court of International Justice ever assembled in the world was inaugurated at The Hague, under the auspices of the League of Nations. Between forty and fifty states have ratified its protocol, and are contributing to its maintenance; but it is open practically to all nations which desire to bring their disputes before it. Its judges are chosen by an ingenious scheme destined to secure a maximum of impartiality and science in its decisions. It is authorized to accept such arbitrations as may be brought before it and to make the settlements of expediency and compromise which arbitration im-

plies; but its principal function is assumed to be the determination of settlements, not of expediency and compromise, but of international law, that is of international rights and duties, of right and wrong, as now understood by the world's most authoritative juridical minds. Its jurisdiction is not compulsory; but a number of smaller states have compacted, as between themselves, to make its jurisdiction compulsory; that is, they have formally agreed to bring all their justiciable disputes, as between themselves, before the court. It is unable, of course, to enforce its verdicts by sanctions, but its authority is assumed to be such, and the good faith of the nations is assumed to be such, that sanctions will not be necessary.

We reach here the primary weakness of international law as it exists to-day—a weakness even greater than the absence of an established code. I refer to this lack of sanctions, the result of which is that, at first glance, it appears that any state may violate at will any or all of the tenets of this so-called law of nations, and in so doing, enjoy complete impunity. Yet even this weakness is more apparent than real. There does exist a moral sanction. The opinion of the civilized world is not altogether an empty phrase; it tends more and more to become a reality. All men, all peoples, desire the good opinion of their peers, and suffer at its loss. The state which is habitually law-breaking, inevitably sacrifices the good opinion of other states. These latter stand more and more aloof from it, become more and more wary in their contacts. Discontent, isolation, boycott, even general hostility are the not improbable consequences for the offender. Who can doubt that Germany's disregard

for international law was an essential factor in forming and maintaining the coalition which arose victoriously against it? What suffering has Soviet Russia not experienced for reasons scarcely dissimilar? It is hardly too much to say that the state, henceforth, which ventures to ignore the sanction of civilized world-opinion, is literally courting ruin.

Not only does international law exert a living influence on all possible contemporary relations between states, but it is itself a kind of summary of all past international relations—a compact compendium, therefore, of international historical experience. For the diplomatist, there can be no doubt that intimate familiarity with its best texts is essential. And even for the better-educated portion of the general public, it has a clear utility. “If the public knew something about the merits of the case concerned,” says Prof. L. Oppenheim, of Cambridge, “they would frequently look upon the matter more coolly and in a more impartial way, and it would be easier for the governments to consent to arbitration.” In all law-schools, as one of our leading American jurists, Prof. J. W. Garner, has pointed out, the study of international law should be compulsory. Instruction in its rudiments might also profitably be included in the course of civics and of international relations which, in my opinion, should be obligatory in the universities of every civilized land.

THE WILL TO END WAR

WHAT with the rapid growth of political, economic, and moral interdependence, and with the weariness resulting from the integral suffering and the vast destruction of life and property occasioned by the World War, the more advanced peoples are manifesting an increasing desire for perpetual peace. "The war to end war!" and "Never again!" were the slogans which carried the allied armies to victory. The unexpected withdrawal of the United States from the settlement in which it had taken a leading part, and the subsequent bickerings between themselves of the European allies, have, it is true, once more spread cynicism and despair. Nevertheless, the popular hope of finding a way to abolish war subsists, and must be taken seriously into account by diplomats and statesmen, no matter how reserved their readings of history may have taught them to become respecting the supposed goodwill and non-belligerency of men and nations.

Before considering the various devices adopted or proposed as checks upon war, it will be well to present briefly an inclusive analysis of the causes of war. These causes may be classified and enumerated as follows:

1. Personal ambitions. By this term, I understand the ambitions of monarchs, dictators, oligarchies, party leaders, individual statesmen, or of occult financial or

industrial groups, as distinct from, and even opposed to, the general interests of the people. The motive may be variously the strengthening of a dynasty, the prevention of grave social or political differences by directing popular attention to external affairs, or merely the aggrandizement of personal wealth or power. The means employed by these highly-placed individuals to bring a nation into war against its will are secret treaties and agreements, the provocation of international "situations" and "incidents" seeming to involve the national honor, and finally, the deliberate falsification of fact in order to mislead and arouse the people.

2. Conquest and annexation, or "imperialism." Such wars are undertaken almost in cold blood by governments and peoples, for the specific purpose of acquiring territory at another's expense. The usual motives are: (a) the alleged lack of food, the alleged necessity of controlling an outlet for surplus population, the alleged right of over-populated states to expand at the expense of so-called under-populated states; (b) the alleged right of inland peoples to conquer an outlet to the sea; (c) irridentism—the desire to annex lands inhabited by radical kinsfolk; (d) the desire to seize and hold strategic points or lines, either in self-defense, or with a view to domination; (e) the will to stifle or destroy by conquest a rival industry; (f) the desire for political control over essential raw-stuffs or over important markets; (g) the desire for colonial empire, whether political or merely economic.

3. Popular passion. Wars of popular passion are begun, almost blindly, with no very definite aim, by peoples who have been wrought, or who have wrought

themselves, into a semi-pathological condition of monomania or of overexcitement. Sometimes the cause of this explosive popular emotion is the drunken desire for domination, power, additional prestige. Sometimes it is revenge for past defeats. Sometimes it is the wild fear of impending aggression; and again, the sense of smart or injustice at real or imagined insults, disparagements, acts of insolence or contempt, tyrannies, oppressions. A people may be intoxicated by pride—by an arrogant belief in its own moral or racial superiority, its own infallibility and hence its right always to have its own way. It may fall a victim to race prejudice, as of white against yellow or black. It may succumb to race-mysticism—pan-Germanism, pan-Slavism, pan-Anglo-Saxonism—the faith that its own particular race is divinely pre-destined to rule over the other and necessarily inferior races. Contrary to what is often said, religion is not obsolete as a factor in popular passion. The Christian denominations no longer fight each other, but Islam is still militant, and Protestantism, in England and America, at least, is still fired with militancy against Islam. The rise of class-government, as in Soviet Russia, introduces class-passion into international relations. Statism is with some peoples a kind of fanaticism—the belief, that is, that the state has a kind of divine existence apart from its component individuals, and that it is to be worshipped and followed blindly. Thus, people will stand and thrill at sound of a national anthem, or bare their heads to the flag. Last, but not least, there is the passion of militarism, so lately exemplified in Germany, the credo of war for war's sake. "Without war," explained Moltke, "the world would stagnate

and lose itself in materialism"; while Nietzsche put the case ever more strongly, thus: "It is mere illusion and pretty sentiment to expect much (even anything at all) from mankind if it forgets how to make war . . . that rough energy, born of the camp, that deep impersonality born of hatred, that conscience born of murder and cold-bloodedness," etc., etc.

4. Economic rivalry. Wars of this sort are begun by governments and peoples in order to obtain or to destroy economic privileges or monopolies, in connection, for example, with tariff discriminations; monopolies of essential rawstuffs; fishing rights; through transit rights; monopolies of transport and communications; control of foreign railways; interference in international trade routes; exclusion acts; rights of immigration to, and citizenship in foreign lands. The nations realize that in modern war, victors and vanquished all suffer economically; but they risk war for economic reasons, nevertheless, because they hope to effect a change in relative positions, giving the victor, in the long run, an advantage over competitors.

5. Interventions. Nations intervene by force of arms in the affairs of other nations for the following reasons or pretexts: to protect oppressed nationalities or oppressed religious and racial minorities; to protect their nationals' lives and property; to put down "intolerable" social disorders; to check, usually by taking sides in, civil war or revolt; to stop the continued fomentation of plots and propaganda against themselves; to set up, in the name of some principle, as "legitimacy" or "democracy," this or that form of government; to collect debts or claims, payment of which is contested or refused; to enforce international

law, as the alleged infraction of treaties, or of neutral or belligerent rights. Intervention is usually attempted only by a stronger against a weaker state, but it is fruitful in trouble, because very often other states then take sides. The motives invoked for intervention are sometimes sincere, but are frequently mere pretexts to mask aggression.

6. Boundary friction. Disputes arising out of mere contiguity of frontiers often cause wars. Frontiers may be ill-defined, and claims conflicting, especially in primitive lands. The line, as drawn, may be contested by one party, for this reason or the other. There may be discrimination in frontier regulations against the nationals of certain neighbors. Nations desiring to provoke a neighbor to war, without the appearance of aggression, may organize raids, incursions or disorders along the frontier line, quickly over and back again.

7. Competitive armament. Nations engaged in political or economic rivalry, each trying to ward against eventual attack by the other, whether singly or in systems of alliances, are sometimes impelled to overstrain their resources in the continual effort to increase land or naval armaments. Universal military service is instituted, and the length of service is prolonged. Mobilization schedules are perfected to such a point that the rush at a word, to and over the threatened frontier is almost instantaneous, all but automatic. Warships and air-fleets are constructed with feverish increase, and the people groan under the weight of taxes. The tension grows, until it becomes intolerable. Both peoples and governments resign themselves fatalistically to the idea that war is inevitable, and the nation

which considers that time works against rather than for it, is first to attack.

These, as I see them, are the seven causes of war. It is rare, however, that the motive is single. More often, several factors operate together, and are correspondingly difficult to analyze.

The cumulative force of the causes of war, thus enumerated, is certainly very great, but statesmen and peoples, nothing daunted, have affronted them with determination, and from the earliest times there have been tentatives of enduring peace, which failed only to be renewed with hopes redoubled. The amphictyonic council of the ancient Greek states was in effect a permanent, though largely inefficacious, peace conference. Rome achieved a long peace by conquest and hegemony; but later attempts to establish by force a new *pax Romana*, notably the attempts of Charles V, Louis XIV, Napoleon I, and William II, have all succumbed fatally, so that the method, for the present at least seems out of the question. The "grand design" of Henri IV and his famous minister, Sully, was peace by European federation; and the idea though still far short of realization, has remained a favorite one with peace philosophers. The XVIII Century was fertile in peace-projects. Fundamentally, it is doubtful if the XIX and XX Centuries have greatly added to the cosmopolitan conceptions of that day. The first great project, which more or less directly inspired all the others, was that of the Abbé de Saint Pierre, in 1712, for a European confederation, the basic articles to be determined or changed unanimously, but to be applicable by majority vote, with drastic sanctions against the possible pact-breaker. Rousseau, in 1756,

deepened and broadened this scheme. Bentham, in 1789, favored also the limitation of armaments, the full emancipation of colonies, and the establishment of an international court, with sanctions. Kant, inspired in 1795 by the teachings of the Abbé de Saint Pierre and Rousseau, advocated the federation of all peoples, under international law, and with world-citizenship—that is, the right of each individual to go and come, and to reside here or there, at pleasure. All four of these philosophers agreed as to the necessity for a super-state organization. In a sense, the dominant ideas of the later XIX Century were in regression from the broad cosmopolitanism of the XVIII Century. In the ground of Europe, ploughed by the sword of Napoleon I and fertilized anew with blood, German philology sowed the seeds of crude race-mysticism, while popular misinterpretations of the Darwinian theory construed the principle of the “struggle for existence” as proof of the necessity and the inevitability of war. Nevertheless, international law continued to develop, and the finer ideals of justice and of human fraternity have never been wholly submerged.

The remedies against the frightful evils of war, which the nations have gradually endeavored to bring into effect, may be considered in two categories, first, the specific remedies, and second, the general remedies. The specific remedies may be listed in direct connection with the seven causes of war already enumerated.

The danger of war from personal ambition, against the popular will, is being met by the spread and intensification of democracy, and by the gradual abolition of secret diplomacy.

The dangers of imperialism, that is, of cold-blooded conquest and annexation, are diminished by an ever more vigorous popular reprobation. The motives adduced to justify imperialism are being met in part by concessions, in part by counter-arguments. The equity of an outlet to the sea for inland states is recognized. Poland has been granted such an outlet at Danzig. Bulgaria is promised an outlet at Dedea-gatch. Great waterways are being internationalized. Irridentism is being at least partially satisfied by the granting of plebiscites, and by the increasing popular favor accorded the principle of self-determination. Strategic points are being internationalized. The alleged necessity for strategic frontiers tends to be obviated by international guarantees. Famine as a motive for aggression is counteracted by international charity; and to the doctrine of the right of invasion because of over-population, the doctrine of birth-control is now being opposed, though still all too timidly.

Popular passion is being combated by somewhat hectic anti-militarist outcries, but for the rest, has not yet been recognized for the increasingly serious danger which it really is, and remains to be analyzed and dealt with more adequately.

The only measures for diminishing the dangers of economic rivalry upon which there seems to be general agreement are the freedom of the seas, through transit facilities by agreement, and the internationalization of straits and waterways. The new doctrine of economic frontiers is often found to stand in direct conflict with the valuable self-determination doctrine. Free trade is abstractly good, but practically is now unacceptable to the majority of the nations, for rea-

sons of national defense. The "most favored nation" clause is a merely partial remedy for tariff discriminations, which continue in other forms. Some nations, particularly the United States, favor the "open door," but the European powers seem to prefer spheres of influence and exclusive concessions as a means of avoiding the bitterness of competition. There is a growing general hostility to monopolies and exclusions; but on the other hand, peoples who have devoted their time, labor, and wealth to the development of certain areas, are reluctant to surrender the full benefits of this development to new-comers, just at the moment when losses begin to turn into profits. The whole question of economic rivalries remains therefore highly confused.

Against armed interventions, there is also an increasing hostility of opinion. Racial and religious minorities are being accorded more or less effective international protection. The right to collect debts by force, until claims have been established, and even then except in cases of voluntary default, is being widely contested. Especially, the so-called "concert of the powers" tends automatically to form, when intervention is seen to be necessary or inevitable, so that the action taken shall be joint action, and the presence of one power shall serve as a guarantee against the possible imperialist designs of another. As evidence of good faith, nations contemplating intervention sometimes even invite other nations to join them for the occasion.

Ordinary boundary disputes are settled more and more frequently by arbitration or by international commission. When the state of hostile feeling between

neighbors is such as to render all contacts dangerously inflammable, the expedient of interposing "neutral zones" or "buffer states" has sometimes been adopted.

The universal hostility to competitive armaments, not only for humanitarian but also for economic reasons, has been developing rapidly. Integral military service, at first viewed in Europe as an additional guarantee against war, is now frowned upon by the British and American sea-powers; but as a matter of fact, it is democratic in principle, and is economically superior to the alternative, professional army system. In time of war, it is recognized to be necessary; but there is a clear impulse to reduce, by ratio agreements, or by mutual guarantees, the size of standing armies in time of peace to a practical minimum. The principle of the ratio limitation of armaments, inaugurated by the United States and Canada, as regards the Great Lakes, in 1818, and applied in 1902 by Chile and the Argentine Republic with respect to their small navies, was extended with more or less success to large navies by the Washington Conference, in 1921-22; and its application to land forces is being studied as I write, by the states of Eastern Europe, by the states of Central and South America, and by the League of Nations.

In addition to these specific anti-war measures, a series of general measures have also been adopted. The nations, in discussing the disputes or dangerous international situations which arise, are accustomed to refer to these as being justiciable, that is, subject to settlement by international law or arbitration; or non-justiciable, that is, not subject to such settlement. Justiciable cases are defined as those involving international law or equity, or the interpretation of treaties;

non-justiciable, as those involving the national honor or fundamental national policy. For justiciable cases, there now exists at The Hague two permanent courts, one of arbitration and one of international justice. But as international law has never been wholly codified, as equity is a vague term and as even the interpretation of treaties may sometimes raise questions of national honor or policy, what the nations actually mean, when they say "justiciable," is, cases which they choose to consider justiciable. All the others are "non-justiciable," and it is therefore in these last, in the so-called political disputes or situations, that the real problem of peace lies embedded.

There are three time-worn natural methods of settling political disputes. The first is by the dictatorship, the unchallenged hegemony, of one state over the other. It has failed consistently in recent centuries, and tends rather to make than to prevent war. The second is federation, either partial or complete. This is a good method, but it is applicable chiefly in "balkanized" areas of small, weak states; and short of engulfing the entire world, it cannot prevent war, but only raise up one federation against another. The third is the balance of power, which, as I have demonstrated, is vital, and does act as a brake upon militant intention, but cannot, unless more carefully organized than at present, actually restrain aggression.

Natural methods having proved inadequate, the nations have resorted more and more of late years to artificial safeguards, applicable both before and after the outbreak of disputes. The safeguards applied prior to the dispute take the form of treaties whose signatories guarantee the neutrality of one another, or of

some certain territory; or guarantee to one another the territorial integrity of certain specified sovereignties; and also of agreements to arbitrate or to confer together before resorting to arms. Agreements of this last variety are known popularly as "cooling off" treaties. After a dispute has broken out, the safeguards attempted, usually on the invitation of third parties interested in preserving peace, are "good offices"—that is, friendly mediation; the appointing of an international commission of inquiry; or the convening of an international conference.

The conference method, both as a means of anticipating international danger and of dealing with this danger after it has been generally recognized, is by no means new, but its popularity since the World War has taken unprecedented proportions, and in some quarters it seems to have been looked upon definitely as a world-panacea. An enthusiast gravely assures us that, in future, "administrative conferences will take the place of diplomatic conversations." In the present complexity of affairs, and given the urgency of many post-war problems, conference-diplomacy is not only expedient but necessary. But against the obvious advantages of conferences must be weighed also certain dangers, equally obvious to all who have attended such important gatherings as those of Paris, Washington, and Genoa. They tend unduly to excite public opinion, and are hence at the mercy of the demagogue. Under pressure of popular impatience, lashed up by the less scrupulous newspapers, they tend to over-haste and to the adoption of somewhat haphazard solutions. What are wanted, as a competent French publicist has emphasized in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, are not

great international orgies of speech-making, but "technical conferences, strictly limited in their objectives, without stage-settings, and which would be merely the meeting of a few highly competent men about a table, and the discussion, without fine phrases, of immediately realizable projects." "The international conference," Mr. Charles E. Hughes warns us, "is largely successful in inverse proportion to its numbers, and to the extent that it represents the common purpose of a few who are interested in a particular problem and sincerely wish to find an appropriate method of solution. In the larger gatherings, real accomplishment is likely to be hindered by the breaking up into groups with rival purposes which prevent results." My personal view is that the international conference, to be useful and successful, must conform to the following conditions: its program, its objectives, should be strictly limited; only those states directly interested should be invited to attend; there should be preliminary agreement as to principles between at least the leading participants; there should be neither undue secrecy nor undue publicity as to the proceedings; the environment should be quiet and friendly; all participants, in matters of form, should be treated as equals and with equal consideration and courtesy; the chief delegates, finally, should be foreign ministers, diplomats, or experts; not parliamentarians—for no eloquence is required; and especially, not chiefs of state, for these, in absenting themselves from their normal posts and duties, make for over-impatience, tend to lose contact with their own parliaments and public opinion, and, worst of all, sacrifice their power of revision—the power subsequently to modify or correct

the position taken, perhaps unwisely, in the heat of debate, by the delegation.

By far the most pretentious device against war ever actually put into effect is the League of Nations, instituted in 1919, by the Treaty of Versailles. Intended ultimately to be universal, it now comprises some fifty states, but is handicapped by the absence of Russia and Germany, and above all, of the United States. In its three brief years of life, it has exhibited quite unexpected vitality, and while, as the poet says, "forecasts of the things to be are doomed to blindness," present indications are that, progressing cautiously between the Scylla of attempting too much, and the Charybdis of attempting too little, it will persist and will prosper, overcoming in time even the over-hasty and ill-founded prejudice of the United States.

In practice, the League is not, as some critics feared, and as others hoped, a super-state. Its will is merely the will of its component members, and except in the case of pact-breaking, there is no compulsion contemplated save that of world-opinion. Broadly envisaged, the great Geneva institution is a clearing-house for international affairs of every description, centralizing, for convenience and for additional efficiency, the scattered tentatives of generations. The permanent secretariat of technicians, although the personnel is international, is the smoothest and ablest official organization which it has been my fortune to observe. It administers, records, and in general, with admirable skill and tact, prepares the varied meetings and projects of the League. As a center of non-partisan economic and political information, it is becoming indispensable. The council, which corresponds approxi-

mately to the old "concert of powers," but with this difference, that some of the smaller states are also represented, is dealing continually with such political questions as are referred to it, seeking prudent and pacifying solutions of expediency and compromise. It watches permanently over the mandate system, and the protection of minorities. It brought about the Upper Silesian settlement, stopped the border warfare of Serbs and Albanians, and fathered the Austrian reconstruction scheme. The assembly, which gathers once a year, is a veritable parliament of nations, a long-needed focus for world-opinion. Thus far, its prevalent spirit of courtesy and of consideration for even the least of its members, has been a model for international gatherings, and as a promoter of world-fellowship, it is unexcelled.

The League's many humanitarian activities, its furtherance of the cause of international law through the Permanent Court of International Justice, its studies toward limited and reasonable disarmament, its economic, financial, and traffic conferences, its international labor office, its successful experiments in international administration, its calm atmosphere of helpfulness and of impartiality—these alone are sufficient justification for its existence. But what of its prime intent, the prevention of war? With certain of the specific causes of war, it is dealing from day to day, as best it can. It files and publishes all treaties concluded by its members. Its diplomacy is an example of candor. Its reports of fact, as has been said, are careful, scientific, impartial. It studies emigration, interchange of populations, through-transit facilities. It is attempting to protect religious and racial minori-

ties, and to ameliorate the existing colonial régime by the mandate system. It has settled several boundary disputes. Its main endeavor, however, is not specific, but general. The features of the Covenant are summarized in these words by the eminent jurist, Paul Fauchille: "Engagement by the League of Nations to guarantee against all external aggression the territorial integrity and the political independence of its members; obligation for the latter to submit all differences which may arise between them to the arbitration or examination of the Council of the League; duty of members of the League to consider as having committed an act of war against them, any state which goes to war, either before the expiration of the delays fixed for the arbitral award or the decision of the Council, or within three months after its award or decision, and consequently, obligation for them to break immediately, with the pact-infringing state or its nationals, all connections and all commercial and financial relations; recommendation to the members of the League of Nations to use their military forces in a common action to enforce respect for the stipulations of the covenant." This rather conservative scheme is seen at once, from what has already been said, to be a natural result of the experience of the last few centuries, and while it does not actually outlaw war, it certainly tends to make war more difficult.

With the exception of hegemony, none of the foregoing checks upon war is, in my opinion, to be disregarded. Democracy, open diplomacy, economic equity, joint as opposed to individual interventions, neutral zones, "buffer" states, limitations of armaments, codification of international law, arbitration,

federation, the principle of the balance of power, treaties of guarantee, "cooling-off" treaties, "good offices," commissions of inquiry, international conferences, the covenant of the League of Nations—all are useful, each in its own degree and its own appropriate circumstances. All should be employed, interacting harmoniously together; and none should be carried to fanatical extremes. Indeed, the insistence upon one method to the exclusion of the others is dangerous; as for example, the limitation of armaments without mutual guarantees; or reliance on the somewhat vague guarantees of the League, unreinforced by other, specific guarantees.

To speak my mind frankly, I believe that while a great advance has undoubtedly been made, even the whole of these measures is not sufficient to prevent war, or to warrant a nation in relaxing, for the present, its armed, defensive vigilance. As long as the United States withholds its co-operation, the League will remain fundamentally crippled; and while limitation of armaments is doubtless good, it must not be forgotten that men, if they get excited enough, will fight even with bare fists. At the outset of the American Civil War, one of the bloodiest and fiercest in history, neither side, strictly speaking, was armed.

Are we to conclude, therefore, that the task of finally abolishing war is an endless one? Long and difficult, certainly. Human passions are deep, violent, and probably ineradicable. The spirit of co-operation is no more basic in human affairs than the spirit of competition. Even if it were true that all peoples want peace, the corollary would have to be added, that each wants it on his own terms. War, in its strategical and tac-

tical aspects, is not only the most fascinating game ever invented; in its psychological aspects, it is not only a marvelous adventure, but in its material and moral aspects, it is the supreme expression of the will to power. However, while passions may be ineradicable, they are subject to at least a partial control. Competition may be good and necessary, but it need not take the form of actual war; it can perhaps ultimately be translated entirely to the economic, cultural, and moral planes. The peoples are certainly egoistic, but to educate them to respect one another's rights and viewpoints is probably not impossible. And as for war itself, despite the undoubted strength of its appeal to certain characters, it has become economically and humanly intolerable, and its abolition is the aim which every civilized and liberal-minded community must henceforth set for itself.

I personally am convinced that war could even now be prevented for an indefinite period, if the nations were only willing to accept the essential conditions. In the first place, while every people has a right to choose its own system of government, each people must understand clearly that it will be held strictly accountable internationally for the acts of its government, whether this government be autocratic or democratic. The theory that a people, by repudiating a government, is exempted from the engagements and responsibilities assumed by that government, leads to inextricable confusion and endless quarrels. In the second place, the principle of joint intervention to enforce international law and fidelity to compacts must be freely acknowledged. In the third place, a nation will not commit an aggression upon another nation unless it thinks it can

win. But the nations should agree among themselves that the aggressor shall never be allowed to win, because all will at once combine against him with their full armed strength, just as all honest citizens combine against the robber and the assassin. The League of Nations would be the best organism for realizing such an effective war-insurance as is here proposed; but it would have to be provided with a permanent general staff, authorized to request contingents of troops or ships from nearby, or nearly interested, states, whenever there is an act of international police duty to be performed.

This plan would almost certainly prevent war for many years, in a way that none of the partial measures earlier enumerated can be expected to do. Yet I do not for one moment assume that the nations will adopt it. The strong and great tend to oppose it because it would institute a form of super-state. Having little to fear, they prefer to reserve their liberty of action. As for the small or weak, the more ambitious among them tend to oppose it because it would make for political stabilization within present frontiers, leaving no allowance for the inevitable historic decline of some peoples and the correlative rise of others. I conclude, therefore, that although the nations do, in a general way, desire peace, especially in these exhausted years after the Great War, they are not, as yet, willing to adopt the only really effective means of preventing war. Consequently, they will have to make the most of such partial anti-war measures as they are willing to employ.

Glancing back over the seven causes of war, we find that more or less interesting remedies have been con-

celved against all of them save one. Personal ambitions are being combated by open diplomacy and an increasingly active personal public opinion; imperialism, by birth-control and a larger equity, as well as by an increasing world-condemnation; economic rivalry, by the "open door," or by equitably shared spheres of influence and concessions; intervention, by limiting its aims to those of justice, and by giving it an international character; boundary friction, by neutral zones, "buffer" states, and "cooling off" territories; competitive armament, by treaties of ratio limitation.

The one cause of war which seems to have been practically ignored is nevertheless one of the most dangerous, particularly in these days of democracy. I refer, of course, to popular passion. The remedy is not far to seek. On the contrary, it is obvious, and its efficacy is very nearly certain. This remedy is education. There is too much contempt for, and hatred of, the foreigner in our modern conception of patriotism. A demagogic press and demagogic politicians, who find a profit in appealing to the meannesses and easy xenophobia of the crowd, play directly into the hands of such unscrupulous occult political or economic groups as may, for their own ends, be plotting war. Newspapers and parliaments resound with doughty insults of foreign peoples and governments. The rude and loud-mouthed perpetrators seem not to realize that they are, as it were, flinging packets of high-explosives around the public thoroughfares, to be set off by the first chance misstep of the passersby. The time has come for a systematic reaction to be undertaken to this condition of affairs. Prejudice, fanaticism, racemysticism, class-warfare, blind state-ism, militarism—

these are the enemy! The meanings of the sweet old cosmopolitan XVIII Century words—humanity, equality, liberty, reason, fraternity—seems almost forgotten; why not restore them? The peoples must be taught that respect for rights is a matter of mutuality. Questions do sometimes have two sides, and the monopolization of right and justice, though often attempted, can rarely be achieved. It is no less boorish to lie and jeer publicly against another people than against another fellow-citizen. Differences of viewpoint are inevitable and proper, but they can be maintained politely, and in cool blood. The public, in these last few years, with a fine absolutism which it is far from professing in private matters, has been accustomed to think and speak as if there were something treacherous and sinister in the settlement of international disputes by concession and compromise. The truth is that no other peaceful means of settlement are known to man. The prevalent fears and suspicions which poison international life are no doubt in part justified, and each nation, certainly, should be vigilant in the defense of its rights and interests; but in part, too, these fears and suspicions are artificial. They can be greatly attenuated by a relatively small amount of courtesy and consideration. International morals depend at last on national and individual morals. In private life, citizens no longer behave like the Three Musketeers, unsheathing swords at the least casual brushing of an elbow. Why should nations continue to bear themselves as common swashbucklers? We must ask ourselves just what this “national honor” the defense of which so excites and preoccupies our minds? In so far as it is sterling, let us cherish it; but

in so far as it is cheap and trashy, throw it away. In all the schools of the world, both primary and secondary, the facts of political, economic, and moral interdependence must be taught, even as they are taught now, I am told, in the schools of far-distant Uruguay. The lesson of these facts is clear. Whosoever has read them aright cannot do other than repeat, as the foundation of all sound, modern international relations, the words which Grotius uttered, to this end, three hundred years ago: Keep faith, and aim at peace!

PART IV
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY,

OUR MANIFOLD INTERESTS

IN Part I of this book, we have seen that the new situation of pre-eminence occupied by the United States requires us to pursue henceforth a policy of peace and of commercial expansion, by means of international co-operation. In Part II, we have found that while it is essential that public opinion be brought to a more energetic understanding of foreign affairs, the details of execution must of necessity be left to the skill and discretion of the organism created for precisely this end—namely, the diplomatic and consular service. Part III has indicated something of the permanency and the increasing importance of the task which confronts diplomacy in general, and something of the new conditions under which it must henceforth work. In these last few chapters, it will be fitting to dwell for a few moments upon certain aspects of our specifically American diplomacy.

The first thing to be understood is that the United States to-day has interests literally everywhere; in the Far East and the Near East, schools and missions; in North and Central America, the Caribbean and the Pacific, vital political preoccupations; in South America, the maintenance of the Monroe and Pan-American Doctrines; in Africa, a special concern with the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Liberia; in Europe—ancestral home of our civilization

and of our own forefathers—close cultural ties and the necessity of working together, in the cause of world-order, with the great European powers whose influence predominates over most of the world to-day. We have marine guards in Peking and Constantinople, and a fleet in the Near East, and we had until recently an army on the Rhine. We are acquiring Pacific and Atlantic submarine cables. Our naval radio stations encircle the globe, and a great American corporation is rapidly extending the scope of our commercial radio communications. Our merchant ships sail the seven seas. As the equal of Britain in naval power, and as being second only to Britain in merchant marine, we cannot affect to ignore any question involving the world's great seaways, ports, and navigable rivers. Our raw products are sent out to all manufacturing countries; our manufactures to all agricultural countries. We are exporting billions of dollars in the form of foreign investments. Our banks are everywhere establishing branches. Our vast organized charities are at work wherever there is suffering on a large scale, from the valley of the Hoang-Ho to Smyrna and Samara. Our energetic inquisitive, money-making citizens are to be found traveling or trading, for business, science, art, education, or pleasure, in every corner of the six continents and all the islands of the oceans.

Moreover, if we are not careful and enterprising, the time is not far off when we shall be dependent on the foreigner for one of the essential factors of modern industry and of national defense. I mean petroleum, whose three products, machine-oil, fuel oil, and gasoline, are already indispensable, the first for all ma-

chinery whatsoever, the second for our great merchant and battle ships, the third for automobiles, trucks, submarines, and airplanes. The United States has been, and still is, producing about three-fourths of the world's oil output, but if the present rate of consumption continues, our reserve will be exhausted in the brief space of some twenty more years. It is therefore essential that we should secure as rapidly as possible oil-field concessions abroad—in Asia Minor, in South Russia, in Mexico, in the Dutch Indies—anywhere we can. The problem is one of the most serious which confronts us.

I think the complacent, home-dwelling citizen would be astonished if he could be brought to realize the primary fact that there is probably to-day not a country, not a city in the world, in which the United States has not genuine interests of some description. As an example almost at random, let us take Holland. How many have even a suspicion of the moral, economic, and political ties which bind us to the sturdy, comfortable people inhabiting that bit of dune, pasture, and polder, salvaged from the gray North Sea by an elaborate system of dykes and pumps? Yet the Dutch, though less nervous, more conservative, more leisurely, have much the same economic and moral bias, the same strong spirit of liberty and independence, as we ourselves. Like us, they are anti-militarist and are juridical-minded. They have the same interest that we have in political and economic stability, and the revival of trade. Their modern political tendency, like ours, is one of isolation and neutrality; but it must be added that this tendency fits their circumstances better than it does ours, and that they, moreover, have

learned more quickly than we the advantages of co-operation. They helped, as everyone knows, to settle our country, and it was not of their free will that they ceded "New Amsterdam" to the English; but the Dutch influence in the United States has never wholly died out. There is a Dutch Chamber of Commerce in New York. Dutch investments in American securities are still large. American banks recently participated in a Dutch government loan of 300,000,000 florins, and issued a loan of \$100,000,000 for the Dutch East Indies. Amsterdam and Rotterdam rank among the first ports of Europe. The latter is the gateway to the Meuse and Rhine river systems and so to Germany, Alsace-Lorraine, and Switzerland. Its importance to our transit trade will be still further increased upon the completion of the contemplated Rhine-Danube canal. Its trade with us, in 1919, was worth some \$40,00,000. It sends us dairy specialties and bulbs, and buys our flour, grain, meat, lard, linseed cake, cottonseed oil, tobacco, steel plates, and machinery. Some of our leading business-men have been seriously considering a combination of Dutch experience and American capital to develop German trade, but conditions in Germany have thus far been inauspicious for such a plan.

There is resentment in Holland against the United States for seizures of Dutch ships during the war, "for which England kindly let us take the blame." But there is resentment in American circles against Holland for the summary manner in which the Dutch parliament rejected, in Britain's favor, the American request for oil concessions in the Dutch East Indies. The powerful Royal Dutch oil trust is closely allied

with the Shell Transport (British) group, and this alliance, in world-competition, is the principal rival of the American Standard Oil trust. However, good relations between the two peoples are being cultivated by chambers of commerce, exchange professorships, exchange art exhibits and the new Holland-American foundation fathered by the Dutch-American, Edward Bok. For fear of offending either the allies or the Central Powers, the Dutch royal family shunned official ceremonies during the war; but in 1922, H.R.H. the Prince of the Netherlands, marked the end of the war period by attending an official dinner at the residence of the American minister. The Dutch hold important islands in the West Indies, which are indirectly of interest to us. The Dutch East Indies, like the Philippines, are supposed, at certain moments, to have been threatened by Japan, and both are now safeguarded by the Washington Four-Power pact, which has been extended to the Dutch East Indies by special declaration of the United States. We are interested in the submarine cable from Yap to Menado and the Dutch are interested in the agitation for independence in the Philippines, which reacts, as they consider, unfavorably, upon the population of their East Indies. Finally, The Hague, Holland's capital, is the seat of the International Arbitration Tribunal, of which we are a member, and of the new Permanent Court of International Justice, in which we are considering membership.

While greater, certainly, than in some countries, our interests in Holland are considerably less than in others. The point is that from Finland to Chile, from China to Italy and South Africa, there is now no coun-

try in which such a brief examination as the foregoing would not reveal a number of points of economic, political, and cultural difference or agreement, from or with ourselves, requiring diplomatic surveillance, opposition or support on the part of the United States.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES

THE broad outlines of our foreign policy, as we have seen, should be determined, as constitutionally provided, by the President under the impulse of an enlightened public opinion, and in co-operation with one of the organs of this opinion, namely, the Senate; or rather, in present conditions, with the Senate's Committee on Foreign Affairs. The details of this policy, and the actual execution of this policy, must be left to the specialists, and to the complex, specialized machinery, trained and devised for the purpose. These specialists, this machinery, whereby our manifold interests abroad are protected and furthered, whereby the information on which we should act is gathered, and whereby all commercial and political negotiations with other nations should be conducted, is known under the new legislation now contemplated, as the Foreign Service of the United States. Its head and center is the Department of State, in Washington, but its field is the world. In every capital, every great city of our human globe, American diplomatic or consular officers are permanently stationed, vigilant and active, for the defense of American rights, the advancement of American trade and American ideals. In every foreign capital there is an American embassy or legation, with an ambassador or minister and a staff of technical secretaries. In every busy port or commercial community

there is an American Consulate with a consul-general or consul in charge, and a staff of trained vice-consuls and clerks. The large diplomatic establishments comprise also military, naval, and commercial attachés with their own staffs, representing the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Commerce. As for the Department of State, it has at its head, and at the head of the entire foreign service, a secretary of state, appointed by the President, and assisted by a large personnel of experienced Foreign Service officers, the majority of whom, at one time or another, have been stationed abroad. Among the other duties of the secretary of state, is that of receiving regularly, upon official or semi-official business, the diplomatic agents accredited by foreign governments to the government of the United States.

The general operation of this vast diplomatic machinery may be briefly described. The secretary of state having, to the best of his ability, advised and informed the President, is instructed by the latter as to the main outlines of policy, and in turn, gives the necessary detailed instructions to the men in the field, either as to what additional information, general or specific, may be required, or as to the diplomatic action required to be taken. The men in the field act on instructions, and report back continually to the secretary of state. The functions performed, in short, are none other than those which have characterized all diplomacy from its inception—first, the gathering of significant information; second, the effort to influence, by conversation, negotiation or other means, foreign powers and peoples in a sense favorable to our national interests and ideals.

"In every part of the earth," as Mr. Charles E. Hughes recently put it, "the diplomatic and consular officers of the United States are watching every turn of events in their relation to the general policies of this government. They report every source of international irritation; they note the signals of economic and political unrest, of international rivalries, prejudices, subversive tendencies, and discriminatory policies. They aid the government not merely in settling disputes, but in removing or limiting the causes of possible controversy."

Ordinary negotiations, as the occasions arise, are carried on partly in Washington, between the Secretary of State and the ambassadors or ministers of foreign governments, partly abroad, between American ambassadors or ministers, acting on instructions, and the designated ministers of foreign governments. For special negotiations, like international conferences, or for unusually important negotiations, like peace negotiations, delegations of commissioners are customarily named, assisted by secretaries and technicians drawn partly from the diplomatic service, partly from the academic, financial, or business world. One of these commissioners may well be the secretary of state. Others may be distinguished diplomats or statesmen, or political leaders. Senators are sometimes named, with a view particularly to the influence they may later be able to exert in the senate, in favor of the ratification of the contemplated treaty. At the Paris Peace Conference, the President of the United States acted as head of the American delegation, but the experiment was unsuccessful and should not be repeated; for in thus boldly entering the diplomatic fray, the President

not only lost contact with his own parliament and his own public opinion, but he also sacrificed his valuable power of revision,—that is, his power subsequently to modify positions taken perhaps unwisely or inexpediently, in the heat of negotiation, by the delegation.

Our diplomats, however, are expected not merely to negotiate; they are expected to observe and to report as well. Theoretically, a proper diplomatic report, dealing with an important matter, should first state the facts, then interpret these facts, and, finally, should make recommendations as to the action, if any, which seems advisable in the circumstances. While the value of the report depends of course primarily upon the experience, skill, and judgment of the officers, I believe that I am justified in asserting that the volume of information which pours continually, by wire and by mail, into the state department, from all quarters of the globe, is more than adequate in quantity, and is not inadequate in quality. Ambassadors, for example, are expected to report at brief intervals upon the political situation in the country to which they are assigned, and these regular periodic reports unfold a moving and instructive panorama of those intermingled interests, ambitions, prejudices, and other “imponderables” which, in whatever clime, make up political life. For certain special inquiries, the department further has at its disposition an “emergency fund” of \$433,000 a year (1922).

The State Department is organized in six different political bureaus, known respectively as the divisions of Western European, Eastern European, Near Eastern, Far Eastern, Latin American, and Mexican affairs. There are also foreign trade advisers, and

various routine and technical bureaus, including an organ called the division of current information which analyzes the foreign and domestic press with regard to foreign views and news. The most urgent or most confidential reports from the field are laid at once before the Secretary of State; but the bulk of information goes to the heads of the divisions concerned, who are supposed to collate, co-ordinate, sift, digest and, in general, so prepare it that it becomes available for immediate use in the formulation or the furtherance of policy, after which it is classified and filed away. At present, unfortunately, the department is seriously undermanned, owing to insufficient appropriations of money, and I have heard it intimated by those who should know that this highly important work of co-ordination and digestion of information is not always performed with the care and thoroughness desirable; but the specific reports prepared by the division heads for the secretary and the members of the administration are said nevertheless to be of real value.

Both as regards points of information and as regards the framing of instructions, there are of course continual conferences between the Secretary of State, the under-secretary and assistant secretaries, and the division heads. Ordinary instructions are drafted, on the Secretary's order, by the division heads, and are merely submitted for signature to the Secretary, or to one of the assistant secretaries; but in not a few cases, the Secretary himself writes the instructions. The assertion has been made by foreign critics that despite our potential power, we are incapable of pursuing a well-considered and consecutive policy, for the reason that our directing personnel does not study foreign

problems as such, but is content to follow, day by day, the impulsions of public opinion. The weakness here implied is a real one, and must be admitted, but my own diagnosis of its cause is quite different from that of the foreign critics. Our diplomatic and consular officers are for the most part able men. They not only can, but they do, study problems objectively. They reach conclusions and they place their advice at the disposition of the Secretary, who in turn may submit it to the President. The trouble is that this advice, whether for political or other reasons, is too rarely followed. We Americans, whose specialists and technicians are pre-eminent in so many walks of life, are still unwilling to trust the details of our foreign policy to the specialist and the technician. The resultant situation is an anomaly, whose discontinuance is now, surely, merely a question of time. The officers of our foreign service are, in the main, worthy of trust and of responsibility. In so far as is compatible with prudence and democracy, let us trust them.

In a complex mechanism like that with which we are here concerned, the problem of co-ordination is a vital one. Ideally, the heads of posts in the field should be kept informed of the evolution of American policies, both general and specific; the heads of divisions in the department should continually exchange information and views; and the more important reports, instructions, and digests should be circulated, not only within the service, but to the President, the cabinet members, and the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. In other words, ambassadors, ministers, division heads, cabinet members, the President, the senators most immediately con-

cerned, should all know what is going on, so that they may, one and all, be vigilant to promote the success of the tentative, whether by seeking to influence a foreign government and foreign opinion, or by seeking to lead and inform our own public opinion. As nearly as I can learn, co-ordination within the department is now pretty well organized. Co-ordination between the department and the field is improving, although, in my opinion, the men in the field are still not sufficiently informed as to what is going on at home. Co-ordination, regionally desirable, between heads of diplomatic missions abroad, has only just begun, and must be developed to meet the increasing interconnection of all political and economic problems. Co-ordination between the state department and other departments of the administration is being undertaken, but leaves much to be desired. There are four departments which are immediately and specifically concerned with foreign affairs. The Department of State and the Departments of the Army and Navy, in their larger policies, are preoccupied almost entirely with conditions in other countries; and an increasing part of the preoccupations of the Department of Commerce is similarly oriented. While the actual execution of policies must of course be left entirely to the State Department, I believe that an informal "council of foreign affairs," consisting of qualified high permanent officials of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and of Commerce, might profitably be instituted to advise the president and his cabinet. Co-ordination between the State Department and the Senate, or its Committee on Foreign Relations, is at present, so far as I can learn, almost entirely lacking, with

evidences, even, of a certain rivalry of aim, and tension of feeling, between this administrative and this legislative organ, both of which are nevertheless essential, the one to the formulation, the other to the conduct, of foreign policy. If this, as I fear, is really the existing condition, ought not the compounding of a remedy to be undertaken without delay?

It is not unlikely that even many members of Congress have heretofore entertained no adequate idea of the vital rôle which the Foreign Service of the United States is henceforth called upon to play. The niggardliness of the appropriations accorded the Department of State in the past can no longer be justified. Owing to lack of funds, the personnel, at present, is not sufficiently numerous, and is underpaid. The United States is the only large power which does not own its embassy and legation buildings in the principal European capitals, but expects its missions to drift from street to street and quarter to quarter, as leases expire, or vacant houses or apartments offer. A rich American has presented us with an embassy in London, and it is an open secret that France, had we ratified the treaty of guarantee, signed in 1919, intended to present to us the former Austro-Hungarian embassy building in Paris. But why should we wait thus upon private or foreign charity?

The inadequacy of the remuneration offered has of course a deplorable limiting effect upon the choice of personnel. Broadly speaking, only well-to-do young men can now enter the service, while only wealthy men can accept the principal appointments. Our ambassadors receive \$17,500 a year, with practically no entertainment allowances. They are nevertheless obliged

to live on a scale permitting them to return hospitality, and to mingle with leading foreign diplomats and statesmen, on a basis of something like equality. It is calculated that the very least an American ambassador in London or Paris must spend is \$50,000. Most spend more. Whitelaw Reid, in London, is said to have disbursed \$500,000 a year. In the lesser embassies, the expense is reckoned at about \$35,000 a year. As for the secretaries, with their \$2,000, or \$3,000, or \$4,000 a year, they can, I am told, live upon these salaries by the expedient of boarding modestly somewhere, but only so long as they remain single, and hence have no obligations of hospitality. An officer in the United States diplomatic service, who desires to marry and raise a family, should command, my friends estimate, a private income of about \$10,000 a year in addition to his salary. Consuls are a little better paid; but the whole situation is one which, in the opinion of Mr. Charles E. Hughes, no American can face "without a sense of humiliation." The custom of leaving the diplomatic service in the hands of rich aristocrats is, of course, a venerable one. Venice almost uniformly sent out wealthy patricians who could afford display; and excepting Britain, and possibly France and Germany, I know of no country which at present even attempts adequately to remunerate its diplomats. The antiquity and the ubiquity of the tradition, however, are scant justification for its continuance. It is not only anti-democratic, it is mean. A great nation like the United States can afford to pay its skilled servants. If large salaries are impracticable, let them be supplemented by "maintenance funds," such as that which I understand is allowed the President for entertainment and for the upkeep of the White House.

Why, in these circumstances, do a few young men nevertheless desire to enter upon the diplomatic career? I have myself been at some pains to answer this question. Generally speaking, there are two types in the service to-day. One type, the more conspicuous of the two, married, often, to a woman with social ambition, is the well-to-do young man, perhaps somewhat snobbish in manner, who, whether he develops ability or not, is at least ornamental. The other type, fortunately the more characteristic of the two, is the young man, whether wealthy, or of perhaps more modest income, who desires really to serve his country even at some material sacrifice, who is patriotic, hard-working, intellectually ambitious, to whom social position is distinctly not an end, but a means, and whose inner desire is to play a part, effective, however small, in his country's and the world's great affairs. As long as there are enough candidates available of this latter category, we shall not lack good professional diplomats, even in the existing discouraging circumstances. Every year, a certain number will take the diplomatic or consular courses offered by two or three universities, or will place themselves in the hands of special coaches in Washington, with a view to preparing the examinations. The diplomatic service has been maintained on an examination basis since 1905, and the consular service since 1906. The consular examinations, from what I can learn, are adequate, but the diplomatic examinations scarcely so. The diplomatic candidate is required to show proficiency in international law, diplomatic usage, one foreign language—French, German, or Spanish, the commerce and resources of the United States, American history, and the general his-

tory of modern times since 1850; but the language and history requirements might profitably, I am told, be stiffened, and tests in general political geography and in economics ought probably to be added.

The consular service, from its lowest to its highest rank, is even now a career, in the strict sense of the word, but the diplomatic service is only partially so, for the posts of minister and ambassador are not held open to promotion on merit from the diplomatic personnel, but are left by the Constitution at the discretion of the President, to be filled by him by appointment, subject to the Senate's ratification. Until quite recently, American ambassadors and ministers have too often been chosen less because of any special fitness for the highly important technical tasks to be performed, than because of conspicuous services, usually in the form of large campaign contributions, rendered to the party in the course of elections. The appointments actually made, in not a few cases, have been excellent, especially as regards the London embassy; in too many cases, bad; in perhaps the majority of cases, mediocre, with this additional drawback, that about the time the more intelligent minister or ambassador began to learn something about the profession, there would be a change of administration, and his resignation would be accepted to make way for some new amateur. This "unfortunate" and "careless" method, to use Bryce's words, of choosing our first-rank diplomats cannot, in my opinion, be too strongly condemned. Diplomacy is a complicated and important business, demanding special training and experience. The statement, recently made editorially by a leading Chicago newspaper, that "to find a diplomatic 'white hope' we must

go back to the primitive American who calls his wife 'ma,' who won't know when he is being shown how to enter a drawing-room, and who thinks Whitehall is named after the White House," may flatter certain crudities which exist in our own people's mentality, as in that of others, but it betrays, of the intellectual and cultural demands of modern statecraft, a fundamental ignorance which is nothing less than appalling. Certainly character, in diplomacy as in everything else, is more essential than either intellect or experience, yet without intellect and experience, character is blindfolded and handcuffed; it can neither see nor strike to accurate purpose. Many of our ministerial posts, and even two minor ambassadorial posts, I am glad to say, have been filled, by the last two or three administrations, on a non-partisan basis, from the ranks of the diplomatic service; to the profit of diplomatic efficiency, not only in the posts concerned, but throughout the whole personnel, because of the moral encouragement thus given our more ambitious young men. As for the more important ambassadorial posts, there may be, there doubtless are, good reasons why they should be held open to political appointees, and changed with each change of administration; but at least the appointments can be made with discretion, and with an increasing regard to fitness. The nation would gain thereby.

I come finally to the question of promotion and transfer of diplomatic and consular officers. There is little danger, in our service, that a man will sink hopelessly into a rut of routine. If anything, transfers from one post to another are too frequent, and too abrupt—that is, sufficient consideration to a man's previous ex-

perience, and consequent fitness or unfitness for the new task, is not always accorded; the human units are regarded rather as indiscriminately interchangeable, and a secretary who has painfully acquired a considerable knowledge of Far Eastern affairs in Peking need not be surprised to find himself suddenly shifted to Poland, where all his previous experience is practically useless. The rotation of service between the field and the department seems now to be well-conceived and well-executed. Promotion for ability seems reasonably certain in the consular service, and also in the diplomatic service, but only up to the rank of secretary of the first class, the posts of minister and ambassador being reserved by the Constitution, as has been said, for presidential appointment.

I have mentioned that there is now pending before Congress legislation looking to the correction of some of the more obvious defects of the service. This legislation is comprised in two bills, one known as the Rogers bill, or H.R. 12543, and the other known simply as H.R. 10213. The Rogers bill welds the diplomatic and consular branches into a single Foreign Service of the United States, with nine graded classes of foreign service officers, the lowest to receive \$3,000 a year, and the highest \$9,000, with traveling expenses to average \$8 a day during absence from post on service, with representation allowances at the discretion of Congress, and with a system of retirement annuities. The two branches of the service are made interchangeable, as regards personnel, and promotion is promised on merit. H.R. 10213 provides for the transfer of ministers from one post to another without the asking each time of the Senate's explicit approval,

and "creates an atmosphere favorable" to the promotion—that is, the appointment by the President—of service men to ministerial posts. These bills have the support of the administration and of all earnest friends of our foreign service. I assume that they will eventually be adopted.

The men who enter the government service to represent their country abroad obtain the somewhat dubious advantages of travel and of assured social position, but they sacrifice, in the immediate sense, more than they gain. Most of them go forth, not to great interesting capitals like Paris, London, and Rome, but to Asia, South America, Eastern Europe, or to provincial seaports and commercial towns, north, south, east, and west. They have to fight, not only the loneliness of prolonged exile, but often disease and the climate. In war or revolution, they do not desert their posts. Their lot is by no means the round of pleasure too commonly imagined. There is scarcely one who could not make more money and live more comfortably at home. The motives by which the majority are animated are high—service, patriotism, the ambition of an honorable career. Too many, unable to meet the financial exigencies of their position, or discouraged by the preference shown to political appointees in the higher posts, leave the service just when they are beginning to be of greatest value. Surely it is not too much to ask that those who remain shall be adequately remunerated, shall be allowed sufficient clerical assistance, and shall be encouraged by the prospect of promotion even perhaps to an embassy, before their careers are ended by old age.

3

TRADITION, POLICY, AND OPPORTUNITY

ALTHOUGH American diplomacy seems often naïve and immature to the elder nations, this diplomacy is not really so young as it appears. It has moved with fair success through nearly a century and a half of history, handicapped in numerous ways, yet meeting emergencies, on the whole, shrewdly and energetically. It has formed, during this period, a quite definite tradition, of simplicity of manner, and of direct and open action.

If anything, under the impulse of the spirit of our earlier, somewhat militant, democracy, it has laid too much stress upon simplicity of manner. The picture of Benjamin Franklin, in his every day apparel, striding up to the royal dais and offering democratically to shake hands with Louis XVI may gratify the poetic sense of schoolboys, but it has no color of reality. What Franklin actually wore was Quaker full dress, which in the time of James II had been court dress. Washington, while expressing impatience with "ceremonious attention to idle forms," felt strongly the inexpediency of attempting to ignore those wise rules of procedure whose acceptance had become general. Jefferson's experiment in the "rule of pell-mell" at official dinners was unfortunate and has not been repeated. A special uniform for our diplomatic officers

was instituted in 1817, was modified by Jackson and abolished by Marcy, who desired our foreign agents to appear henceforth in the "simple dress of an American citizen," by which is to be understood not overalls or a business suit, but civilian full-dress. There is still one court, however, namely, the Court of St. James, which on certain great occasions does not admit civilian full-dress. For the American ambassador to appear inappropriately attired on these occasions, would be no less offensive than for him not to appear at all. To meet these contingencies, our ambassador to London is still accustomed to don the lace ruffles and black silk knee-breeches of civilian court dress; but all our other diplomats, so far as I can learn, now find the ordinary full-dress suit sufficient to every requirement. The whole question has been accorded an importance for exceeding its merits. Regardless of whether we, in our wisdom, might be able to improve upon those rules, our agents should follow punctiliously the prevailing rules of diplomatic or court etiquette. To do otherwise is to be needlessly boorish. We may properly expect foreign agents in Washington to accede, on public occasions, to our home customs; our own agents abroad should be equally scrupulous not to offend the sensibilities of the people with whom they have to work and whom they aspire to be able, perhaps, to influence.

The opinion of our first President was not only moderate and sound in this matter of diplomatic manner; it was equally so in the matter of diplomatic action. The instructions issued to John Jay, our minister to London in 1794, contain the following sentence, which has ever since served as a guide and ritual to Ameri-

can diplomats: "It is the president's wish that the characteristics of an American minister should be marked on the one hand by a firmness against improper compliances, and on the other by sincerity, candor, truth and prudence, and by a horror of finesse and chicane." From that day to this, as Mr. John Bassett Moore remarks, "American diplomats have usually relied rather upon the strength of their cause, frankly and clearly argued, than upon a subtle diplomacy for the attainment of their ends." Our caricaturists have sometimes symbolized this method, not by an iron hand in a velvet glove, as an older tradition is sometimes depicted, but by the sturdy Uncle Sam in shirt-sleeves, as befitted a nation of pioneers and soil-breakers. Eliminate the suggestion of the uncouth and of the needlessly brusque, and the image remains a healthy one, well worth preserving, if only as an indication that diplomacy, properly understood, implies, before all else, hard work to a definite purpose.

Just here, there emerges what is in my opinion the fundamental weakness of American diplomacy, as now practised. We have the organization, we have the trained personnel, we have an adequate tradition, both as to manner and as to action. Only one thing is lacking, but it is a vital thing: definite purpose! Politics, said Rousseau, is "a science of calculations, combinations, and exceptions, in accordance with place, time, and circumstances." Opportunities for the realization of aims arise and pass, perhaps never to return. In order to seize these opportunities, it is essential that we should clearly pre-determine precisely what it is that we want. Failing definite policies, conceived in a spirit of continuity and practicability, the entire dip-

lomatic machinery is falsified; it functions emptily, to vague and meager ends. The point is one which might be developed feelingly, and at some length. But perhaps my intention may be more readily seized if I give a few examples from events which are fresh in every memory.

In the autumn of 1922, the Turkish Nationalist Army, after two years of fighting, swept the Greek Army out of Asia Minor, burned all save the Turkish quarter of Smyrna, and began expelling the Christian population from Turkish territory. American opinion, which had theretofore manifested indifference to the Greco-Turkish War, suddenly became excited. Our numerous and influential protestant religious element, which a year earlier had seemingly favored the sinking unceremoniously of all navies, now clamored for measures which could only have meant war against the Turks. The government, moved partly by a true sense of American interests, but largely by the pressure of this opinion, was constrained to send a fleet to the Near East, and a delegation to the Lausanne Peace Conference; though it must be said that as the fleet had orders not to shoot anything, and the delegation had orders not to sign anything, neither the one nor the other were really effective.

But if the United States has material and moral interests to protect in the Near East—and that it has, cannot for a moment be doubted—these interests do not merely exist now and then, in crises; they are quasi-permanent, and should command the solicitude of our diplomacy not spasmodically, but continuously, whether the administration is Democratic or Republican. As soon as Turkey entered the War, we should have

become alert. When it edicted the abolition of the capitulations, when some hundreds of thousands of Armenians were cold-bloodedly massacred, we should have protested. Instead, even when we entered the torment whose battle-line stretched unbroken from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf, we declared war against Germany and Austria-Hungary, but not against Bulgaria and Turkey; and at the Peace Conference, we professed small interest in the treaties negotiated with these last two countries. We had not been at war, we explained, with Bulgaria and Turkey! When the Greek Army landed at Smyrna and shot up the Turkish quarter, we were indifferent. When the treaty of Sèvres and the San Remo oil agreement were drafted, we were absent, though we resented afterward that our interests had not been taken into consideration. When the Russians overran Georgia and re-established a common frontier with Turkey, across the crushed body of Armenia, where we had refused even to consider assuming a mandate, we were unconcerned. The French withdrawal from Silesia and the Franco-Turkish agreement of Angora scarcely aroused our curiosity. The repeated tentatives of the French to effect a compromise peace between Greeks and Turks passed by without attracting our attention. Then suddenly, when all was over, and it was too late for action, we awoke, staggered at the result, amazed, indignant, and all but belligerent!

If we had understood our interests in the first place, if we had really known what we wanted, we should have protested the abolition of the capitulations, protested the Armenian massacres, and at the same time that we declared war on Germany, should have de-

clared war on Turkey. If we had taken part subsequently in the Turkish peace negotiations, perhaps the Greeks would never have landed at Smyrna; perhaps the Greco-Turkish War, and its sufferings, would not have occurred. If we had helped to form an independent Armenia, Russia could not so easily have supported Turkey. Beyond any doubt we could have influenced the conclusion of a compromise peace before the final Greek disaster. Our diplomats, on the ground, knowing what we wanted, could have advised the government as to the best moments for peaceful and stabilizing action, and the government could have instructed them accordingly. Instead of contributing indirectly, by our indifference, to the consummation of vast inhumanities, then rushing with money and supplies to heal the resultant wounds, we might have prevented these wounds altogether. The recent history of the Near East, in any case, would have been entirely different.

Now, let us observe another instance, in an opposite quarter of the world, of our embarrassing lack of diplomatic foresight and continuity. Since the Spanish-American War, the United States, resuming the interesting tentatives interrupted, forty years earlier, by the Civil War, had been engaged in developing several definite policies in the Pacific and the Far East, and in consequence a certain tension was observable between ourselves and Japan. The latter, as Britain's ally, declared war against Germany in 1914, and assaulted and captured Tsing-Tao, limiting its participation in the war thereafter to a few minor naval actions, the furnishing and convoying of supplies and an expedition to Siberia. Japanese opinion

throughout was divided. The pro-German party was strong. What the allies desired above all else was that Japan should not suddenly go over to the enemy. To insure against this, they agreed in writing, early in 1917, to support, at the peace conference, Japan's claims to the former German islands in the Pacific. The United States, also with a view to mollifying Japan, negotiated the Lansing-Ishii agreement. All our previous Far Eastern policy seemed suddenly forgotten; although later, it is true, we went into Siberia, jointly with Japan, as a guarantee against Japanese ambition in that region, and we got China into the war in order to strengthen that country's diplomatic position against Japan. Having repeatedly announced that we had no territorial ambitions of any description, we nevertheless expressed pain and indignation at and after the peace conference, on learning that our associates had agreed, in 1917, to support Japan's claim to the former German islands; and we have not yet done talking about how badly we were treated by the allies in the matter of these and other secret agreements. Japan, meanwhile, of course, received the islands, though under the limitations imposed by the mandate system.

I am sorry to have to say that in my opinion this whole misunderstanding is our own fault. People who do not know enough to look after their own interests should not reproach their friends for failing to do their thinking and acting. War implies peace; and it is customary for nations, on entering a war-coalition, to make clear to their associates just what they are fighting for, so that the coalition may not be undermined by suspicions, and may not be disrupted by

wranglings and dissensions, at the time of the peace negotiations. With the exception of the United States, all the great allied nations did this. It was our business, when we entered the war, to ask the allies to communicate to us officially all their secret agreements, knowledge of which was of course already unofficially in the hands of our diplomats. It should have been obvious that the former German islands in the Pacific would be taken from Germany, in the event of victory. We must have known that one of these islands contained immensely valuable phosphate deposits, that another was vital as a cable station, and that the rest, lying on the flank of our communications with the Philippines, were of interest strategically. To assert that we did not know of Japan's claim is idle. Unofficially, the thing was known. If we did not know officially, it was because we did not ask. If we objected to Japan having these islands, that was the time to say so. If we wanted any ourselves, we should have so informed the allies. But we insisted that we wanted nothing; and when they took us at our word, we affected chagrined surprise. The trouble then, as to-day, was that we did not know our own mind. We do not look after other people's interests for them, yet somehow we expect them to look after ours.

I will discuss one example more. The Harding administration, in 1921, assumed office on a promise of forming "an association of nations," and at once began to manifest an almost puerile hostility to the League of Nations, just then beginning feebly to function in Geneva. In the early summer, we issued invitations to the Washington Conference. All Europe was instantly at attention. Was this the possible forerunner

of the promised "association?" In August, the Supreme Council held an extremely important meeting in Paris. Mr. George Harvey, our new ambassador to London, who had just pronounced a funeral oration over what he supposed to be the disintegrating corpse of the League, attended this meeting as an "observer." An "observer," I may add, is a peculiarly American functionary, whose duty is to sit, like a skeleton at a feast, in grim ironical silence, while others struggle with the problems of the world. Deadlocked over the Upper Silesian question, both the French and the British premiers repeatedly besought the American "observer" to speak the deciding word which would relieve them of their inability to give in sufficiently, the one to the other, to effect a compromise. Would not Mr. Harvey at least lunch with Mr. Lloyd George and M. Briand, to talk the matter over? Mr. Harvey, being inexperienced and feeling constrained to refuse even this mild appearance of "entanglement," would not. The French and British premiers thereupon referred the dispute to the League, whose prestige immediately rose several hundred per cent. In September, the League assembly met, greatly encouraged, put through the organization of the Permanent Court of International Justice, and thereby ostensibly assured the League's future. In November, President Harding announced that he considered the League "a good thing for Europe," and of the projected "associations of nations" nothing has since been heard.

Yet rarely has there been a more brilliant diplomatic opportunity than that offered the United States at the August meeting of the Supreme Council. The League was weak and uncertain, hence easily

malleable, or even easily destructible. It had accomplished practically nothing of importance. Moreover the calling of the Washington Conference had suddenly heightened our waning prestige. Whether we wanted to destroy the League and set up an "association" in its place, or whether we wanted to remodel the League in accordance with our prejudices, here, if ever, was the occasion. President Harding had only to say a word; the arbitration of the Upper Silesian dispute, without "entangling" us in any way, would have gone to Washington instead of to Geneva, the League situation would have remained in suspense, and whatever our proposals, they would almost certainly have been followed. But what we actually did was nothing at all. The opportunity passed, and passed, no doubt, for ever.

Whether in the Near East or the Pacific, whether with regard to the League, or with regard to oilfields in the Dutch Indies or Asia Minor, it is always the same thing; not knowing our own mind, the time for action is allowed passively to elapse; the accomplished fact is erected against us, we protest crossly, and the only consolation vouchsafed us is the meager pleasure we may enjoy at contrasting our own international virtuousness with the supposed unregeneracy and cunning of Asiatics and Europeans.

No wonder that so many of our abler young diplomats leave the service in disgust; They enter filled with enthusiasm and dreaming of a career. They are sent out to a post, they report faithfully regarding American interests and opportunities, but wait vainly for instructions to act. One occasion vanishes after another. Whatever happens, they must say nothing,

do nothing, officially or unofficially, which might tend to implicate the United States in anything whatsoever! If I exaggerate, I do so but slightly. We have the interests, and they are universal; we have the diplomatic machinery and it is, in the main, adequate. What we have not yet evolved is a definite purpose, a complex of general and specific policies adapted to our character and our needs. So long as this condition of a short-sighted discontinuity, broken by fitful and ineffective protests and indignations, is allowed to persist, no better description of our foreign service can be given than the picturesque colloquialism laconically quoted to me in this connection a few days ago by an American counsellor of embassy: "All dressed up and no place to go!"

SUGGESTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

THE chief criticism brought against Americans generally by Edward Bok, the well-known Dutch-born American editor, is our lack of thoroughness. Certainly, in at least two subjects, geography and living languages, the better educated among our people are conspicuously remiss. It was only the other day that a letter addressed by an Illinois manufacturer to "Warsaw, Russia," was returned by the indignant Polish postal authorities with the ironical inscription "Chicago, China." A Boston leather-goods firm had its catalogue translated into Spanish, for the South American market, and sent out many copies to Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, not realizing that the language spoken in Brazil is Portuguese. In this remarkable catalogue, the item harness "for single-horse buggy," was rendered "para cavallo soltero lleno de insectos," which means, literally, "for lousy bachelor horse."

The men chosen to represent us diplomatically should "know the world," not only socially, but geographically. They should be familiar, by reading at least, with the situation and characteristics of all countries, for in the diplomatic corps, they will be meeting the agents of all countries. They should study the principal currents of foreign trade, and the traditional policies of the great powers. The foreign language which, with English, is now used almost universally for

purposes of diplomatic intercourse is French. After French, the languages which will best serve an American diplomat are Spanish and German, though we should always have available a certain number of able secretaries who have specialized in Japanese and Chinese. All these languages should be studied not merely with a view to reading, but also to speaking them.

Another subject in which our diplomats can never be too well read is history. The Europeans tend rather to envy us our bland disregard of the great experiences of the past, for the peoples of Europe are heavily fettered by the sins of their fathers. Their disillusionments have made them over-critical; they seem always on the verge of losing faith; and with this paralyzing caution of theirs, they like to contrast our own free exuberance, our optimism, our zest for fresh endeavors, as if the world were now just new, and nothing had as yet been tried. It is true, in a sense, that too much history is a burden, like advanced age; but to have too little history is perhaps to lack judgment, like adolescence. If the Europeans, in this respect, are leaden-shod, are not we a bit light-headed? In the first place, history is one of those eternal realities which cannot intelligently be ignored. Through all the varying changes of his present, each man must carry his past, and it may almost be said that every people is but the sum of its history. In the second place, forasmuch as human character shows very little evidence of modification in the last four thousand years, one may reasonably suppose that, to given causes, men will continue, in the bulk, to respond by similar reactions, so that for the statesman, history teems with revealing instances, the lessons of which are

applicable daily. Europe may know too much history; but we do not know enough. By giving a little more heed to the past, both of ourselves and of others, we shall come into a better and kindlier understanding of the present—of those things which, regarded in the soft glow of retrospection, seem possible to be attempted with success, and of those which do not.

Our diplomats should be cultured, cautious, discreet, convincing in manner and firm of character. They should know how to get the essentials quickly from reports and texts; but they should be judges of men as well, for "in the solution of international problems," to quote Raymond Poincaré, "the knowledge and handling of men is no less important than the examination of documents." They should beware of the pitfalls of over-suspicion, which, as a great French ambassador, Jules Cambon, has said, "has caused more mistakes than over-confidence." They should understand the four factors of diplomatic strength, military, moral, economic, cultural, and should be familiar with that sound rule of success, which derives from the nice and the constant adaptation, the one to the other, of means and ends.

In method, they should adhere strictly to the principle of straightforwardness, which befits both our character and our position of potential preponderance. Frankness is good for its own sake. Marquis Curzon remarked recently that, in his opinion, it was not the cleverest statesmen who had been most notable, but the honestest. "We have a broad continental position," wrote Dr. Paul S. Reinsch with perspicacity, "which makes secret plotting and devious transactions unnatural, inappropriate, and unnecessary." I think it is a

mistake, however, to assume, as Dr. Reinsch does, that a measure of cunning on the part of other, weaker nations, which have neither our character nor our "broad continental position," is necessarily injurious to us. Honesty does not imply ingenuousness. If we are alert, we have nothing to fear from those others whose methods differ from our own; we should even make allowances for the intricate difficulties through which, with inadequate means, they have at times to make their way. Nor does honesty entail rude out-blurtings and tactless emphasis which unnecessarily wound the feelings. Frankness can and must be made entirely compatible with courtesy and consideration. There has of late, I venture to suggest, been too much thunderous assertion, by one or two of our ambassadors, as to what the "American people" would never consent to do, and too little intimation of what the American people is actually willing to do. This kind of negative fury profits us nothing. When we cannot meet proposal with counter-proposal, when we cannot be constructive, we had best be silent. For silence, too, at times, is a form of frankness.

A basic tenet of diplomatic practice in ordinary circumstances, is the necessity for giving as well as taking. He who has nothing to offer will find little to receive. "International bargains and compensations," as I have already said, not only are not reprehensible, they are, or should be, normal. Our people, and in consequence, some of our diplomats, have been slow to realize the truth that rights imply duties, and that one must not expect, even at the expense of the foreigner, to obtain something for nothing. Our best statesmen, however, have descried in this unwillingness of ours to

make sacrifices and to assume obligations a fundamental defect of our diplomacy. "‘Give and take’—the axiom of diplomacy to the rest of the world—" wrote John Hay to a friend at the moment of the "Boxer" uprising, "is positively forbidden to us, by both the senate and public opinion. We must take what we can, and give nothing—which greatly narrows our possibilities."

Having grounded himself thoroughly in knowledge of the United States, the first care of an American diplomat, on proceeding to a new post, should be to analyze the country and the people, in accordance with some such formula as that given in the preceding chapter. He should find out what relation to the national life the people bear whom he meets socially, and should so round out his acquaintanceship that it becomes representative. He should then undertake a particular study of the various existing points of contact or conflict between the interests and policies of the United States, and the interests and policies of the foreign country; and as soon as he feels competent to do so, he should report his findings to the State Department, concluding with specific recommendations for diplomatic action, whenever and wherever such action seems desirable.

In preparing a recommendation, the first step is to ascertain clearly the specific interest and policy of the United States. The second, is to ascertain with equal clarity, and with sympathetic understanding, the viewpoint of the foreign government and people. This is important. There are some men so lacking in imagination, that to look, as it were, from the eyes of another, for a moment, instead of from their own eyes,

is for them virtually impossible. Such men should not enter diplomacy. The third, and most difficult step is to find, between the two conflicting viewpoints, a common ground which will satisfy, in the main, the aims of the United States, and will also accord a measure of satisfaction to the aims of the foreign country. The diplomat who exhibits proficiency in the devising of successful compromises is a man of worth beyond weighing—an emissary, not of prejudice and intolerance, but of understanding,—and an honor not alone to his fatherland, but to mankind, for he is a maker of peace. It will of course frequently happen, that with the best will and the utmost skill, the problem raised reveals no common ground whatever, and the two viewpoints remain unalterably opposed. In this case, the diplomat has to ask himself the question, whether time, in the matter, is seemingly working for or against the aims of the United States. If the former, he should recommend that the solution be deferred as long as possible; if the latter, the proper course is to press the issue to a crisis of some sort without more ado, on the assumption that a present solution, even if bad, will be better than any possible later solution.

Having subjoined to his report of fact these recommendations, the diplomat will have performed his entire duty, until such time as instructions may be sent him from Washington, indicating the sense in which it has been decided he shall act. With respect to instructions, a diplomat is like a soldier: his one thought must be to obey, even when the order runs counter to his own advice, and is apparently all-adapted to the achievement of the desired ends. In such a case, he must swallow his pride, bow to the exigencies of dis-

cipline, and continue in good part conscientiously to report and to recommend as his judgment impels; for in matters of foreign policy, although the importance of good diplomats is not easily exaggerated, the final decision rests, and must rest, with the President of the United States, acting through his principal secretary.

The President, under our Constitution, is empowered with full initiative to conduct our foreign affairs, subject only to four checks: first, his appointments to ministerial and ambassadorial posts must be ratified by the Senate; second, the treaties whose negotiation he has authorized must be ratified by the Senate; third, except in so far as funds have already been made available to him as executive, he must procure from the House the permission to make such disbursements as his policies require; and fourth, only Congress can declare war. Beyond these four checks, the President's powers, as regards foreign affairs, are practically unlimited. He may correspond with foreign governments in any way he sees fit, ask questions, give answers, advance or withdraw proposals, convene conferences, appoint agents and commissioners, engage negotiations of any character whatsoever. In all this, he is responsible only to the majority which elected him, and of which he, as well as the members of Congress, and perhaps to an extent even greater than they, is the direct representative. In practice, for the sake of harmony and good council, I should like to see the President advised, as to foreign policy, not only by the Secretary of State, on the one hand, and by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate, on the other, but also by a special Foreign Affairs Council, to consist of qualified high permanent officials of the De-

partments of State, the Army, the Navy, and of Commerce, and by a non-partisan, technical "public opinion bureau," whose function should be the incessant analysis, in a scientific manner, of the flux of American opinion, both regionally and by economic and political categories. However, having taken the best advice he can procure, it is the president who should decide, on a basis of what seem to be the best interest and the preponderant desire of the nation. In the event of disagreements between the President and the Senate, the President, from whom at all times leadership is to be expected, should appeal direct to the people, and should be guided, so far as is practicable, by the consequent popular reactions.

We are thus brought back, in the end, to the conclusion that, in our great and true democracy, it is the people themselves who are at last supreme, even in foreign affairs; and that, in consequence, the first necessity of our time is that they should awaken to this responsibility, and should make the most of it. To expect all citizens to inform themselves regarding the proper relation of the United States to the outside world is doubtless to be over-sanguine, although a course in international law, to be made compulsory in our secondary schools, would doubtless give interesting results. What is chiefly requisite is that, in every community, and in every social group, there shall emerge a few intelligent individuals who are naturally interested in the fascinating problems of foreign policy, who will devote a part of their leisure to the study of these problems, making them, as it were, their hobby; and through whose influence the issues will be classified, and opinion, in the larger sense, will be formed. Opin-

ion, even in its élite, cannot properly attempt to dictate the details of policy, for these depend upon changing circumstances, and must be entrusted to the experts, to diplomats, to the Department of State. Opinion can and should, however, generate the atmosphere, lay down the broad considerations, in and from which the more specific policies must be evolved, as: knowledge or ignorance, understanding or prejudice, confidence or suspicion, consideration or provocation, courtesy or insult, reason or passion, interest or ideology, compromise or intransigence, trade or stagnation, order or disorder, initiative or inaction, co-operation or isolation, peace or war.

Four years of observation and reflection have served only to confirm, in my own case, a conviction of the urgency of attempting something new, which was shared by almost everyone at the termination of war, but which has since been sadly undermined by suspicion, recrimination, the spirit of vengeance, and the desire to dominate. I believe that a convalescent civilization can ill support another shock within a generation or so of the last. The evidence tends all to indicate, moreover, that the next great war, if allowed to occur, will surpass even the former in the intensity of its destructive horror. Fortunately, a resumption of hostilities on any large scale seems now neither imminent nor possible; but it is our duty and our interest, in so far as may lie within our power, to ward away the danger, even from our children. Experience shows the error of allowing the scars to heal, the tired body to recuperate, while the old poison still runs strong in the veins. The danger is that the nations should continue to let the affairs of their world-community simply drift,

as heretofore; and that the lesson learned in such bitterness and suffering by the present generation should be allowed to die from mind unheeded, or not acted upon. If something new is to be attempted, the propitious time is in precisely such a period of disorder, uncertainty, and reconstruction as the present. I believe that people's minds are still open, and that it is not yet too late to set ourselves seriously to the task of world-organization, for the common peace and the common prosperity which everyone, at heart, desires. Indeed, I consider that perhaps never have the conditions been so generally propitious to such a noble undertaking as at present.

To imagine, however, that this world organization can be brought about without the participation of the United States, the strongest power both economically and politically, is vain. So long as the United States continues to sulk apart, nursing its suspicions and imaginary grievances, or quibbling over means, nothing durable will be accomplished. Not only is it our duty and our interest to participate, it is our duty and our interest, if but because of our pre-eminence, to take the initiative, to lead. If our minds are less littered with the shards of broken dreams, if our hearts are less envenomed by ancient hatreds, than those of our European kinsfolk, the more reason why they should look to us for fair and constructive proposals. There are problems bequeathed men by the War, whose solution is arduous, it is true; but if we wait until the slate is wiped clean, and no more problems remain, we shall wait forever. The time to act is now — at once. Enough of hesitations, scruples, delays! The opportunity is worthy of the best that is in us. Let us seize

it; and without undue self-righteousness, in calmness and in courtesy, neither meddling nor crusading, yet looking ever to that general good which is also our own best fortune, go forward to those high achievements among mankind to which the wisdom of our forefathers, and the very profusion of our own great gifts, have destined us.

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